NATO Standardizes FN's 5.7x28mm Caliber

[spyderco monkey]

Solution in search of a problem. Both the PDW caliber wars and the Milkor.

Its actually the solution to the one of the most enduring and bedeviling problems in infantry combat thats been worked on continuously since the Korean war.

Namely, the extremely low hit probability of rifleman in combat.

This began with project SALVO and NIBLICK and continues to the present day with the NGSW program.

The ACR rifle trials, with its use of computerized range of pop up and moving targets, provides the best data we have on the problem.

https://www.docdroid.net/ffL1XVy/s00440-pdf





The results were that burst firing rifles were no more effective (and often less effective) then the M16 with irons. And the M16 with a 4x ACOG was only marginally better then the M16 with irons. And even at this ideal configuration, hit probability against realistic targets was exceedingly poor once range increased (to say nothing of the deleterious effects of incoming enemy fire on marksmanship.)





By 300m, Hit Probability has dropped to 0.3, and by 600m, it has dropped to 0.1. And this is against a full size torso target without anyone being shot at. One can extrapolate from there what the hit probability is against an enemy popping their head and rifle over a concrete wall is at 300-600m...



The direct result of the ACR trials was the realization that hit probability could only be improved measurably by the use of explosive weapons, whose 5m fragmentation patterns would ameliorate aiming errors, while the ability to airburst over a target would eliminate the ability for an enemy to hide effectively behind most forms of cover.

This gave rise to the OICW and then XM25 programs. The XM25 ended up solving the hit probability issue through use of fire control unit and airbursting. A 40x51 would have the same effect but better, as the 240-250g shell has 2x the payload and blast of the 25mm, and is available off the shelf.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM25_C...to_Afghanistan





So that solves the problem of hit probability the US has been working on since 1950.

But then we're left with the other problem - weight and self defense. If you issue a XM25 or Milkor 'XM40' to a man, and also issue them a rifle, then they're carrying 50+ lbs of weapons and bulk. But if you only issue them a pistol, they have almost no ability to protect themselves, or engage in room clearing operations in urban combat.

The PDW solves this issue. Its light and compact enough that the soldier with the HE Chucker can still maneuver, yet provides enough range to defend themselves out to 100m, and offers enough firepower that they can engage in room clearing urban operations with their fellows.

In short, the PDW is the lynchpin for providing more HE at the squad level, which in turn is the key to solving the hit probability problem and dramatically increasing the lethality of the infantry squad.

[JRB]

All of that analysis makes some bold assumptions:

It assumes:
-The military's weapons quals are an accurate representation of combat effectiveness in the modern OE. I can say in particular that the US Army's qual that prevailed through all of these tests was relatively poor in the 1970's and was even worse in the modern day. The shiny-brand-new Army IWQ is a good step in the right direction but does not solve this issue and the entire argument you're making is predicated on solving marksmanship problems by blowing more shit up instead of putting more emphasis in training and more improvements in COTS options to increase marksmanship and mechanical accuracy of existing weapons like M4's and M16's.

-The US Army's continuing cultural shifts haven't played a massive role in the reduction of marksmanship skill. Marksmanship isn't even considered in any promotion above E6 and senior leaders are often derisive of Soldiers that are passionate about weapons skills and knowledge. When senior leaders don't prioritize marksmanship skill via institutional standards and routinely loathe it within their own commands, of course there are going to be training limitations and reduced overall skill Army wide with those weapons.

-That a 'hit' is the same as an effective hit. PDW calibers have notoriously poor performance that is far inferior to M855/SS109 5.56 which was subject to quite a few reviews/studies/etc for poor terminal performance in combat. A hit doesn't mean a damn thing if it doesn't take the fight out of the enemy. Furthermore, expecting a 140 round combat load of a less effective weapon with shorter range to somehow fill the gap for a 210 round load with a more suitable rifle is ill-advised, to put it gently.
Let's also not ignore the push for 6.5mm weapons to simplify logistics between 7.62 and 5.56 as well as increase terminal effectiveness for basic rifleman duties, which strongly indicates a third less-effective caliber is massive a step backwards both operationally and logistically.

-That the prevailing OE these days isn't rife with concerns of collateral damage that have limited if not totally prevented the use of .50 cal and HE ammo in many engagements. In that scenario you just replaced a rifleman that can also rapidly switch to LL or smoke rounds in a lightweight launcher to toting a far less effective PDW and a shitload of extra weight. Trading to an even less effective firearm than a 5.56 rifle and carrying even less ammo and having a new ammo/magazine etc to logistically support with gear and training and all those other logistics is just a bunch of steps in the wrong direction for the sake of a heavy, expensive, logistically problematic, and relatively unreliable system (that's already being replaced in the USMC, much as how the Army dropped the XM25's) that can't be effectively used in a lot of modern types of engagements.


