Heien v. State of North Carolina

[Shellback]

Although the courts have historically held that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for breaking the law, in its 8-1 ruling in Heien v. State of North Carolina, the Supreme Court seemingly upheld that this does not pertain to the police in the performance of their job. How do you think this will impact the 4th Amendment going forward?

The Heien case arose from a 2009 traffic stop in North Carolina, in which motorist Nicholas Heien was improperly stopped by police for driving with one broken brake light. That stop led to a search of Heien’s vehicle, which in turn led to the discovery of illegal drugs. Sergeant Matt Darisse arrested Mr. Heien because of the contents of a baggie found in his vehicle.

The twist came from the fact that North Carolina law does not provide the legal pretext for an officer to perform a stop for one broken brake light. State law requires that drivers maintain only one operable “stop lamp” — not two.

A NY Times article provides more details and opinions from the presiding justices.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the court’s decision “does not discourage officers from learning the law,” because only objectively reasonable mistakes were permitted.

“An officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage,” the chief justice wrote, “through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.”

Justice Elena Kagan joined the majority opinion but added a concurrence, which was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She emphasized that the state law in question “poses a quite difficult question of interpretation, and Sergeant Darisse’s judgment, although overturned, had much to recommend it.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented. She said the court’s ruling “means further eroding the Fourth Amendment’s protection of civil liberties in a context where that protection has already been worn down.”

The majority’s approach will also, she said, contribute to distrust between citizens and the police. If police officers are given leeway to interpret the law, she wrote, “one wonders how a citizen seeking to be law-abiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these invasive, frightening and humiliating encounters could do so.”

Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the court’s decision at first blush ran afoul of the maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”

On reflection, he said, the maxim holds the government and its citizens to the same standard where it counts.

“Just as an individual generally cannot escape criminal liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “so too the government cannot impose criminal liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law.”...

Full SCOTUS docs - PDF file here.

[John Hearne]

If you look at the history of the exclusionary rule and the previous rulings in this area, the decision isn't surprising. The exclusionary rules exists to remove the reward for using improperly acquired evidence. The courts have held that there is little interest in dissuading police misconduct that is not deliberate. Historically, if you put the wrong address on the warrant but properly describe the residence, the courts have held that the warrant is still valid.

This is not some radical change in American jurisprudence as some are painting it.

[Shellback]

Thanks for your input John. ETA - I'm not sure how the warrant business pertains to the Heien case.

I was reading through the Cato briefing and found it to be interesting: http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.or...iled-brief.pdf

[joshs]

If you look at the history of the exclusionary rule and the previous rulings in this area, the decision isn't surprising. The exclusionary rules exists to remove the reward for using improperly acquired evidence. The courts have held that there is little interest in dissuading police misconduct that is not deliberate. Historically, if you put the wrong address on the warrant but properly describe the residence, the courts have held that the warrant is still valid.

This is not some radical change in American jurisprudence as some are painting it.

I think allowing mistake-of-law as a exception to the exclusionary rule is a significant step beyond the prior rule that only allowed mistake-of-fact. Not only just for the fairness reasons that everyone is generally charged with perfect knowledge of the law, but, as you pointed out, the intent of the exclusionary rule is to punish bad behavior. Mistake-of-fact is generally much more obvious to the reviewing court. E.g., address on the affidavit and warrant don't match. Mistake-of-law is much more complicated. And, if allowed to extend beyond the specific facts of Heien, could prove very damaging for the interstate transportation provision of FOPA. While I don't think the result itself is very problematic, it was questionable whether a mistake-of-law actually occurred until the North Carolina court determined that the defendant was actually in compliance with state law, I generally prefer bright-line rules like: reasonable mistake-of-fact is ok, reasonable mistake-of-law is not ok.

[Lon]

If you read the entire opinion, you'll find this in the concurring opinion by Justice Kagan:

A court tasked with deciding whether an officer’s mistake of law can support a seizure thus faces a straightforward question of statutory construction. If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not.

