What winning looks like - REVISIT Pech Valley

[JHC]

[Title related to the earlier thread with the 3 part documentary serious whose narrator was totally down on the prognosis]


Interesting and encouraging read about surprises found in a very tough area. An NCO friend has told me that just speaking for the ANA units they are assisting this year; they are way ahead of where they were on his last tour and quite effective and can move faster now without close US tutelage actually slowing them down.

That point rings true to me; considering some of what I saw in the 3 part video documentary posted months ago on this board.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/asia/us-soldiers-find-surprise-on-returning-to-afghan-valley-peace.html?pagewanted=all

[Odin Bravo One]

I think winning looks a lot more like this..........

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v690/SavageHunter/11028880_1_zpsff6b8879.jpg (http://smg.photobucket.com/user/SavageHunter/media/11028880_1_zpsff6b8879.jpg.html)

I don't recall seeing any sort of headlines like the one above.

And I don't see any indicators we are "winning" the war in Afghanistan. After about the first 6 months of the war, the US started playing "Not to lose". That is much different than playing to "Win".

[TCinVA]

Kind of hard to actually win when you announce timetables for withdrawal regardless of the circumstances.

[Kyle Reese]

Someone failed to inform the enemy of our victory plans. I have grave reservations about the ANSF and their ability to keep it together upon the withdrawal of conventional forces from Afghanistan.

I guess it also matters how one defines "victory".


Taliban launch suicide assault on ISAF PRT in Ghazni (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/taliban_launch_suici_3.php)

Taliban suicide team hits base at border crossing with Pakistan (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/taliban_suicide_team_1.php)

Suicide bomber kills district chief in attack at Kunduz mosque (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/08/suicide_bomber_kills_district.php)

[JHC]

Yeah it's harder that way for sure.

Then again there is this interesting info from Pech Valley. And interesting feedback from an Infantry NCO advising ANA units. If we only see victory in nuclear rubble then fine; there will never be another. If we expect insurgencies and terrorists to sit down at a table and sign the paper; then fine. There will never be another.

Most likely we should not have applied the Iraq surge formula to AFG and I don't think general's Petraeus, McChrystal, Mattis or Allen deserve much praise for the strategy or conduct of the AFG campaign over the years.

It's incredible to read Killcullen's book on COIN and then wonder; if he was retained by all these guys as an advisor, did they ever listen? His lessons don't seem to have been applied in AFG as much as in say Anbar. Weird.

[Kevin B.]

I was in A-stan shortly after 9/11, I have been back a few times and I am here now. We are not winning. We are not losing, but we are not winning.

[JHC]

Someone failed to inform the enemy of our victory plans. I have grave reservations about the ANSF and their ability to keep it together upon the withdrawal of conventional forces from Afghanistan.

I guess it also matters how one defines "victory".


Taliban launch suicide assault on ISAF PRT in Ghazni (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/taliban_launch_suici_3.php)

Taliban suicide team hits base at border crossing with Pakistan (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/taliban_suicide_team_1.php)

Suicide bomber kills district chief in attack at Kunduz mosque (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/08/suicide_bomber_kills_district.php)

Yeah exactly! Which what the mil folks in that linked article were thinking too in the Pech Valley. Long War journal and some regional news outlets report those stories and also daily of Taliban being rolled up or plowed under too. I mean we aren't expecting the Taliban to just quit right?

I don't trust conventional wisdom most of the time and conventional wisdom is all gloom and doom. From the earlier video documentary series I thought some of those ANA or police might have a better grasp on what COIN means THERE than the professionals giving them instruction on being professional.

It's not going to be pretty and Jeffersonian but I think the ANA is largely going to make a go of it.

[Odin Bravo One]

I too rolled in for my first Afghan tour in October 2001. The way the war was conducted then, compared to now is night and day. And the results show. An NCO talking about how one little valley has changed over a couple of years is hardly an indicator of success. If this were 1 year into it, then I might be a little more optimistic. As it stands, we are 12 years into it, with tangible progress elusive at best. Success in that one location, sure. But victory it is not. And trending it is not. That we are still there 12 years later is a pretty good indicator that "Victory" is not on the horizon. Nor will it ever be. The war in Afghanistan is being fought not to lose.