There's an argument tactically/operationally for PDW's to replace 9mm pistols and M4's among support dweebs. There's a LOT of logistical arguments against doing that. In my 12 years of doing miscellaneous support dweeb shit, a 10.3in or 11.5in Colt with a LAW folder would work perfectly for support dweeb purposes and I can't think of a single time when I'd have rather had a PDW of some kind.
Ultimately a PDW offers no value that isn't completely offset by the training and logistical challenges against said Colt 933 solution, unless said PDW can fit and work where an 11.5in/LAW folding Colt AR wouldn't fit, (combat air crews, armor crews, etc) at which point the argument is really PDW vs pistol, not short AR vs PDW, and has nothing to do with very cool but expensive and heavy weapons to blow lots of shit up.

All in all, I'm sold that you're sold, but I'm not buying. Sadly there's a lot of non-shooting gun-idiot Colonels out there that would love your presentation on the topic, which is a large part of why hit probability and marksmanship is a DoD wide problem in the first place.

[TGS]

I agree with most of what you wrote, @JRB.

Just to be clear about the situation though, the NATO PDW concept was never meant to compete in roles against 5.56 carbines. It was purposed to replace much smaller SMGs, such as the Sterling, MP5, Uzi, M3, etc. Just to simplify things for illustrative purposes...let's say we armed an entire army with HK weapons designed to the NATO concept ground force when this was spurred: riflemen would be armed with the HK G11, support troops with the HK G41, and troops whose roles would otherwise necessitate an SMG due to size/encumbrance restraints (armor and air crew, anti-tank missile/MANPADs teams, etc) would be armed with an MP7. Those who absolutely couldn't carry a shoulder weapon would be armed with the HK UCP.

In such a case, it makes sense, and was never purposed for jobs like yours. Regardless of the killin' ability of a 5.7 vs a 5.56, the 5.7 has way more killin' potential than a 9mm SMG on a conventional battlefield with a proliferation of body armor.....the 9mm SMG is almost a non-starter, in comparison.

So, comparing a P90 or MP7 against a Colt 733 is sort of apples to oranges. It should be P90/MP7 vs SMG. I do agree with everything else that you wrote, however, and that integrating them in as a squad-organic weapon expected to do fighting with would just complicate shit. In their designed role, the impact on logistics would be negligible since they're a "if in danger, break glass" type weapon, not something that would account for any regular or significant expenditure of ammunition.

[Coyotesfan97]

This is from the LE perspective from a former chemical agent instructor and SAGE instructor. Id rather have a single shot 37mm or 40mm launcher vs a six shot revolving drum launcher of any type.

I’ve never seen a durable multi launcher. Most of the time the multi launchers seem to be needing some type of repair while the single shot gas gun from the 60s is still being used. Most of the time they rode in pelican cases in a SWAT armored car or van and they still broke easily. I can’t imagine carrying them in the field all the time.

The multi launchers are heavy. I can carry a single shot launcher in a bag loaded with munitions and it’s still equal to or lesser to the multi launcher in weight.

The SWAT guys pretty much stick with the single shot rifled 40s for LL work and the 37mm for gas work.

I never got to shoot an ARWEN or I play with a 320 but I’d liked to. One of my friend’s sons is in a Ranger Battalion and he’s carrying a 320 along with his M4.

[spyderco monkey]

All of that analysis makes some bold assumptions:

It assumes:
-The military's weapons quals are an accurate representation of combat effectiveness in the modern OE. I can say in particular that the US Army's qual that prevailed through all of these tests was relatively poor in the 1970's and was even worse in the modern day. The shiny-brand-new Army IWQ is a good step in the right direction but does not solve this issue and the entire argument you're making is predicated on solving marksmanship problems by blowing more shit up instead of putting more emphasis in training and more improvements in COTS options to increase marksmanship and mechanical accuracy of existing weapons like M4's and M16's.

-The US Army's continuing cultural shifts haven't played a massive role in the reduction of marksmanship skill. Marksmanship isn't even considered in any promotion above E6 and senior leaders are often derisive of Soldiers that are passionate about weapons skills and knowledge. When senior leaders don't prioritize marksmanship skill via institutional standards and routinely loathe it within their own commands, of course there are going to be training limitations and reduced overall skill Army wide with those weapons.

Think about what you've just said here:

-Marksmanship drills in the 70's [20 years after hit probability became a serious concern in SALVO and SPIW] was poor, and that if anything marksmanship training is now worse today, decades later and after 20 years of rifle centric warfare.

-Marksmanship training is actively disparaged by senior leadership aka those in a position to fix this marksmanship training.

-->

Problem: Infantry rifle fire has a historically low hit probability, and the US Military has a decades long history of mediocre rifle marksmanship training despite being well aware of the problem.

