#RESIST
BLUF - Epstein didn't kill himself?
TL/DR
Pg xiii
Pg xiv (emphasis mine)While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of
intent ional misconduct on the part of the case agents
who assisted OI in preparing the applications, or the
agents and supervisors who performed the Woods
Procedures, we also did not receive satisfactory
explanations for the errors or problems we identified.
In most instances, t he agent s and supervisors told us
that they either did not know or recall why the
information was not shared with OI, that the fa ilure to
do so may have been an oversight, that they did not
recognize at t he time the relevance of the information
to t he FISA application, or that they did not believe the
missing information to be significant .
And the real nothing burger..... Recommendations.That so many basic and fundamental errors
were made by three separate, hand- picked teams on
one of the most sensitive FBI investigations that was
briefed to the highest levels within the FBI, and that FBI
officials expected would eventually be subjected to
close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the
FBI chain of command's management and supervision
of the FISA process. FBI Headquarters established a
chain of command for Crossfire Hurricane that included
close supervision by senior CD managers, who then
briefed FBI leadership throughout the investigation.
Although we do not expect managers and supervisors to
know every fact about an investigation, or senior
officials to know all the details of cases about which
they are briefed, in a sensitive, high-priority matter like
this one, it is reasonable to expect that they will take
the necessary steps to ensure that they are sufficiently
familiar with the facts and circumstances supporting
and potentially undermining a FISA application in order
to provide effective oversight, consistent with their level
of supervisory responsibility. We concluded that the
information that was known to the managers,
supervisors, and senior officials should have resulted in
questions being raised regarding the reliability of the
Steele reporting and the probable cause supporting the
FISA applications, but did not.
In our view, this was a failure of not only the
operational team, but also of the managers and
supervisors, including senior officials, in the chain of
command. For these reasons, we recommend that the
FBI review the performance of the employees who had
responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or
approval of the FISA applications, as well as the
managers and supervisors in the chain of command of
the Carter Page investigation, including senior officials,
and take any action deemed appropriate.
Starting on Pg xviii
LOL!Recommendations
Our report makes nine recommendations to the
FBI and the Department to assist them in addressing
the issues that we identified in this review:
• The Department and the FBI should ensure that
adequate procedures are in place for OI to obtain
all relevant and accurate information needed to
prepare FISA applications and renewal
applications, including CHS information. In
Chapter Twelve, we identify a few specific steps
to assist in this effort.
• The Department and FBI should evaluate which
types of SIMs require advance notification to a
senior Department official, such as the DAG, in
addition to the notifications currently required for
SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate
core First Amendment activity and raise policy
considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and
establish implementing policies and guidance, as
necessary.
• The FBI should develop protocols and guidelines
for staffing and administrating any future
sensitive investigative matters from FBI
Headquarters.
• The FBI should address the problems with the
administration and assessment of CHSs identified
in this report, including, at a minimum, revising
the FBI's standard CHS admonishments,
improving the documentation of CHS
information, revising FBI policy to address the
acceptance of information from a closed CHS
indirectly through a third party, and taking other
steps we identify in Chapter Twelve.
• The Department and FBI should clarify the terms
(1) "sensitive monitoring circumstance" in the
AG Guidelines and the DIOG to determine
whether to expand its scope to include
consensual monitoring of a domestic political
candidate or an individual prominent within a
domestic political organization, or a subset of
these persons, so that consensual monitoring of
such individuals would require consultation with
or advance notification to a senior Department
official, such as the DAG, and (2) "prominent in a
domestic political organization" so that agents
understand which campaign officials fall within
that definition as it relates to "sensitive
investigative matters," "sensitive UDP," the
designation of "sensitive sources," and "sensitive
monitoring circumstance."