This says it all, really. Anyone who has read and studied the statutes of their state has undoubtedly come across one on occasion that makes you go "WTF does that mean?" Some laws are just poorly written and difficult to understand. This decision seems to address those cases. Justice Kagan also goes on to reiterate that this rule is on a case by case basis and just like other 4th Am. issues, that the mistake must be "objectively reasonable".

For example, the Ohio Revised Code statute for disorderly conduct reads:

(A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by doing any of the following:

(1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior;

(2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive language to any person;

(3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response;

(4) Hindering or preventing the movement of persons on a public street, road, highway, or right-of-way, or to, from, within, or upon public or private property, so as to interfere with the rights of others, and by any act that serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender;

(5) Creating a condition that is physically offensive to persons or that presents a risk of physical harm to persons or property, by any act that serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender

Interpret 2,3 and 5 to yourself. How easy do you think it would be for an Officer to come across a situation that at first glance, to them, was a no brainer violation of one of those sections? Only to find out later that it wasn't. I don't think this is the end of the world, 4th Am. wise, that people are making it out to be.

[Shellback]

The issue I see is that when the legitimacy of the traffic stop was challenged in court, the arresting officer claimed ignorance, and the courts deemed it a “reasonable mistake.” If the courts are willing to excuse ignorance on the part of the officer then the same thing should apply across the board.

Julio Marrero's case is a prime example.

New York's highest court was sharply divided yesterday over the ancient legal principle summarized by the maxim ''ignorantia legis neminem excusat'' - ignorance, or even mistake, of the law is no excuse.

The Court of Appeals upheld the principle, but only by a 4 to 3 vote that reflected strong opinions in an unusual judicial debate over when, under the limited exceptions provided by New York law, one may successfully claim ignorance as a defense.

The case that caused the division, People v. Marrero, arose from the arrest 10 years ago of a Federal correction officer, Julio Marrero, on weapons possession charges. Mr. Marrero, who was arrested in a Manhattan social club and charged with possession of a handgun without a permit, sought to defend himself by claiming that, as he understood New York law, correction officers were exempt from the permit requirement.

He was convicted, nevertheless, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, fined $500 and discharged on the condition that he violate no laws for six months. And, according to his lawyers, Mr. Marrero lost his job as a correction officer at the Federal penitentiary in Danbury, Conn...

[joshs]

If you read the entire opinion, you'll find this in the concurring opinion by Justice Kagan . . .

But, the concurring opinion is not the law. There were 5 justices who signed the majority opinion, but not the concurrence, so the concurring votes were not necessary to reach a majority.

On your ORC disorderly conduct example, there is a significant amount of case law narrowing the subsections you cited. I'd also note that if it is difficult for an officer to determine if there is a violation of that statute, then it is equally difficult for a person to limit their behavior so as to conform with the statute. Any statue that leads to a "reasonable mistake-of-law," to me, should raise significant constitutional vagueness issues.

[Alpha Sierra]

The issue I see is that when the legitimacy of the traffic stop was challenged in court, the arresting officer claimed ignorance, and the courts deemed it a “reasonable mistake.” If the courts are willing to excuse ignorance on the part of the officer then the same thing should apply across the board.

Yes. Goose -> Gander

[ToddG]

Disorderly conduct laws are also still limited by 1st Amendment protections (which include protection of offensive expression) which often make the laws far less enforceable in their abstract definitions anyway. Add in the vagueness issues that Josh mentioned and it's amazing to me when anyone gets an actual disorderly for anything that is simply speech/expression. In Maryland the most controlling case basically hinged on the fact that the actor disobeyed lawful orders by the police to cease their behavior and, without that intercession by the police, the behavior most likely would not have been prosecutable.

This decision (Heien) was more meaningful than some think, IMHO, and while I believe it was very well intentioned by the Supremes it will have consequences they weren't considering. While I doubt it will be formally overturned I'd expect it to be "narrowed" to the point of near-nonexistence eventually.

[TAZ]

Who is going to narrow it and how long will it take?? In the mean time how many people are going to get rolled up by "well intentioned, but ignorant" cops.

I'm of the opinion that if ignorance is no excuse for the layman, who may not even be aware of what laws have been passed by a bill happy legislature, it sure as heck is unacceptable for the professionals entrusted with enforcing them.