Possible Solutions:

Option A: Continue to make everyone in the 13-man Squad carry a rifle, and hope that somehow this decades long trend of mediocre marksmanship will be reversed, despite little evidence to suggest that it will.

Option B: Recognize the mediocre marksmanship problem is unlikely to be solved, and instead issue 1 man out of the 13-man Squad a smart grenade launcher that requires dramatically less marksmanship in order to be effective.

Given the historical data, plus the points you've just made, Option B seems like the pragmatic choice.

[JRB]

Think about what you've just said here:

-Marksmanship drills in the 70's [20 years after hit probability became a serious concern in SALVO and SPIW] was poor, and that if anything marksmanship training is now worse today, decades later and after 20 years of rifle centric warfare.

-Marksmanship training is actively disparaged by senior leadership aka those in a position to fix this marksmanship training.

-->

Problem: Infantry rifle fire has a historically low hit probability, and the US Military has a decades long history of mediocre rifle marksmanship training despite being well aware of the problem.

Possible Solutions:

Option A: Continue to make everyone in the 13-man Squad carry a rifle, and hope that somehow this decades long trend of mediocre marksmanship will be reversed, despite little evidence to suggest that it will.

Option B: Recognize the mediocre marksmanship problem is unlikely to be solved, and instead issue 1 man out of the 13-man Squad a smart grenade launcher that requires dramatically less marksmanship in order to be effective.

Given the historical data, plus the points you've just made, Option B seems like the pragmatic choice.

You misunderstood my point, and there's three separate issues here:
-The old rifle qual itself is a flawed representation of battlefield effectiveness. The new IWQ has implemented some very important changes but overall it's still inadequate. This inadequacy is perpetuated by a bunch of non-shooting softies in higher leadership positions and unfortunately that problem is going to keep being one of the many elephants in the room until a bunch of bad shit happens and priorities are finally redrawn.

-PDW's are a distinct downgrade from a 5.56mm weapon and there's a lot of reliable smaller 5.56 weapons out there now. If a pistol or old SMG can be upgraded to a PDW in the hands of rear echelon sorts of Soldiers, that's an improvement. Taking away a rifle from a front line combat troop for a PDW is a really bad idea for a lot of reasons related to effectiveness, operational flexibility, training, and logistics.

-PDW's aren't a magic missing puzzle piece that permits more effective grenades from being used by grenadiers. All of these FCG and sighting system upgrades can be integrated on much lighter, more flexible, and more reliable single shot systems currently fielded without taking away a rifle from front line combat troops. Adding a complicated, heavy, and unreliable multi-shot system to the mix and taking away an infantryman's rifle to do so is simply not a good move.

If your answer is to replace marksmanship and rifle fire with just blowing shit up, we should skip all the boots-on-ground stuff and just stick with airstrikes. :shrug:

[TGS]

-PDW's aren't a magic missing puzzle piece that permits more effective grenades from being used by grenadiers. All of these FCG and sighting system upgrades can be integrated on much lighter, more flexible, and more reliable single shot systems currently fielded without taking away a rifle from front line combat troops. Adding a complicated, heavy, and unreliable multi-shot system to the mix and taking away an infantryman's rifle to do so is simply not a good move.

Not only that, but what happens when the squad's one "super grenadier" gets tagged? What about when the single Milkor in the squad, on which so much hinges, ends up going down due to the known reliability issues?

A single shot grenadier per fire team (so 3 per squad in the USMC, dunno what the Army does) is more flexible and has greater force economy in terms of both resiliency as well as likelihood of being in the right place at right time. The MAAWS, even with its limited ammunition, is apropos for targets beyond the range of the M320 but not appropriate for mortar fire, much more effective at obtaining casualties at those extended ranges than a 40mm, while also giving the squad a greatly enhanced capability for other uses over what simply the Milkor offers (how's that Milkor work against bunkers and armor compared to the MAAWS?).

In the new 15-man USMC infantry squad, there's plenty of manpower for carrying requisite MAAWS ammunition. If the MAAWS goes down, you still have your 3 grenadiers, and you still have your Squad Systems Operator who can drop HE on you with a drone.

In the end, it's almost like there's a reason the USMC experimented with both concepts and dropped the Milkor while deciding to field the MAAWS at the squad level.

[MickAK]

I really wasn't expecting to learn this much about grenade launchers when I opened the 5.7 thread.

[CCT125US]

I really wasn't expecting to learn this much about grenade launchers when I opened the 5.7 thread.

Haha, you and me both. When the rabbit trail ends with grenade launchers, I'm cool with that.

[DocGKR]

Ah....airburst grenades have proven to be most ineffective against modern armored combatants.

Likewise, 5.7mm is a no go.