Originally Posted by
MDS
TGS, thanks again for those articles. The boys decided to play instead of building their new model rockets right now, so I had time to peruse them. Admittedly, I didn't read every word of all of them, but I do feel like I got a strong sense for the picture each was trying to paint.
I agree with this article pretty well. It plainly states that Russia's actions in the Ukraine only look like expansionist aggression to US eyes, but are in fact motivated by Russia's perception of existential threats from the US. "Putin describes the Crimea as a birthplace of Russian culture, and his government has repeatedly warned against the expansion of Western economic and political influence into a region historically regarded as Moscow’s sphere of influence." And Russia is in fact a dangerous adversary, because "sanctions sometimes provoke precisely the opposite response from what policymakers hope. In Russia’s case, that could mean a threat to America’s survival."
Not sure why you think this article supports ongoing intervention, could you clarify that?
This article isn't far off, though it ignores a lot of context that could help interpret the facts it reports. My view of Russian military exercises in areas that are traditionally thought of as European or American sphere of influence is that it's a simple how do you like it when the shoe's on the other foot? Buried in the article is a line that captures my thinking: 'Gortney said the Russian air patrols, in part, are designed to "communicate its displeasure with Western policies, particularly with regard to Ukraine."' I would add that it communicates not only displeasure, but also an ability and willingness to step up military posturing in lockstep with Western posturing...with attendant military possibilities.
This article only supports ongoing intervention if the facts are taken out of context, and placed in a new, illusory context of a natural, intrinsic animosity between Russia and the West.
This article has a slant much more in line with what you've been arguing. The points are not invalid, and in fact I was fascinated by the following: 'Russia’s approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right groups. [...] Far-right groups are seduced by the idea of Moscow as a counterweight to the EU, and by its law-and-order policies. Its stance on homosexuality and promotion of “traditional” moral values appeal to religious conservatives. The far left likes the talk of fighting American hegemony.'
There's a lot of detailed understanding about the mechanics of this adversarial dance. No one is questioning that there is such a dance. Malamute wrote above about Russian crowds cheering the image of Yellowstone as a nuclear wasteland. No doubt, America and Russia are geopolitical adversaries.
What's missing, though, is an understanding of what's under that dance. A good start is to think about the question someone asked above: is Russia gunning for imperial glory, or looking to reestablish that ancient buffer zone? But the issue is much more complex - whether expansionist or buffer-zone-ist (sp?) we have a Kremlin with some apparent internal struggles, and an economy that's not keeping the people as happy with their leaders as their leaders might like. These are the questions I'm alluding to, when I ask if we have to be so anti-Russia all the time.
Sure, the regime is oppressive. The people are often on the government's side in large part because of lies and propaganda. But are the interests of liberating oppressed people be better served by continuing to antagonize those people? Or could we respect their space and their sphere of influence, engage in mutually beneficial trade, and allow the rubbing of cultures (which is inevitable in this internet age) to do the slow work of breaking down barriers? More to my point, is the need to keep Russia out of Ukraine so urgent, that we're willing to risk so much? I get that we're entangled in many ways now, but why are we so eager to intervene in the Baltics when we've got so many pressing issues at home and elsewhere in the world?
I really liked this article, even though I cringed at gratuitous barbs like "he seems certain to get what he wants there [in Ukraine]: a wretched little quasi-state in the Donbas" - I wish they're replace the hysterical phrase wretched little quasi-state with some more objectively descriptive words. There's clearly an anti-Russia bias, and there's not a real explanation of why. Implicit in that bias is a very romantic notion of what motivates the West. Consider: "Mr Putin plays by different rules; indeed, for him, there are no inviolable rules, nor universal values, nor even cast-iron facts [...]" There's a long and well-analyzed body of evidence showing that these are exactly the rules the US plays by. Again, I just loathe the internal inconsistency - if not outright dishonesty - of moral or ethical arguments in geopolitics.
But whatever. I can put that aside, and in fact I don't know why I don't read more of The Economist. The article states the obvious: that Russia wants to destabilize Western institutions as much as we want to keep Russian institutions as weak as possible. Our patronizing attitude after the Cold War spawned a lot of butt hurt, and though I'm not well-versed in that period enough to say for sure, I can't imagine there wasn't a better long-term approach. But that was all foreplay, and things are now getting serious, this adversarial relationship is getting very dangerous. Russia's going to get what's fair (a buffer zone periphery) because we don't want nuclear war, either, and Russia seems willing to risk nukes if it means protecting their sovereignty. By the same token, they're not going to cross the line into invading Europe because is also willing to go all the way to protect its sovereignty as well. So we'll do a little dance for a while, find some kind of equilibrium, and each side will stay just shy of truly threatening the sovereignty of the other.
But here again, there is a core unstated assumption, that as sure as the sun rises in the east, our military must rush to intervene wherever Russia flexes. My question is, why don't we let Europe and Russia figure out that equilibrium (mostly) on their own? Then, if against all odds major war does break out, it'll stay (mostly) on the continent. We can weigh in towards the end, being careful to avoid threatening such critical interests that we're liable to get nuked. If Russia really does nuke Europe, well, all bets are off and that's where my whiskey, tobacco, and ammo come in. But the lesson from the Cold War is that people don't want to trigger that if they can help it, so we should be able to find a middle path. (Not that I'm confident in our ability to find that path...)
So there's a lot to gain from delayed intervention. Now let's come at it the other way. What will early intervention buy us? Do we really think Russia will stop working on its peripheral buffer zone because of some US troops nearby? On the contrary, I suspect this would embolden Putin, the Kremlin, and the Russian people. Do we really think these maneuvers will make nuclear war less likely? Again, on the contrary, it can only serve to make Russia even more nervous about our motivations and the threat to their sovereignty. So what do we gain from early intervention, and would that be lost by a policy of late intervention?