[JHC]

I too rolled in for my first Afghan tour in October 2001. The way the war was conducted then, compared to now is night and day. And the results show. An NCO talking about how one little valley has changed over a couple of years is hardly an indicator of success. If this were 1 year into it, then I might be a little more optimistic. As it stands, we are 12 years into it, with tangible progress elusive at best. Success in that one location, sure. But victory it is not. And trending it is not. That we are still there 12 years later is a pretty good indicator that "Victory" is not on the horizon. Nor will it ever be. The war in Afghanistan is being fought not to lose.

+1 Great points. I don't disagree. Announcing the withdraw timeline in the same sentence you announce your surge is definitely not committing to victory! We are fighting to not lose and get out (by explicit CinC strategy) agreed. The ANA may fight to win.

But the phrase "What winning looks like" is almost inherently sarcastic since shortly after the Marine general first uttered it.

And in retrospect I think much of the "new" COIN strategy from the last decade got badly off track. And a helluvan argument can be made for skipping that altogether. Beat it down, hand the keys to somebody and leave.

If a large ANA can hold what they will inherit indefinitely - not at all clear, granted - but if they can, that's better than a lot of forecasts.

btw I think Colin Powell is one of the most destructive American leaders of his generation - with his calling off finishing off the Iraqi Army after 100 hrs in Gulf War 1 then promoting this "you break it you bought it" thing as Sec of State, then not going with Rumsfeld's argument to turn Iraq over to the first plausible Iraqi face to take over governance but instead install Bremer for a few years of insurgency feeding provisional American governance.

[Kevin B.]

If a large ANA can hold what they will inherit indefinitely - not at all clear, granted - but if they can, that's better than a lot of forecasts.

Unfortunately, I am convinced they cannot. I do not even think it is debatable.

[Kyle Reese]

Unfortunately, I am convinced they cannot. I do not even think it is debatable.

Agreed. The ANA didn't last long as a cohesive or viable entity after the USSR withdrew it's forces and left the Najibullah regime to it's fate, and I'm not convinced they'll do any better after we withdraw the bulk of conventional forces by the end of next year. From my own personal observations, the different ethnic groups, tribes and sub-tribes of the Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Nuristanis, Uzbeks and Turkmen all comprise the ANSF (and many are traditional enemies), and I'm not convinced that these groups will remain in uniform when we leave.

[Tamara]

Sadly, I see this as becoming a "conservative litmus test" five or ten years down the road, the way Vietnam was in the Eighties. Anyone says anything other than "The Army won all the battles but the cowardly politicians lost the war," then their credibility as a 'Murrican and viability as a conservative candidate will be toast.

(I'm just putting this down here as a marker.)

[JHC]

Unfortunately, I am convinced they cannot. I do not even think it is debatable.

Noted for future reference. ;)

[JHC]

Sadly, I see this as becoming a "conservative litmus test" five or ten years down the road, the way Vietnam was in the Eighties. Anyone says anything other than "The Army won all the battles but the cowardly politicians lost the war," then their credibility as a 'Murrican and viability as a conservative candidate will be toast.

(I'm just putting this down here as a marker.)

As it should be since the NVA had been licked and the ARVN were pretty good by the early 70's, just needing air support to withstand the fully Soviet subsidized NVA - which didn't happen thanks to the US Congress. So much hidden in history by our social studies teachers.

[Tamara]

...and thus is my point proven. Let's meet for lunch at Chick-Fil-A and burn some Dixie Chicks albums! :D

[Tamara]

(I should add that I think Congress's petulant cutoff of arms to the South merely hastened the end. The entire RVN was riddled with corruption and kept on life support by us long past its "Sell By" date. I do like the way that the party that started the war turned into a bunch of war-hating peaceniks when they lost the reins of power; it's good to know some things never change. ;) )

[Suvorov]

And I don't see any indicators we are "winning" the war in Afghanistan. After about the first 6 months of the war, the US started playing "Not to lose". That is much different than playing to "Win".

