Originally Posted by
TGS
I've been thinking about how to address some of the comments made thus far in the thread. Here's my thoughts, as someone that specializes in physical security and protecting targeted populations:
Protective Security Theory, Goals and Execution:
"Left of boom" and prevention is only one facet of security, and often times not the only goal (or I should say not a realistic goal). A core mission for protective security (i.e. securing people, not necessarily places/merchandise) is influencing actions for the better "right of boom".....as in, after something happens, make it suck less. Just because you cannot afford to turn every single school house out of 130,000 in the US into a fortress with impregnable security does not mean that security measures overall are a fruitless endeavor since they would still present vulnerabilities.
At the same time, you have to come to terms with the fact that bad things will still happen even if you spend a lot of money on security. Most people think spending a lot of money on security ala the most protected US government facilities will mean nothing bad happens, but that's just not realistic. Yes, we want to influence "left of boom" as much as we can, but as someone who works in this field I'm telling you straight up that it's completely fucking unrealistic to think you can eliminate it, and a significant majority of our techniques, tactics and procedures revolve around trying to regain control of the situation quicker than we'd otherwise be able to.
Hardening Schools:
Any significant hardening of schools isn't going to happen on a widespread basis without people who specialize in this having some sort of authoritative capacity over schools. My own agency had this problem for decades, and it literally took several very severe terrorist attacks for us to have a seat at the big boy's table where we could DICTATE security measures instead of simply recommend them through a chain of command that included people who have zero training, education or experience on mitigating threats or dealing with violence. No offense to the one-off teachers in this thread who are going above and beyond, but as long as the educational cadre is in charge of school security, nothing worthwhile will change. Someone mentioned that we don't need a new department of government to handle this, but what you will need are dictated security measures which the educational system has to abide by......not come up with themselves.
Kids will still get killed:
The phenomena of school shootings in the US does not revolve around the location. We call them school shootings, but don't let the name fool you: it's about the kids. You could turn every school into a fortress, and they will still be targeted at places where it's impossible to secure them as well.....popular field trip venues, sports events, parades, etc. So just realize that even if we changed course as a nation and spent untold billions on physical security measures for schools, that's not a solution to the root problem. That's a mitigation of a vulnerability, and will not address or eliminate the root problem. The root problem is not lack of security at schools.
Feasibility and the "but we do it at our other critical infrastructure buildings" fallacy:
The fact there are 130,000 schools in the nation and the daunting logistical nature of revamping their physical security is not a reason to ignore revamping physical security measures. It does however mean expectation management, as some of these measures are things that aren't realistic unless you do it from the ground up when the school is being built. I work for an agency that is responsible for securing high-profile USG installations, and many of our physical security measures are phased-in over a life cycle period of a building....i.e., we simply can't do certain things until it's time to construct a new building. So realize that even if we dictate much more stringent physical security measures on par with the most protected US government installations, it's not going to be complete for another 50+ years.
The reason I'm pointing this out is because the "but we do it at other government buildings" is not a great comparison. It is a fallacy, as even among the most protected US government installations where we have a uniformed code of security measures, those measures are not actually applied equally because it's impossible to do such unless the buildings were all built to the same standard......which they weren't. All of our buildings were built decades, even centuries apart, and thus each one will have vulnerabilities stemming from that until it's time to build a completely new structure. And, to harp on the fallacy part of that: no, we do not rebuild all USG installations overnight when a new important security measure comes out. That's simply not a realistic or even informed viewpoint on how we conduct physical security on critical infrastructure protection to then apply it to schools.