Active Shooter Uvalde TX Elementary School

[ccmdfd]

From a facilities design standpoint:

So do you look at this instance and say, man we need to really up our game in terms of making our schools more like a fortress?

If only one of those two door locks had worked the way it was supposed to have, then either he would have been outside the school building or just trapped in the Halls. He probably could have still done some damage by shooting through the windows, but he would have been an open Target as soon as law enforcement showed up on the scene.

Or, do you look at this and say the more of a fortress that we make, if a guy does make it into the classroom, then it's much more difficult for our law enforcement men and women to make entry and take care of the situation?

[Hambo]

That’s been happening for decades already. Most ALERRT classes are taught in schools. The first time I took the class was in a school with the school police whose chief made them take it every year.

Of course, but I'm not talking about ALERRT training.

[TGS]

From a facilities design standpoint:

So do you look at this instance and say, man we need to really up our game in terms of making our schools more like a fortress?

If only one of those two door locks had worked the way it was supposed to have, then either he would have been outside the school building or just trapped in the Halls. He probably could have still done some damage by shooting through the windows, but he would have been an open Target as soon as law enforcement showed up on the scene.

Or, do you look at this and say the more of a fortress that we make, if a guy does make it into the classroom, then it's much more difficult for our law enforcement men and women to make entry and take care of the situation?

This is a problem, from my perspective....especially considering many active shooters are insider threats. A design hardening entry to this degree should require a hardened control center with a person staffing it whose job it is to stay in that room for the purpose of coordination and access control. Given the proclivities and typical historical actions of active shooters where forced entry with tools is exceptionally rare, steel doors are counterproductive in this design.

Most people working as "school security experts" in this field that are advising schools what to do have no clue what they're doing. You get results like this.

[ccmdfd]

This is a problem, from my perspective....especially considering many active shooters are insider threats. A design hardening entry to this degree should require a hardened control center with a person staffing it whose job it is to stay in that room for the purpose of coordination and access control. Given the proclivities and typical historical actions of active shooters where forced entry with tools is exceptionally rare, steel doors are counterproductive in this design.

Most people working as "school security experts" in this field that are advising schools what to do have no clue what they're doing. You get results like this.

Thanks

Kind of reminds me of a documentary I was watching one day on a Greek commercial aircraft that lost cabin pressure. Both Pilots didn't realize what was going on and therefore they became incapacitated. One of the cabin crew however had his wits with him and got himself some oxygen bottles and was able to stay alert and active. Unfortunately this was post 9/11 and therefore the flight deck door was reinforced. By the time that cabin crew person was able to get it open the plane had run out of fuel and down it went.

[Glenn E. Meyer]

When they did our building, they built all classrooms with glass walls so you could see the students and faculty working! So much for hide! This led to folks standing outside and making faces. I asked the building manager what it would take bring down one of the glass walls (he was a real SEAL who went into academics). Four well placed shots - so that's it for locking the doors or just shooting through the glass. Our offices were the same. Glass walls to prevent you from taking a nap, looking at porn or doing the nasty with someone in the office. We covered them with posters and artistic blankets.

They did put mechanical locks on the doors so you could keep them from opening. There was a gadget the campus cops had that could open the lock and they all carried it. However, with a glass door, that's a moot point.

No thought of security. As I've said repeatedly, the major lecture halls were death traps if a shooter got in. For most you would have had to get past the shooter to get out. Good luck on the 4th floor windows. They were sealed anyway. One room had two entrances on each side of the front of the room. For some reason, the door were designed with an outer door and a little alcove and then an inner door. All these doors were heavy wood. They weren't locked during class time. So if a bad person entered and you tried for the doors, there would be a tremendous pile up to get through the double door / alcove. It happened at change of classes normally.

I, as said, ditched that room even though it had all the great AV bells and whistles, had a great light view of the surroundings, for one that had back doors and front doors.

