Active Shooter Uvalde TX Elementary School

[scjbash]

As noted in the ALERRT report the exterior windows could have been used in a variety of ways as a distraction in support of an entry but entering via the windows was not feasible.

Note the metal cross framing on the window.

I can't come up with a good reason to not break the glass and try to tear down or move whatever covering was hanging in front of those windows. Even without being able to make entry though them it opens up the possibility of getting a shot on the fucker from outside.

[camel]

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Much more....[/QUOTE]

This simple statement highlights my frustration with how things played out. Nobody continued to work the problem.
It seems like once bortac showed up they were waiting for them to get them in. When in reality there were multiple options to solve the problem. Hindsight being 20/20 and all.

[fixer]

In addition to the video you referenced re the suspect and officers interaction / non interaction with the door, there was a prior, unfulfilled maintenance request for the door lock for that particular Classroom. However all this only came to light after the fact.

Like the exterior door the shooter used to enter the building the classroom door was supposed to lock automatically.

As @El Cid noted, the adhoc DHS team which did make entry was prepping charges for an explosive breach. The XP breach was abandoned when the classroom key was obtained from the school janitor. All of which indicates that even the guys who made entry and killed the shooter were operating on the assumption/ Intel that the door was locked.

As Clausewitz said:

And none of that changes the fact nor does it color it any different than what it is: with that many men there no one engaged their pre frontal cortex despite very reasonable clues that the door should have been tried a bit more vigorously, to put it mildly.

Which also underlines what LittleLebowski is saying.

I’ll also add that fog of war looks more like an attempt at glossing over a lot of failure here.

[HCM]

And none of that changes the fact nor does it color it any different than what it is: with that many men there no one engaged their pre frontal cortex despite very reasonable clues that the door should have been tried a bit more vigorously, to put it mildly.

Which also underlines what LittleLebowski is saying.

I’ll also add that fog of war looks more like an attempt at glossing over a lot of failure here.

The many failures and bad info are not exclusive of each other. It's a real thing in critical incidents whether you want to acknowledge it or not.

I'm referring to the guys who actually went in and get it done despite bad info. Or now you criticizing them too ? Took 15 rounds and killed the shooter not good enough for you ?

[HCM]

I can't come up with a good reason to not break the glass and try to tear down or move whatever covering was hanging in front of those windows. Even without being able to make entry though them it opens up the possibility of getting a shot on the fucker from outside.

Maybe. Or the shooter can move out of the arc of fire possible from the window while it's being breached. But not addressing the window in some fashion, was one of the critiques in the ALERRT report. When to do it is the question.

I wonder how much entry being self initiated impacted the ability to coordinate a secondary action at the window?

[Redhat]

Maybe. Or the shooter can move out of the arc of fire possible from the window while it's being breached. But not addressing the window in some fashion, was one of the critiques in the ALERRT report. When to do it is the question.

I wonder how much entry being self initiated impacted the ability to coordinate a secondary action at the window?

I'd be interested to know what happened that possibly stood in their way as it seems they certainly had time to coordinate.

[HCM]

I'd be interested to know what happened that possibly stood in their way as it seems they certainly had time to coordinate.

Two thoughts.

This was an adhoc group of random guys from different agencies not a homogeneous team.

They were acting contrary to the incident commands orders on their own initiative. If they telegraph their intentions too much do they have to deal with someone trying to stop them ?

There’s an an argument for K.I.S.S when making things up on the fly, especially with a random group that hasn’t worked together.

[Redhat]

Two thoughts.

This was an adhoc group of random guys from different agencies not a homogeneous team.

They were acting contrary to the incident commands orders on their own initiative. If they telegraph their intentions too much do they have to deal with someone trying to stop them ?

There’s an an argument for K.I.S.S when making things up on the fly, especially with a random group that hasn’t worked together.

Any blow-back for their actions since then?

[fixer]

The many failures and bad info are not exclusive of each other. It's a real thing in critical incidents whether you want to acknowledge it or not.

I'm referring to the guys who actually went in and get it done despite bad info. Or now you criticizing them too ? Took 15 rounds and killed the shooter not good enough for you ?

One error does not preclude other errors. In fact they magnify each other and propagate.

I’m implying the exact opposite of “exclusion”. I acknowledge this fairly well despite your accusation ( which is awkwardly written and a bit confusing in and of itself).

There is no possible way to reasonably critique the guys who got it done.

[HCM]

Any blow-back for their actions since then?

No. “success has a thousand fathers.”