Looking for data-scan and assess-ambushes

[Dov]

For some research/training that I am doing, I have a question for anyone with knowledge. Is anyone aware of any situation in which an officer has been "ambushed" after holstering a drawn gun, in the sense of what is something we supposedly seek to guard against by "scan and assess?" If yes, any details would be appreciated and if necessary, I can provide my LE email address for the information.

Note: I am familiar with the risk of ambushes, and the topics of ambushes and scan and assess in general and am not really wanting to get into theories and beliefs; I am only researching this one narrow issue, and looking for actual events to confirm or contradict my research so far, in which I can find no instance of such a thing. Than k you to any/all who may be able to help.

In a separate thread I am happy to discuss my opinion on the topic, if that is interesting to anyone.

Tom Givens @Mas & Chuck Haggard probably have some useful data or input (I can't seem to remember how to @ users with two part forum names)

Mas used to include some handouts from NYPD officer survival training (don't recall what it was called exactly but thats what it was) in his classes IDK if he still does. But they are big department with lots of data, and Mas spent some time learning from them.

I do know that Mas and others involved with officer survival emphasized used of cover and distance and not being in rush to get close violent armed felons.

I have seen few documented cases, though I don't think i recorded sources, where bad guys had a backup shooter that wasn't part of visible attack group, but when they shot officer or armed civilian it was near immediately when good guy revealed themselves long before the pause assess would be happening IMHO.

My personal take of this was that tactics and good utilization of what Keith Jones calls DCT (Distance Cover Time) were the critical aspects.

Good Tactics in general should be keeping you safeish from hidden attacker in these situations, I don't think they are going to wait around after the shooting starts. Far more likely IMVHO that they will ether engage or flee.

My recollection of talking and reading Keith's stuff is he and his department spent time looking at not just situations where cops died, but where they prevailed.

And his department had exceptionally good track record for some time with shootings, to the point that officer survival people from across the country where asking what they were doing.

Here is copy past of my notes from talking to Keith on old forum that's no longer around:

Keith: Was there ever any additional lessons gleaned from your departments success rate back when they changed to 357/125 JHP & monthly qualifier/practice, other than good load & monthly structured training?

That's about it, except that the structured training frequently involved mock-ups that attempted to duplicate the dynamics of past gunfights where officers had lost (and won) the confrontation. We did role plays, too, that stressed staying within a step or so of cover, recognizing and maintaining the right sort of reactionary gap, and the importance of getting the weapon un-holstered when things first started to look hinky.

Let me repeat that we tried hard to build an awareness in everyone of the distances involved in gunfights where, again, officers had "lost"...versus the ones where they'd "won". Bear in mind that many, many people back then (and now) were basing their survival training on the FBI's annual "LEOKA" report ("Law Enforcement officers Killed and Assaulted").

Trouble is, LEOKA chronicled only incidents where officers had lost the fight. This resulted in trainers saying, "Okay...the LEOKA report shows that almost all police-action gunfights occur at '7 yards or less', so we need to concentrate our training within those parameters since that's the reality of the street". We believed that basing your survival shooting techniques only on dynamics where officers had been killed was sort of like pre-programming your people to fail.

So we started studying gunfights where officers had prevailed, ours and those from any other agency who'd talk to us. If we gleaned anything, Dov, it was that when officers opened their contact distances...even just a few yards...it made it really harder for the bad guys to hit them, or it sure looked that way.

On the firing range we stressed controlling contact distances whenever possible, and demonstrated how "getting in the hole" with a dangerous suspect was tantamount to climbing into a coffin with him. Finally, we drilled the guys (and gals) on getting fast, decently-centered hits from 10 to 15 yards, instead of just at 3 to 7 yards. We drilled on that a lot, straight through 'boring'...and right on into 'monotonous'.

The "survivor's triad" is "Distance, Cover and Time", and the guys who think ahead and try to control it tend to be the ones who avoid that wheelchair and colostomy bag, or worse.

[jd950]

I agree there is no good repository of such information, and doubt there could be, given the number of agencies and cops in the USA. But I do know there are a number of active and retired LEOs around here, including some investigators and instructors, and I wanted to at least check. I have already made other inquiries and conducted as much research as I could, with no results. I kind of hoped that by limiting the request to data (although doubting there would be any), I could keep the thread drift and broader discussions reduced, at least until anyone with such data had an opportunity to respond.

But, yeah, I think for the most part, the scan before holstering stuff is BS. There are a number of reasons for my opinion but a post explaining them properly would be very long. In short, from a cognitive standpoint, and knowing what we do about the psychological and neuro changes that occur in a high stress situation, it isn't going to happen or if it does, it will be useless.

Additionally, from a practical perspective, we don't holster when the threat goes down. If in a shooting, one's attention is going to be on the threat until the officer is confident it is no longer a threat. No officer is going to have a down but unsecured threat in front of him and start looking around and scanning the onlookers. Plus, if the training actually takes hold and is applied in a real situation, whether we mean to or not, we are "teaching" cops to holster right after shooting, while in other aspects of training, we are training them not automatically holster after firing. That inconsistency and unintended training isn't just BS, that is crazy BS.