• The FBI should ensure that appropriate training
on DIOG § 4 is provided to emphasize the
constitutional implications of certain monitoring
situations and to ensure that agents account for
these concerns, both in the tasking of CHSs and
in the way they document interactions with and
tasking of CHSs.
xix
• The FBI should establish a policy regarding the
use of defensive and transition briefings for
investigative purposes, including the factors to
be considered and approval by senior leaders at
the FBI with notice to a senior Department
official, such as the DAG.
• The Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility should review our findings related
to the conduct of Department attorney Bruce Ohr
for any action it deems appropriate. Ohr's
current supervisors in CRM should also review
our findings related to Ohr's performance for any
action they deem appropriate.
• The FBI should review the performance of all
employees who had responsibility for the
preparation, Woods review, or approval of the
FISA applications, as well as the managers,
supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of
command of the Carter Page investigation for
any action it deems appropriate.
Somebody please give me a shout if the other 400+ pages turn up anything we didn't already know.
"No free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms." - Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Constitution, Draft 1, 1776
Other than the recommendations are all "adding more process checks", here are the only two recommendations of substance.
That is a whole lot of nothing.The Department's Office of Professional Responsibility should review our findings related to the conduct of Department attorney Bruce Ohr for any action it deems appropriate. Ohr's current supervisors in CRM should also review our findings related to Ohr's performance for any action they deem appropriate.
The FBI should review the performance of all employees who had responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or approval of the FISA applications, as well as the managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command of the Carter Page investigation for any action it deems appropriate.
Did anybody actually expect anything different? Nobody will be charged with anything, nobody will go to jail, business as usual. The only way things will change is when the money runs out...Barring that, the only other way to force change is for a very large group of very angry people go to D.C. and start stringing these bastards up from lampposts.. With the presidency seemingly up for sale to billionaires, to be bought and sold to the highest bidder, We are truly screwed.
Last edited by ralph; 12-09-2019 at 01:59 PM.
Bottom line, the FBI are the good guys. Unfortunately the majority of the GOP (per polling these last few years) thinks they are the bad guys now.
“Remember, being healthy is basically just dying as slowly as possible,” Ricky Gervais
IGs in the federal government can only "recommend" things unless they develop PC for a crime.
I'm not sure what you guys were expecting other than recommendations. I think a good exercise is to understand what an IG is and is not before you read this report so you read it while grounded in reality. In other words, expectation management.
FWIW, having read an IG report or two, in IG language this is a pretty harsh report. Recommending an employee "be reviewed" is the IG basically saying "this dude is severely fucked up and you might want to fire him, because he is doing bad shit for obvious reasons but we can't develop PC to actually put him in jail". Put it this way:
Our tactical team basically blew up/caught our training HQ on fire because of improper/not-to-code storage of explosives.
Even in that debacle, our OIG never went so far to recommend that employees be reviewed, even though we McVeighed our own goddamn office building that should never have been storing HE to begin with.
(!)
Last edited by TGS; 12-09-2019 at 02:50 PM. Reason: hoohked on foniks wurked fer me
"Are you ready? Okay. Let's roll."- Last words of Todd Beamer
@TGS thanks for the context. I was wondering if I should read it harsh or more like an HR chiding.
Barr and Durham seem to have a different take on things. It may be worthwhile to wait for a more expansive criminal probe to wrap up before reaching any conclusions.Originally Posted by JHC
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By a few degrees. It sounds like Durham may want to prosecute the lawyer who doctored an email to back up what he said in a meeting. Possibly leaving out info about Page providing the CIA information? I'm all for wait and see.
Barr is another story. Compare his take on the M Report and then your reading of the actual M Report. Highly concerning.
Oh and this is rich, the IG recommends the FBI look for more advice from the top levels of the DoJ before embarking on sensitive investigations.
But it looks very strong that this was a properly predicated investigation (as I posted predictively a year or two ago here
Last edited by JHC; 12-09-2019 at 04:43 PM.
“Remember, being healthy is basically just dying as slowly as possible,” Ricky Gervais
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