And the problem with that is, if you are not playing to win and the other side IS playing to win, you will eventually loose.

[JHC]

(I should add that I think Congress's petulant cutoff of arms to the South merely hastened the end. The entire RVN was riddled with corruption and kept on life support by us long past its "Sell By" date. I do like the way that the party that started the war turned into a bunch of war-hating peaceniks when they lost the reins of power; it's good to know some things never change. ;) )

Riddled or normal business as usual? Rapid expansion of ARVN up to 1.1 million men is gonna bring a lot of crap with it inevitably.

ARVN is underestimated pretty significantly; maybe not here, but generally. Their performance was far better than Dan Rather would have had us believe with all their warts. Good piece here details the good and bad.
http://www.generalhieu.com/arvn-sorley-2.htm

I don't think the ANA will be completely abandoned as the ARVN were by the US Congress.

The Marines in the earlier vids on What Winning Looks Like were drilling their students per a lesson plan on professionalism - from washing their hands after a shit or not firing a shot until they saw a Taliban to shoot. Is that what an indig fighter in that war in that country really needed? They may have understood that stepping out in front of the gate with a belt fed and dumping a hundred rounds into the treeline Rambo style meant something to the commander's troops and to the Taliban out there watching. We shall see.

[Tamara]

Their performance was far better than Dan Rather would have had us believe with all their warts.

Dan Rather's opinion does not even factor with me. Nor does my social studies teacher's.

[JAD]

Sadly, I see this as becoming a "conservative litmus test" five or ten years down the road, the way Vietnam was in the Eighties. )
It was a tie!

[Odin Bravo One]

Unfortunately, I am convinced they cannot. I do not even think it is debatable.

I'm not optimistic.

[Kevin B.]

Offered for consideration...

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/08/pakistan-militants-preparing-for-afghanistan-civil-war/?test=latestnews

[JHC]

Offered for consideration...

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/08/pakistan-militants-preparing-for-afghanistan-civil-war/?test=latestnews

And certainly due it! Thanks.

[Tamara]

Dr. Simbal Khan, a regional security expert with the Islamabad Policy Research Institute in Islamabad, said Pakistan doesn't want to see Afghanistan return to the 1990s, when civil war destroyed the country and gave rise to the repressive Taliban regime which in turn strengthened Pakistan's militants.

Considering that the Taliban was nurtured by the ISI specifically to destabilize post-Soviet Afghanistan, this is a cheeky assertion to make.

[Kevin B.]

Considering that the Taliban was nurtured by the ISI specifically to destabilize post-Soviet Afghanistan, this is a cheeky assertion to make.

Afghanistan was pretty well destablized by the time Pakistan started backing the Taliban.

[Tamara]

Afghanistan was pretty well destablized by the time Pakistan started backing the Taliban.

Well, maybe "make sure it stayed an inward-turned backwards nation that was no threat to the Punjabi shopkeepers to the south" might have described the theory better.

[JHC]

Afghanistan was pretty well destablized by the time Pakistan started backing the Taliban.

That's was their old school tribal stuff. But Pakistan essentially invented the Taliban; they didn't have to start backing them.

http://www.hindu.com/2000/01/01/stories/05011349.htm

[Tamara]

That's was their old school tribal stuff. But Pakistan essentially invented the Taliban; they didn't have to start backing them.

Well, I'd take anything about Pakistan written in New Delhi with the same size grain of salt I'd take a George W. Bush biopic filmed by Michael Moore. ;)

But, yeah, the Taliban was essentially a non-factor until the ISI came along.

[Kevin B.]

But Pakistan essentially invented the Taliban; they didn't have to start backing them.

They did not "invent" them so much as they made them a viable entity. It is worth noting that the Taliban was not Pakistan's first choice. They only began backing the Taliban after it became clear that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (their first choice) had alienated the majority of Pashtuns. The Taliban was the next viable (from the Pak perspective) entity that could establish Pashtun governence of Afghanistan.

It is also worth noting that the Taliban did not experience the success that they did without considerable intervention from the Pakistani military.

