FWIW, the way that the PIC explained the MCAS failure to me is to simply flip a switch and trim out.
He made it sound so basic, which is what drove his view that if anyone thinks the MAX8 wasn't appropriate for developing nation airlines, then no plane is appropriate, because it was a relatively benign thing for hundreds of people to die over. His point being that if anything goes wrong in any other airplane for any other reason, you're probably going to die as well, because the pilot competency simply isn't there no matter how you spin the angle on "finding a middle ground"...…..they shouldn't be flying.
His feelings were that the matter is a far cry from systems being too complex.
From the comments by the pilots here about many nations simply pushing people through pipelines because they have the right family name, that sounds on point.
"Are you ready? Okay. Let's roll."- Last words of Todd Beamer
Why not?
Adequate training in any industry costs money. If the blame for over 500 deaths in two accidents is put back on lackluster airline education, the airlines are on the hook (and would probably go out of business). Bye Bye Air Ethiopia and Lion Air. More unemployment, political unrest, social outrage....and every regulatory agency knows there’s airlines on their turf who cut training corners.
Way easier for the worlds regulators to blame big bad Boeing. Everyone else’s jobs and reputation get saved that way. I’m no defender of Donald Trump, but based on the proof I’ve seen recently he was correct to avoid grounding the type.
Insofar as my blatantly ignorant comment earlier goes,I’ve been educated about other examples of aircraft using the same type rating but being truly distinct types such as the Canadian CRJ series. A CRJ 900 doesn’t share much with the -200; except a type rating and excellent safety record.
The Minority Marksman.
"When you meet a swordsman, draw your sword: Do not recite poetry to one who is not a poet."
-a Ch'an Buddhist axiom.
Here is a question for those that think this is merely a training issue. How should this training be accomplished?
Simulators are great for routine flying in the proven flight envelope, but simulators are only as good as how they are programmed, which can make them not realistic for certain unusual situations. Based on what I have learned so far about the MCAS system, I would be extremely surprised if the existing 737 MAX simulators accurately reflect what the two crews that crashed experienced. I can also guarantee airlines are not going to send flight crews in real aircraft to train MCAS failures.
Boeing and the regulators need to figure out exactly what is going on, make whatever changes are necessary to make the system as good as possible, and then get the simulators to reflect the changes and the actual behavior of the aircraft.
Likes pretty much everything in every caliber.
Just to keep perspectives in line here. Modern air travel is so so (and has been for years) that NO SINGLE REASON is behind any of these accidents. Crashes like this (and like Colgan 3407) and the subsequent investigations “kick over a rock” of the industry and expose all the ugly things that are usually out of the view of the public and legislative eyes.
The flaws with MCAS are serious but unlike the string of accidents that grounded the DC10 - these accidents could have been stopped by the pilots had they maintained aircraft control and followed established procedures. That rabbit hole leads to a place that no one really wants to discuss or deal with so the simple “fix” right now is to blame Boeing and cross their fingers - but that isn’t going to help the next time an airplane does something it is not “supposed “ to do.
Last edited by Suvorov; 07-01-2019 at 12:36 PM.