[Casual Friday]

From a facilities design standpoint:

So do you look at this instance and say, man we need to really up our game in terms of making our schools more like a fortress?

If only one of those two door locks had worked the way it was supposed to have, then either he would have been outside the school building or just trapped in the Halls. He probably could have still done some damage by shooting through the windows, but he would have been an open Target as soon as law enforcement showed up on the scene.

Or, do you look at this and say the more of a fortress that we make, if a guy does make it into the classroom, then it's much more difficult for our law enforcement men and women to make entry and take care of the situation?

Getting teachers and staff to take safety procedures seriously more than a week after every school shooting would be a start. A few weeks after Uvalde my daughter forgot her chromebook at home and needed me to drop it off. The front of the school was locked down tight, had to show ID to the camera and be buzzed in. As I left I drove around the back of the school and the band door and cafeteria doors were propped wide open.

An important tidbit of info is that back in early spring pre Uvalde, the local PD were alerted to a man walking down the alley with a long gun in the direction of the high school and two elementary schools, guess where that alley dumps out. Yep, it goes right past both elementary schools and ends looking smack dab at those doors that had been left open. The schools were locked down for more than an hour while the guy was taken into custody. He was a known drug addict who'd stolen the shotgun and they were never able to discern whether or not he was heading to one of the schools or just fleeing the home he burglarized.

People have short memories but none are shorter than those with a "it can't happen here" mentality.

[TheRoland]

Getting teachers and staff to take safety procedures seriously more than a week after every school shooting would be a start. A few weeks after Uvalde my daughter forgot her chromebook at home and needed me to drop it off. The front of the school was locked down tight, had to show ID to the camera and be buzzed in. As I left I drove around the back of the school and the band door and cafeteria doors were propped wide open.

I'm really skeptical that this is a fruitful path. People who want to diligently guard the walls of fortresses do not become teachers.

Not that we shouldn't try, but at some point expectations need to be realistic.

[LukeNCMX]

Prior to Uvalde if you and your folks arrived on scene 40 minutes or so after an event and half a dozen agencies are there already, you’re not going to stroll past all of them to the door in question just to make sure it’s not unlocked. That’s pure fantasy to make yourself feel better.

Sure I am. If I am there to take over as the entry team then me and my dudes are going to move to the door, someone on entry is going to check the knob to see if it is locked. If it is unlocked we go in. If it is locked we are going to call up a breacher and the breacher is going to attempt a manual breach or a shotgun breach, if that doesn't work and there is not an alternate breach point then we are going to take the time to setup an explosive breach. This is not that complicated and my situation and training is neither unique nor exceptional.

Remember it was unthinkable to people arriving that LEO’s would be standing around doing nothing while kids are being shot and bleeding out in a room down the hall.

I disagree. Cops are human and make errors and are on a wide spectrum of training and experience and sometimes make bad calls or get sucked into group think.

Yes. Lots of agencies, mine included, teach checking the door prior to a mechanical breach But that’s when you’re in place and ready to enter.

Yes. Was there not a group of cops ready to enter??

But I take strong issue with your comment that BORTAC “blindly” accepted that intel and should’ve checked the door themselves upon arrival.

I hope I am wrong and more comes out to explain why things went down the way they did. Verifying the lock should not be part of the lessons learned since we already train that way.

[runcible]

Thanks

Kind of reminds me of a documentary I was watching one day on a Greek commercial aircraft that lost cabin pressure. Both Pilots didn't realize what was going on and therefore they became incapacitated. One of the cabin crew however had his wits with him and got himself some oxygen bottles and was able to stay alert and active. Unfortunately this was post 9/11 and therefore the flight deck door was reinforced. By the time that cabin crew person was able to get it open the plane had run out of fuel and down it went.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Airways_Flight_522

[Casual Friday]

I'm really skeptical that this is a fruitful path. People who want to diligently guard the walls of fortresses do not become teachers.

Not that we shouldn't try, but at some point expectations need to be realistic.

My post had nothing to do with arming teachers.