Oh, for anyone interested, Happy Massoud Day...:rolleyes:

[JHC]

This is the latest of recent articles about the ANA's development. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/02/15/afghan-helmand-coalition-leatherneck/5373981/

Check out the end around the ANA did through a minefield to then drive the Taliban through their own minefield/IED trap.


A few weeks ago it was http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/23/taliban-afghanistan-kabul/4800131/ 3-4K firefights, almost all dominated.

[JHC]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/can-the-afghan-security-forces-stand-up-to-the-taliban

[Kevin B.]

The observations attributed to the ODA mirror my experience.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/27/army-green-berets-reportedly-criticize-performance-afghan-army-troops/

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/26/green-berets-tell-of-afghan-national-army-soldiers/?page=all#pagebreak

[JHC]

The observations attributed to the ODA mirror my experience.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/27/army-green-berets-reportedly-criticize-performance-afghan-army-troops/

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/26/green-berets-tell-of-afghan-national-army-soldiers/?page=all#pagebreak

I remember that B1 incident when it hit. Just after the AF was arguing against the A10 and that the B1 can handle that CAS stuff just as well. That ODA sure had a scathing assessment of the ANA they were working with.

[Jeep]

I remember that B1 incident when it hit. Just after the AF was arguing against the A10 and that the B1 can handle that CAS stuff just as well. That ODA sure had a scathing assessment of the ANA they were working with.

In truth, the ANA would probably be good enough against a Taliban force without outside support. The problem is that the Taliban remain Pakistan's proxy and Pakistan is still arming, supplying and training them.

It's tough to win wars when you you've convinced yourself that the main supporter of your enemy is your "ally."

[Kevin B.]

There is a deep routed mistrust between the Afghans and the Pakistanis, our diplomatic efforts notwithstanding.

There are a handful of Afghan units capable of fighting the Taliban unilaterally. The ANA as a whole is woefully unprepared and largely lacks the will.

[JHC]

There is a deep routed mistrust between the Afghans and the Pakistanis, our diplomatic efforts notwithstanding.

There are a handful of Afghan units capable of fighting the Taliban unilaterally. The ANA as a whole is woefully unprepared and largely lacks the will.

I value your experience, I do. As I do the one ODA that testified to the experience they had in the linked article. But that isn't personally working with the entire ANA. They were in a LOT of gunfights last year as in discussed in some previously linked articles. It appears they didn't do badly as a 3rd world army.

An Inf E6 I know well worked with them on 2010 and again in 2013. He said no comparison for the units he worked with. 2013 they were pretty good. Operating on their own and US tag alongs would have slowed them down.

Our current level of 9800 going forward may be the equivalent of just abandoning them. I'm not sure. It's hard to imagine that small of a force helping them much but that could be all wrong.

They were supposed to fall flat on their face this year. They didn't. Now they are supposed to fall flat on their face next year. We will see.

This piece is as recent as July. They have come a long way as a society for the majority of the population. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-good-news-from-afghanistan/

We will see.

[Kevin B.]

You are right, I have not worked with the entire ANA.

But I have had several lengthy discussions with Sher Mohammed Karimi about the state of the ANA and the work that remains to be done. I have had the MoD G2 ask me (yes, me) where his targets are going to come from. I have seen, firsthand, the level of training the ANA receives and I have seen several units in the field. I have personally toured the MoD Central Supply Depot and witnessed the dysfunction of the MoD logistics system (incidentally, as an American taxpayer, you should be outraged). I have watched numerous U.S. commanders scramble behind the scenes to get their Afghan counterparts fuel and ammunition that they were unable to provide themselves. I know that beyond what the international community has already pledged in financial support the MoD has a $3 Billion shortfall. I had a front row seat to CRU222's response to the IEC attack in March and I was completely underwhelmed, given the amount of equipment and training that unit has received over the last decade. I have witnessed, firsthand, the culture of nepotism/patronage that protects/promotes the incompetent/corrupt.

Maybe after 20+ years of military service, I do not understand the processes and systems that need to be in place for an organization as large as the ANA (let alone all ANSF) to function on a level that would be considered marginally effective. But I do not think so.