Plus, what is an officer to do if he scans and sees someone who looks hostile or whose hands are not visible, or whatever? Start ordering them to show hands, approach them, cuff them, hold them at gunpoint, take cover from that threat and ignore the guy who he just shot? In most OIS cases I have handled, there are plenty of onlookers around, or who show up, and some are unfriendly. Handling such a thing is not a an automatic process, it requires some strategic thought. Or are we only interested in looking for and identifying someone who is pointing a gun at you and for some reason not yet shooting? Has that ever occurred? Is it likely to? I have to teach this scan thing sometimes, but not by choice. It is nothing more than a dance step, IMO, and I am not willingly a dance instructor. Even when this is taught by people who believe in it, it is taught as an automatic, rote behavior, and is learned and applied that way. Pointless.

I spend a lot of time working with and studying and thinking about the human factors aspects of police shootings; the psychological, biological, neuro aspects of these things. I don't believe adding crap like having instructors hold up fingers or signs to make officers "see" those things makes any difference "on the street" and cannot think of a valid scientific theory that would support otherwise. I would be willing to bet that no expert in the field would disagree with me. We aren't really teaching people to do anything but go through the steps, and we can't do more than that without a massive amount of time, effort and money.

In none of the OIS cases that I have handled, or have ever heard about, has there been an officer ambushed from someplace off to the side or behind during an OIS. My suspicion is that if such a threat was in the area, he or she is not going to stand by and wait for the officer to reholster, that person would already be shooting, running away, or whatever. Sure, a terrorist attack or organized assassination of a cop might be different, but scan and assess is not going to help in such a situation. Granted, I do not disagree that in the event of a "situation," it would be a good idea, if practical, for an officer to check for suspects, threats, victims, evidence, witnesses, etc. And I do see that happen, but usually only after the threat is secure and ems and backup is on the way and the situation is at least semi-stable. But that is a different thing, and scan & assess before holstering has no impact on that. In fact, often we want to get the gun out of the officer's hand and into a holster as soon as possible post shoot. Muzzle awareness and trigger finger discipline is often not great when you have just fought for your life or that of a victim.

With all of that said, I accept that maybe this silliness began as a response to a legit issue, and not just some tacticool wet dream, and I have been making efforts to see if that is the case. Facts matter. If they exist. And I am always willing to change my mind in the face of meaningful evidence or argument, which is why I started this topic. If you think scan & assess is a good thing, and practice it, then that is great and support your desire to do what you think works for you or if you think it is great and teach it, then I disagree but support your desire to teach what you think is important and if you want to tell me your rationale, I will listen and consider your position.

So after stepping into this steaming pile, maybe I should talk about "getting off the X?"

[HCM]

I agree there is no good repository of such information, and doubt there could be, given the number of agencies and cops in the USA. But I do know there are a number of active and retired LEOs around here, including some investigators and instructors, and I wanted to at least check. I have already made other inquiries and conducted as much research as I could, with no results. I kind of hoped that by limiting the request to data (although doubting there would be any), I could keep the thread drift and broader discussions reduced, at least until anyone with such data had an opportunity to respond.

But, yeah, I think for the most part, the scan before holstering stuff is BS. There are a number of reasons for my opinion but a post explaining them properly would be very long. In short, from a cognitive standpoint, and knowing what we do about the psychological and neuro changes that occur in a high stress situation, it isn't going to happen or if it does, it will be useless.

Additionally, from a practical perspective, we don't holster when the threat goes down. If in a shooting, one's attention is going to be on the threat until the officer is confident it is no longer a threat. No officer is going to have a down but unsecured threat in front of him and start looking around and scanning the onlookers. Plus, if the training actually takes hold and is applied in a real situation, whether we mean to or not, we are "teaching" cops to holster right after shooting, while in other aspects of training, we are training them not automatically holster after firing. That inconsistency and unintended training isn't just BS, that is crazy BS.

Plus, what is an officer to do if he scans and sees someone who looks hostile or whose hands are not visible, or whatever? Start ordering them to show hands, approach them, cuff them, hold them at gunpoint, take cover from that threat and ignore the guy who he just shot? In most OIS cases I have handled, there are plenty of onlookers around, or who show up, and some are unfriendly. Handling such a thing is not a an automatic process, it requires some strategic thought. Or are we only interested in looking for and identifying someone who is pointing a gun at you and for some reason not yet shooting? Has that ever occurred? Is it likely to? I have to teach this scan thing sometimes, but not by choice. It is nothing more than a dance step, IMO, and I am not willingly a dance instructor. Even when this is taught by people who believe in it, it is taught as an automatic, rote behavior, and is learned and applied that way. Pointless.

I spend a lot of time working with and studying and thinking about the human factors aspects of police shootings; the psychological, biological, neuro aspects of these things. I don't believe adding crap like having instructors hold up fingers or signs to make officers "see" those things makes any difference "on the street" and cannot think of a valid scientific theory that would support otherwise. I would be willing to bet that no expert in the field would disagree with me. We aren't really teaching people to do anything but go through the steps, and we can't do more than that without a massive amount of time, effort and money.

