Originally Posted by
Dan Lehr
Trying to think about this from a fairly objective perspective:
First of all this statement points out the reason agencies might consider this device:
Because generally, when an officer arrives on the scene, they do not have these other less-lethal devices readily available as they may be in their patrol car or in the trunk of their patrol vehicle, and in some instances the officer would have to be in close proximity for the device to be effective which could potentially put the officer in danger. As an officer steps out of their vehicle, they already have THE ALTERNATIVE® attached to their duty belt. Within seconds, an officer can utilize THE ALTERNATIVE® without having to return to their patrol car or removing their eyes from the suspect.
This seems to make sense, except, many officers carry TASERS as a part of their duty gear. I'm sure their argument is that the Alternative extended stand-off capabilities as compared to the TASER:
10ft to 30ft but it has been tested at 30ft to 40ft with exceptionally accuracy.
The point that they seem to ignore is the way LE has traditionally, with good reason, approached LL projectile deployment. Most agencies don't allow the use of LL projectiles without other officers on the scene to provide lethal-cover. This device seems to be directed to lone officer use, especially with their caveat that lethal force is immediately available after the officer fires the Alternative.
That leads us to consider another problem, inadvertent doubles. Looking at this from a training perspective, my answer would be to include an empty, functional orange magazine nested in the device as it rests in the belt pouch. If the mag was nested in the device, it would have to be removed before the device could be docked with the pistol. So the training would be: drop duty mag, insert orange mag, dock device. If the orange mag is functional, it would lock the slide to the rear, eliminating the chance for a double, and allowing the officer to perform an out-of-battery reload. Removing the immediate follow-up lethal force potential, also puts the Alternative into the more traditional category of LL projectiles requiring lethal force cover.
Despite all that, there is a reason that agencies either went away from, or never adopted, the verified transition system for the 12 gauge LL shotgun - the potential for mistakes/shortcuts.
From my viewpoint, another problem is the fact that I couldn't find data on weigth, or diameter. Admittedly, I gave the site a quick once-over, so I may have missed them. They do say that: Depending on the type of ammunition used, the projectile still travels at approximately 250 - 300 feet per second. This is within the velocity envelop of the original bean bag at 300 fps, and the sock rounds at 280 fps.
The problem is that one has enough data on the beanbag and sock rounds to figure their KE, which is 120 and 112 foot pounds respectively. Additionally their statement that: Being impacted by THE ALTERNATIVE® is comparable to getting hit in the chest with a 170 MPH fastball is problematic when one considers this: After William Ryan Wojick’s death in 1990, Little League was given a copy of a federal study from 1986 which “documented nearly two dozen cases in which children died after being hit in the chest by baseballs,” Last time I looked, little leaguers aren't throwing baseballs at 170.
So, a lot of legit problems with this device.