As you said, we will see.

[JHC]

Yes they are a basket case for logistics support. Without a doubt. Does Gen Karimi think they are a lost cause? Or that they can do this with logistical and air support? How good do they need to be to hold?

What was your assessment of the Iraqis? In 2005-2007 what happened by 2008 was also deemed impossible by many that had close contact with them. And yet, they did what they did. The fact that they cracked up doesn't change what they did. South Korea, Germany and Japan would also have cracked up without our occupation spanning many years.

[Kevin B.]

I thought the Iraqi military was in fairly good shape in 2007. They still had some work to do with regard to training, but they were able to perform basic military functions largely independent of the U.S. They suffered primarily from Sunni v. Shia conflict throughout the ranks.

For example, I worked with an Iraqi Battalion Commander who had an extensive network of informants throughout our AO (former intel officer during the Iran-Iraq War). The logistics system was slow but generally worked if you put the effort in. He had about 30 commandoes who were fairly good that formed the nucleus of our assault force and we would typically roll with another 50-150 of his men to establish the cordon. Highly effective. We would run raids every night, sometimes as many as five per night based on intelligence he provided. We pulled 2-3 caches per week. He was arrested by the MoI (he was Sunni, MoI was Shia, targets were primarily JAM). His arrest went to GEN Petreaus and I believe Secretary Rice to no avail. After a month of house arrest he was released but the damage had been done.

When I went back to Iraq, the military infrastructure was much more robust than what exists in Afghanistan. The Nepotism was more subdues though still present. I was on the ground in 2011 when our withdrawl was announced and everyone knew that the Iraqis were going to have serious issues. In my estimation, the Afghans are much further behind where the Iraqis were in 2011 and the level of corruption is significantly greater, hence my lack of optimism.

[will_1400]

This is the latest of recent articles about the ANA's development. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/02/15/afghan-helmand-coalition-leatherneck/5373981/

Check out the end around the ANA did through a minefield to then drive the Taliban through their own minefield/IED trap.


A few weeks ago it was http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/23/taliban-afghanistan-kabul/4800131/ 3-4K firefights, almost all dominated.

I'm still laughing at that mental image in the first link. People like to talk trash about middle-easterners but they're tough and clever as most here already know.

[Jeep]

There is a deep routed mistrust between the Afghans and the Pakistanis, our diplomatic efforts notwithstanding.

There are a handful of Afghan units capable of fighting the Taliban unilaterally. The ANA as a whole is woefully unprepared and largely lacks the will.

The Taliban, however, can't fight on the current scale without Pakistani support. So the initial question is whether the Pakistanis are going to keep supporting the Taliban. If they do, it is hard for me to see good things happening. If they yank their support--which I have to greatly doubt--then there is the possibility of a happier outcome.

I could be wrong but I think that because of decisions made in Washington the outcome of this war will be decided in Islamabad/Rawalpindi.

[Kevin B.]

I wrote my thesis on Pakistan's role in the conflict. I would disagree that the Afghan Taliban are dependent on Pakistan, though I would agree that they benefit from certain elements within the Pakistani governement.

[Kyle Reese]

I wrote my thesis on Pakistan's role in the conflict. I would disagree that the Afghan Taliban are dependent on Pakistan, though I would agree that they benefit from certain elements within the Pakistani governement.

***cough ISI cough***

[Kevin B.]

***cough ISI cough***
They would certainly be on my list.

[JHC]

I thought the Iraqi military was in fairly good shape in 2007. They still had some work to do with regard to training, but they were able to perform basic military functions largely independent of the U.S. They suffered primarily from Sunni v. Shia conflict throughout the ranks.

For example, I worked with an Iraqi Battalion Commander who had an extensive network of informants throughout our AO (former intel officer during the Iran-Iraq War). The logistics system was slow but generally worked if you put the effort in. He had about 30 commandoes who were fairly good that formed the nucleus of our assault force and we would typically roll with another 50-150 of his men to establish the cordon. Highly effective. We would run raids every night, sometimes as many as five per night based on intelligence he provided. We pulled 2-3 caches per week. He was arrested by the MoI (he was Sunni, MoI was Shia, targets were primarily JAM). His arrest went to GEN Petreaus and I believe Secretary Rice to no avail. After a month of house arrest he was released but the damage had been done.