In none of the OIS cases that I have handled, or have ever heard about, has there been an officer ambushed from someplace off to the side or behind during an OIS. My suspicion is that if such a threat was in the area, he or she is not going to stand by and wait for the officer to reholster, that person would already be shooting, running away, or whatever. Sure, a terrorist attack or organized assassination of a cop might be different, but scan and assess is not going to help in such a situation. Granted, I do not disagree that in the event of a "situation," it would be a good idea, if practical, for an officer to check for suspects, threats, victims, evidence, witnesses, etc. And I do see that happen, but usually only after the threat is secure and ems and backup is on the way and the situation is at least semi-stable. But that is a different thing, and scan & assess before holstering has no impact on that. In fact, often we want to get the gun out of the officer's hand and into a holster as soon as possible post shoot. Muzzle awareness and trigger finger discipline is often not great when you have just fought for your life or that of a victim.

With all of that said, I accept that maybe this silliness began as a response to a legit issue, and not just some tacticool wet dream, and I have been making efforts to see if that is the case. Facts matter. If they exist. And I am always willing to change my mind in the face of meaningful evidence or argument, which is why I started this topic. If you think scan & assess is a good thing, and practice it, then that is great and support your desire to do what you think works for you or if you think it is great and teach it, then I disagree but support your desire to teach what you think is important and if you want to tell me your rationale, I will listen and consider your position.

So after stepping into this steaming pile, maybe I should talk about "getting off the X?"

I think the whole “scan” thing was originally intended just to break task focus and look around at what is going on around you. That could be anything from witnesses, oncoming, traffic, uniform officers rolling while you’re in plain clothes, a victim / bystander in need of aid. The idea that it’s primarily or exclusively for “ambushes” is part of the reason it’s devolved into range theatrics.

Personally, I’ve kind of shifted to telling people to breathe. I’ve seen people in stressful situations lock up for a minute or two and literally be holding their breath. Not everyone does this but it is also a good way to break task focus and I think a belly breath or two also gives a good pause to enable more deliberate re-holstering.

I think they getting off the X thing is also well intentioned but it’s context dependent and square range limitations turn that into taking a single step as opposed to something which can be more effective

[Utm]

I will also add that I think head checks are a good thing when going from kneeling to standing, I view them separate from scanning

[Dov]

I will also add that I think head checks are a good thing when going from kneeling to standing, I view them separate from scanning

I'm not familiar with that phrase "head check", can you give definition please?

[AMC]

I will also add that I think head checks are a good thing when going from kneeling to standing, I view them separate from scanning

We taught to check behind you any time to raised yourself up from a lower position, if you were involved in a 'guns out' situation. Prone to kneeling, or kneeling to standing. That was about avoiding blue on blue though, as I think you're alluding to.

[SoCalDep]

Too late to search for the body cam and while not an ambush per se, it was certainly someone running up on a cop immediately following a shooting and needing an immediate assessment.

Add to that at least one off duty So Cal shooting where an off duty engaged a bad guy and was taken out by a secondary bad guy.

Then sprinkle in the many cops on and off duty who were shot by fellow cops because they didn’t react to the “drop the gun” and I’d say getting out of the focus on the immediate threat when it isn’t an immediate threat and start thinking about things like other bad guys, other people involved, and getting shot by your own partners or responding cops should probably be within the paradigm of cops and those carrying a gun.

[Utm]

We taught to check behind you any time to raised yourself up from a lower position, if you were involved in a 'guns out' situation. Prone to kneeling, or kneeling to standing. That was about avoiding blue on blue though, as I think you're alluding to.

That is correct

[Dov]

From BehindBlueI's excellent thread https://pistol-forum.com/showthread....ter-Gun-Fights, here is someone who has documentation of what I was talking about in earlier post where badguy not part of the overt crew "on overwatch" as BBI's puts it. But if they engage they act while good guy is dealing on rest of badguys.

I only quoted relevant part of linked post but whole thread linked is well worth reading.

On very rare occasion a crew was professional enough to have an overwatch who shot the defender from ambush while he was engaging the bad guys he saw, but this was always occupational violence (targeting delivery men, armored car guards, etc) and not random in the same sense a street robbery or stranger rape attempt is.

[BehindBlueI's]

I have not seen and am not aware of an ambush of the sort being described. I am aware of ambushes, of course, but not one after a brief lull and a officer who holstered up. I can ask around and go through our archives as I have time, we have records going back to pre-1900s except for a block of years that were destroyed in a water intrusion incident in a store room. I know up front no fatalities resulted, as those are kept in every roll call and the circumstances are read out on the anniversary of the event. Doesn't matter if you were shot, hit by a drunk driver, or electrocuted by a faulty call box, it's in the book.

I think the whole “scan” thing was originally intended just to break task focus and look around at what is going on around you. That could be anything from witnesses, oncoming, traffic, uniform officers rolling while you’re in plain clothes, a victim / bystander in need of aid. The idea that it’s primarily or exclusively for “ambushes” is part of the reason it’s devolved into range theatrics.

This.