The Russians Are Coming: Lithuania's Operation Lightning Strike

[LittleLebowski]

Back up for a second.

1) Bot net attacks are a form of cyber warfare. I used the correct terminology, whether you want to omit certain actions from its bredth or not.
I wasn't saying it is not cyber warfare. My point is that we, the US, conduct cyber warfare every day against everyone.

2) I never said our financial system. I actually said it was against a former Soviet satellite.
You're absolutely right. Sorry I missed that.

3) I think it's pretty naive to assume that the Russian government wasn't behind such an action. If you want proof, then I'm going to disappoint you because there isn't any, and never will be. You know, that whole black ops/covert/espionage thing.....
Again, I missed that second sentence. However, I still don't count Russian cyber warfare against say the Ukraine as something American needs to be terribly concerned about.

[TGS]

Yes, of course we conduct cyber warfare.

That's incredibly broad though. If I criticized the North Korean government for murdering and imprisoning tens of thousands of subjects within a weekend, would you then respond, "Well yeah, but our security services kill people everyday, and just last weekend built a prison camp for a thousand children"? No, because it'd be wrong to compare the detention of illegal immigrants and lawful self-defense shootings of LEOs to the mass murder and slavery of political dissidents.

Just the same as its disingenuous to compare our cyber warfare actions against those of Russia, and insinuate that Russia's no worse than us.

[MDS]

Yes, of course we conduct cyber warfare.

That's incredibly broad though. If I criticized the North Korean government for murdering and imprisoning tens of thousands of subjects within a weekend, would you then respond, "Well yeah, but our security services kill people everyday, and just last weekend built a prison camp for a thousand children"? No, because it'd be wrong to compare the detention of illegal immigrants and lawful self-defense shootings of LEOs to the mass murder and slavery of political dissidents.

Just the same as its disingenuous to compare our cyber warfare actions against those of Russia, and insinuate that Russia's no worse than us.

Still haven't read the articles you posted, but this seems like you're harkening back to moral superiority as the cause and justification for these interventions.

I'm not trying to nail you down, dude. But come on, if our reason for war and mootw are based on a good-guy/bad-guy dichotomy and an urge to shove our values down other people's throats, let's just say so. Then we can discuss why we're so selective about which oppressive regimes we hate, which ones we love, and which ones we blissfully ignore.

If not, then let's stop confusing the discussion by injecting non-sequiturs about North Korean death camps vs. American "alien processing facilities."

[Jay Cunningham]

What about our BFFs, the Saudis?

[MDS]

TGS, thanks again for those articles. The boys decided to play instead of building their new model rockets right now, so I had time to peruse them. Admittedly, I didn't read every word of all of them, but I do feel like I got a strong sense for the picture each was trying to paint.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorentho...erica-in-2015/

I agree with this article pretty well. It plainly states that Russia's actions in the Ukraine only look like expansionist aggression to US eyes, but are in fact motivated by Russia's perception of existential threats from the US. "Putin describes the Crimea as a birthplace of Russian culture, and his government has repeatedly warned against the expansion of Western economic and political influence into a region historically regarded as Moscow’s sphere of influence." And Russia is in fact a dangerous adversary, because "sanctions sometimes provoke precisely the opposite response from what policymakers hope. In Russia’s case, that could mean a threat to America’s survival."

Not sure why you think this article supports ongoing intervention, could you clarify that?

http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/12/politi...t-alarm-norad/

This article isn't far off, though it ignores a lot of context that could help interpret the facts it reports. My view of Russian military exercises in areas that are traditionally thought of as European or American sphere of influence is that it's a simple how do you like it when the shoe's on the other foot? Buried in the article is a line that captures my thinking: 'Gortney said the Russian air patrols, in part, are designed to "communicate its displeasure with Western policies, particularly with regard to Ukraine."' I would add that it communicates not only displeasure, but also an ability and willingness to step up military posturing in lockstep with Western posturing...with attendant military possibilities.

This article only supports ongoing intervention if the facts are taken out of context, and placed in a new, illusory context of a natural, intrinsic animosity between Russia and the West.

http://www.economist.com/news/briefi...-confrontation

This article has a slant much more in line with what you've been arguing. The points are not invalid, and in fact I was fascinated by the following: 'Russia’s approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right groups. [...] Far-right groups are seduced by the idea of Moscow as a counterweight to the EU, and by its law-and-order policies. Its stance on homosexuality and promotion of “traditional” moral values appeal to religious conservatives. The far left likes the talk of fighting American hegemony.'

There's a lot of detailed understanding about the mechanics of this adversarial dance. No one is questioning that there is such a dance. Malamute wrote above about Russian crowds cheering the image of Yellowstone as a nuclear wasteland. No doubt, America and Russia are geopolitical adversaries.

What's missing, though, is an understanding of what's under that dance. A good start is to think about the question someone asked above: is Russia gunning for imperial glory, or looking to reestablish that ancient buffer zone? But the issue is much more complex - whether expansionist or buffer-zone-ist (sp?) we have a Kremlin with some apparent internal struggles, and an economy that's not keeping the people as happy with their leaders as their leaders might like. These are the questions I'm alluding to, when I ask if we have to be so anti-Russia all the time.

