Heien v. State of North Carolina

[KeeFus]

I hope this helps.

Link to NCGS 20-129. http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislat...GS_20-129.html

The contested part of the statute is sub-section "g".

The "mistake of law" issue is due to "g", which only references one (1) stop lamp. Now look at subsection "d". It reads, in part "Rear Lamps. - Every motor vehicle, and every trailer or semitrailer attached to a motor vehicle and every vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, shall have all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order, which lamps shall exhibit a red light plainly visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of such vehicle..." In BLET (police academy) we are taught that ALL brake lamps should be in working order.

One subsection references "originally equipped rear lamps, while the other only references one (1). See the confusion? Legislators make it difficult sometimes. As was mentioned by someone else (Lon?), this stuff can get confusing to say the least. I'm glad because it has been a point of contention here since this case started. A LOT of cases have been dismissed because of this case.

[BWT]

Heien gave consent to the search.

I did not know this portion.

I feel better about the situation now.

[ssb]

Suppose an officer knocked on your door and wrote a summons for having a brass doorknob. In passing, he also asks if he can search your house. You say yes. Should the search be deemed unconstitutional?

The issue vis-à-vis the mistake of law was whether Heine could be stopped. Going all the way from a mistake of law in the initial stop to exclusion of the evidence from a voluntary consented search is a big, big step. I think a lot of people are reading the headline and thinking cops can search anyone anytime just by pretending they don't know 4th Amendment law. That's not anywhere close to what this case holds.

The fact that the consent was stupid -- as most are if they lead to a trial -- is completely immaterial. The Fourth Amendment doesn't protect you against your own stupidity.

I'm not disputing that consent searches can (and usually are) constitutional. I do not think, however, in this situation that Heien's consent to the search should have been the determining factor in whether the drugs were admitted against him.

I don't think your example is at all analogous to this situation. For starters, the officers in Heien seized the defendant and his car based on probable cause for a crime that didn't exist. They pulled him off the road under the mistaken belief that they were justified in doing so. Their mistake in law is what led to the encounter. You make no mention of a mistake in law. Your example seems tailored to question the consent search.

A more appropriate example:

A is walking through the airport with a locked container. B, a police officer, observes A as he declares a firearm with TSA/whoever you do that with. B, under the mistaken but good faith belief that it is unlawful for any person to possess a firearm in an airport (after all, there are signs all over the place that say "no guns"), detains A and takes him to a security room in the airport based on the reasonable suspicion that A is in possession of a firearm. B requests permission to inspect A's luggage, and A consents. B finds several ounces of cocaine. Should the results of that search be admissible?

Under Heien, that's now a good search. However, to understand my point that since the basis for the seizure was bad, the consent was invalidated, take a look at Florida v. Royer.

In Royer, the defendant bought a plane ticket under a different name and police were tipped off by the attendant that he was probably a drug smuggler. The officers confronted him, identified themselves, requested his ID and ticket, and stated that they suspected him of drug trafficking (his behavior apparently fit the pattern). He was asked to go to a security room with them while the officers had possession of his ID and ticket. He did so. Later, the police also went and got his luggage. He consented to a search of that luggage and drugs were found.

The officers turned a consensual encounter into a seizure by holding onto his ID and ticket and asking him to come with them (for a reasonable person wouldn't feel free to leave if the police are holding onto their ID and ticket). They did not, however, have cause to seize him on suspicion of drug trafficking at that time -- all they knew at the time of the seizure was that the name on his ticket didn't match the one on his ID. They also didn't have cause to seize his luggage. Even though he consented to the search, the Court held that it was not a good search because the basis of the initial seizure -- and thus, why he was in a position to consent to the search -- was bad. To my mind, that reasoning should have prevailed in Heien as well.

[ToddG]

I just skimmed Royer and don't see anything about a mistaken reading of a criminal statute by the detectives. In fact, a digital search for the word "mistake" anywhere in any of the opinions came up empty. The majority opinion does specifically say that the reason Royer's "consent" was inadequate was because he'd been held for a time and in a manner that exceeded what was reasonable under the objective circumstances.

It seems, then, that the question the Heien court needed to answer was whether it was reasonable for the officer to have made the mistake of law. They decided it was, and the post above by Keefus probably shows why. I think it's important to keep in mind that the Court did not say Heien was guilty of violating the law for which he was initially pulled over. Had that been the question -- can the defendant be convicted when the arresting officer arrested him for a crime he didn't actually commit -- I think it's clear the answer would have been NO. Instead, the Court followed the very established series of cases that decide exclusion based on a reasonable officer's behavior.

As I said a few posts ago, I think it's a mistake to believe this decision will go far beyond the very narrow fact pattern presented.

[John Hearne]

I still think this case has more to do with respecting all of the previous cases that have shaped the modern interpretation of the exclusionary rule. For a good while there has always been a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, see U.S. v Leon. The exclusionary rule seem intended to punish deliberate misconduct by law enforcement - the whole fruits of a poisonous tree, etc. If the misconduct isn't deliberate then excluding the evidence doesn't serve as a deterrent.

I really need to read the case and see if the standard POST teachings were discussed. If the officers had been taught that a vehicle had to have all of its brake lights by the academy, then there is very little "deliberate" about the misconduct. FWIW, most academies don't read the letter of the law to the students. The instructor generally tells the student what the law says. If the instructor tells you wrong, how are you supposed to know?

[ToddG]

JH -- Flipside, do private citizens get the same benefit?

If the law says just one taillight need be out to get a ticket but he thinks it's all his taillights need to be out so he knowingly drives around with one of the lights broken, can he avoid the fine by pleading that his driving instructor told him wrong?

[MDS]

JH -- Flipside, do private citizens get the same benefit?

If the law says just one taillight need be out to get a ticket but he thinks it's all his taillights need to be out so he knowingly drives around with one of the lights broken, can he avoid the fine by pleading that his driving instructor told him wrong?

Wait. This question implies that the opinion protects cops from breaking the law. Does an officer break the law when he pulls someone over inappropriately? Or is it more of an administrative error with possibly civil but no criminal consequences?

[ToddG]

Does an officer break the law when he pulls someone over inappropriately?

Depending on exactly what you mean by "inappropriately," yes. It's a violation of the driver's 4th Amendment rights.

[MDS]

Depending on exactly what you mean by "inappropriately," yes. It's a violation of the driver's 4th Amendment rights.

Well, if the standard is RAS, I think it's certainly reasonable and articulable if the cop says "broken tail light." Incorrect, because mistake-of-law, but not unreasonable...?

[Shellback]

I think it's important to keep in mind that the Court did not say Heien was guilty of violating the law for which he was initially pulled over...

Just for clarification, Nicholas Heien wasn't driving the vehicle at the time the vehicle was stopped, he was asleep in the back of the car, covered by a blanket. Maynor Javier Vasquez was actually driving the vehicle owned by Heien.