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947.013 Harassment.
(1) In this section:
(a) “Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
(b) “Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat.
(c) “Personally identifiable information" has the meaning given in s. 19.62 (5).
(d) “Record" has the meaning given in s. 19.32 (2).
(1m) Whoever, with intent to harass or intimidate another person, does any of the following is subject to a Class B forfeiture:
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the person to physical contact or attempts or threatens to do the same.
(b) Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which harass or intimidate the person and which serve no legitimate purpose.
(1r) Whoever violates sub. (1m) under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor:
(a) The act is accompanied by a credible threat that places the victim in reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.
(b) The act occurs while the actor is subject to an order or injunction under s. 813.12, 813.122 or 813.125 that prohibits or limits his or her contact with the victim.
(1t) Whoever violates sub. (1r) is guilty of a Class I felony if the person has a prior conviction under this subsection or sub. (1r), (1v), or (1x) or s. 940.32 (2), (2e), (2m), or (3) involving the same victim and the present violation occurs within 7 years of the prior conviction.
(1v) Whoever violates sub. (1r) is guilty of a Class H felony if he or she intentionally gains access to a record in electronic format that contains personally identifiable information regarding the victim in order to facilitate the violation under sub. (1r).
(1x) Whoever violates sub. (1r) under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class H felony:
(a) The person has a prior conviction under sub. (1r), (1t) or (1v) or this subsection or s. 940.32 (2), (2e), (2m), or (3).
(b) The person intentionally gains access to a record in order to facilitate the current violation under sub. (1r).
(2) This section does not prohibit any person from participating in lawful conduct in labor disputes under s. 103.53.
History: 1983 a. 336; 1991 a. 194; 1993 a. 496; 2001 a. 109.
This section is not a safety statute and does not grant a private right of action for its violation. In re Estate of Drab, 143 Wis. 2d 568, 422 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1988).
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947.019 Terrorist threats.
(1) Whoever, under any of the following circumstances, threatens to cause the death of or bodily harm to any person or to damage any person's property is guilty of a Class I felony:
(a) The actor intends to prevent the occupation of or cause the evacuation of a building, dwelling, school premises, vehicle, facility of public transportation, or place of public assembly or any room within a building, dwelling, or school premises.
(b) The actor intends to cause public inconvenience.
(c) The actor intends to cause public panic or fear.
(d) The actor intends to cause an interruption or impairment of governmental operations or public communication, of transportation, or of a supply of water, gas, or other public service.
(e) The actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of causing a result described in par. (a), (b), (c), or (d) and is aware of that risk.
(2) Any person who violates sub. (1) and thereby contributes to any individual's death is guilty of a Class G felony.
History: 2015 a. 311.
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947.01 Disorderly conduct.
(1) Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
(2) Unless other facts and circumstances that indicate a criminal or malicious intent on the part of the person apply, a person is not in violation of, and may not be charged with a violation of, this section for loading a firearm, or for carrying or going armed with a firearm or a knife, without regard to whether the firearm is loaded or the firearm or the knife is concealed or openly carried.
History: 1977 c. 173; 1979 c. 131; 2011 a. 35; 2015 a. 149.
The defendant was properly convicted of disorderly conduct when he appeared on a stage wearing a minimum of clothing intending to and succeeding in causing a loud reaction in the audience. State v. Maker, 48 Wis. 2d 612, 180 N.W.2d 707 (1970).
An attorney was properly convicted under this section for refusing to leave a ward in a mental hospital until he had seen a client after having made statements in the presence of patients that caused some to become agitated. State v. Elson, 60 Wis. 2d 54, 208 N.W.2d 363 (1973).
It was not disorderly conduct for 4 people to enter an office with other members of the public for the purpose of protesting the draft and to refuse to leave on orders of the police when their conduct was not otherwise disturbing. State v. Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d 668, 211 N.W.2d 437 (1973).
This statute does not require a victim, but when the disorderly conduct is directed at a person, that person is the victim for the purpose of prosecuting the perpetrator for intimidating a victim under s. 940.44. State v. Vinje, 201 Wis. 2d 98, 548 N.W.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1484.
A “true threat" is a statement that a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly protected speech. It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out the threat. State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762, 99-1924.
Purely written speech, even written speech that fails to cause an actual disturbance, can constitute disorderly conduct, but the state has the burden to prove that the speech is constitutionally unprotected “abusive" conduct. “Abusive" conduct is conduct that is injurious, improper, hurtful, offensive, or reproachful. “True threats" clearly fall within the scope of this definition. State v. Douglas D. 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725, 99-1767.
Application of the disorderly conduct statute to speech alone is permissible under appropriate circumstances. When speech is not an essential part of any exposition of ideas, when it is utterly devoid of social value, and when it can cause or provoke a disturbance, the disorderly conduct statute can be applicable. State v. A.S. 2001 WI 48, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712, 99-2317.
Disorderly conduct does not necessarily require disruptions that implicate the public directly. This section encompasses conduct that tends to cause a disturbance or disruption that is personal or private in nature, as long as there exists the real possibility that the disturbance or disruption will spill over and disrupt the peace, order, or safety of the surrounding community as well. Sending repeated, unwelcome, and anonymous mailings was “otherwise disorderly conduct." State v. Schwebke, 2002 WI 55, 253 Wis. 2d 1, 644 N.W.2d 666, 99-3204.
Defiance of a police officer's order to move is itself disorderly conduct if the order is lawful. Braun v. Baldwin, 346 F.3d 761 (2003).]