Sure, the regime is oppressive. The people are often on the government's side in large part because of lies and propaganda. But are the interests of liberating oppressed people be better served by continuing to antagonize those people? Or could we respect their space and their sphere of influence, engage in mutually beneficial trade, and allow the rubbing of cultures (which is inevitable in this internet age) to do the slow work of breaking down barriers? More to my point, is the need to keep Russia out of Ukraine so urgent, that we're willing to risk so much? I get that we're entangled in many ways now, but why are we so eager to intervene in the Baltics when we've got so many pressing issues at home and elsewhere in the world?

http://www.economist.com/news/leader...eatand-counter

I really liked this article, even though I cringed at gratuitous barbs like "he seems certain to get what he wants there [in Ukraine]: a wretched little quasi-state in the Donbas" - I wish they're replace the hysterical phrase wretched little quasi-state with some more objectively descriptive words. There's clearly an anti-Russia bias, and there's not a real explanation of why. Implicit in that bias is a very romantic notion of what motivates the West. Consider: "Mr Putin plays by different rules; indeed, for him, there are no inviolable rules, nor universal values, nor even cast-iron facts [...]" There's a long and well-analyzed body of evidence showing that these are exactly the rules the US plays by. Again, I just loathe the internal inconsistency - if not outright dishonesty - of moral or ethical arguments in geopolitics.

But whatever. I can put that aside, and in fact I don't know why I don't read more of The Economist. The article states the obvious: that Russia wants to destabilize Western institutions as much as we want to keep Russian institutions as weak as possible. Our patronizing attitude after the Cold War spawned a lot of butt hurt, and though I'm not well-versed in that period enough to say for sure, I can't imagine there wasn't a better long-term approach. But that was all foreplay, and things are now getting serious, this adversarial relationship is getting very dangerous. Russia's going to get what's fair (a buffer zone periphery) because we don't want nuclear war, either, and Russia seems willing to risk nukes if it means protecting their sovereignty. By the same token, they're not going to cross the line into invading Europe because is also willing to go all the way to protect its sovereignty as well. So we'll do a little dance for a while, find some kind of equilibrium, and each side will stay just shy of truly threatening the sovereignty of the other.

But here again, there is a core unstated assumption, that as sure as the sun rises in the east, our military must rush to intervene wherever Russia flexes. My question is, why don't we let Europe and Russia figure out that equilibrium (mostly) on their own? Then, if against all odds major war does break out, it'll stay (mostly) on the continent. We can weigh in towards the end, being careful to avoid threatening such critical interests that we're liable to get nuked. If Russia really does nuke Europe, well, all bets are off and that's where my whiskey, tobacco, and ammo come in. But the lesson from the Cold War is that people don't want to trigger that if they can help it, so we should be able to find a middle path. (Not that I'm confident in our ability to find that path...)

So there's a lot to gain from delayed intervention. Now let's come at it the other way. What will early intervention buy us? Do we really think Russia will stop working on its peripheral buffer zone because of some US troops nearby? On the contrary, I suspect this would embolden Putin, the Kremlin, and the Russian people. Do we really think these maneuvers will make nuclear war less likely? Again, on the contrary, it can only serve to make Russia even more nervous about our motivations and the threat to their sovereignty. So what do we gain from early intervention, and would that be lost by a policy of late intervention?

[Kyle Reese]

https://youtu.be/2zssIFN2mso

[Wondering Beard]

So we'll do a little dance for a while, find some kind of equilibrium, and each side will stay just shy of truly threatening the sovereignty of the other.

The problem is that there isn't much of an equilibrium to be had. The Russian political culture (going back even to the early tsars) is rather paranoid. To oversimplify, their thinking is that they must take from you while you are weak, because if they are weak then you will take from them; naturally, when you get stronger after they have taken from you, you take some back when they are weak thus confirming their original outlook and setting up a self fulfilling prophecy. This is central to how they (both leaders and population) understand politics at a very primal emotional level, to them this is how the world works. They see power as a pie and in order to feel safe they reflexively think it's better to have as much as possible of that pie.

For the US gov't, and Americans in general, it's not how we think. To us, "live and let live" and establishing some sort of balance is how we approach international politics (even internal societal ones. e.g. "good fences make for good neighbors").

Now that doesn't mean we should go intervening everywhere and every time Russia starts acting aggressive but it does mean we need to be ready to smack some knuckles (metaphorically of course and it doesn't require the use of the military most of the time) just so things don't get out of hand.

Russia and the US see a very different reality when they look at the world and it's not going away any time soon.

[Jay Cunningham]

For the US gov't, and Americans in general, it's not how we think. To us, "live and let live" and establishing some sort of balance is how we approach international politics (even internal societal ones. e.g. "good fences make for good neighbors").

Do you really believe what you wrote above?

[Wondering Beard]

Do you really believe what you wrote above?

I really should have taken more time to write out that paragraph.

Do I believe the US gov't makes (and has made) its policy guided by a "live and let live" approach to international politics? no, absolutely not.

What I was trying to convey (and did badly) is that Americans, as a population in general, do not see the world as a pie of which we need a huge share in order to feel safe but rather do not see a pie at all. Instead we tend to see at a minimum a place in which cohabitation is a fine thing (so long as you don't "step on our toes" thus the fences comment) or at a maximum a place where we extend our interests all over in order to grow wealth (preferably ours). As a result, most Americans who enter international politics start off with that sort of vague cultural attitude in mind. Whereas the Russians start off with the vague cultural attitude of "if you win something, I must have lost something" and vice versa.

What I mean to present is how differently Americans and Russians see the reality of international politics.

[MDS]

WB, that's a lucid explanation of what I think is the main confusing element here - the idea that Russia and the US are natural-born adversaries. Personally, I don't buy it. But it's a point on which reasonable people might disagree.

Meanwhile, here's an entertaining look at how Russia might be thinking about continuing this dance that leads to a new equilibrium.