When I went back to Iraq, the military infrastructure was much more robust than what exists in Afghanistan. The Nepotism was more subdues though still present. I was on the ground in 2011 when our withdrawl was announced and everyone knew that the Iraqis were going to have serious issues. In my estimation, the Afghans are much further behind where the Iraqis were in 2011 and the level of corruption is significantly greater, hence my lack of optimism.

FuckinA.

[JHC]

Pakistan must be the most complicated shithole on the planet.

I am not a participant. I am a spectator. I choose to be optimistic because I don't want to see the disaster of true defeat and I have a giant amount of confidence in what the big Mil can figure out given the time and resources. This last part has gotten esp unstable since BHO swore his oath. But I also see no upside in being pessimistic; what with so many veterans of that war with so much invested in it and sons in the business.

I realize the ANA may suck by low standards. I just think there have been signs they don't suck so bad that they can't do this - WITH continued logistical help, ideally CAS and ongoing training assistance.

My hunch is much of the strategy since 2002-3 was probably poor with a top down model for a land that historically organized bottom up if I understand it correctly. I am puzzled why Petraeus and McChrystal bothered to have Kilcullen on staff if they were going to use so little of his advice - or so I've been puzzled since reading Kilcullen's book (i.e. bottom up)

I wonder if the turning over of the "nation building" to NATO governance didn't have a lot to do with that. But we alone may not have done much better. But the bottom up approach to first organize and empower tribes and traditional warlords with money and support - building up into a federation would not seem to be something that would have just been overlooked.

I also wonder if the US (mostly in the bodies of Petraeus and McChrystal) didn't poorly understand "hearts and minds". McChrystal perhaps worse, since it appears after he departed, Petraeus, it has been reported opened up the ROE and there was more ordinance dropped in the following few months than in the prior year. Then again it's also possible half of the ROE restrictions were due to poor brigade and battalion level leadership playing CYA and ratcheting the ROE tighter with each level it passed through. It seems that it was reported that cleaning that up was one of Petraeus' messages when he took it over.

Kilcullen made the point that the counterinsurgency force does not have to be gentle. It just has to be predictable. OIF COIN templates probably were inappropriate in AFG if in fact they were applied.

Any other insights sharable you (KevinB) may have about COIN strategy in general or specific would be much appreciated but I can also appreciate you may not for any reason of your choosing.

[Kevin B.]

A detailed discussion of COIN is far too extensive for a post. I think both Iraq and Afghanistan would have turned out better if the warfighting had been left to the warfighters. Sadly, that has not been the case. We (at least some of us) forgot why we went to Afghanistan in the first place.

I was having dinner with a very experienced SAS officer one evening in Kabul. The conversation turned to the challenges faced by the Afghans and the future of Afghanistan. He posed the question "Knowing what you know now, what would you have done differently?"

My answer was "Leave back in 2003."

After a few minutes of quiet dining he said "I think you are right."

[JHC]

A detailed discussion of COIN is far too extensive for a post. I think both Iraq and Afghanistan would have turned out better if the warfighting had been left to the warfighters. Sadly, that has not been the case. We (at least some of us) forgot why we went to Afghanistan in the first place.

I was having dinner with a very experienced SAS officer one evening in Kabul. The conversation turned to the challenges faced by the Afghans and the future of Afghanistan. He posed the question "Knowing what you know now, what would you have done differently?"

My answer was "Leave back in 2003."

After a few minutes of quiet dining he said "I think you are right."

+1 on the bolded.

Yeah the idea that "you broke it, you own it" is stupidly limiting and one of Colin Powell's two disasterous contributions to national defense. It worked in Japan, Germany, South Korea and to a lesser degree perhaps in the Philippines but it's not the Law of Gravity.

I assume your background is as a shooter, like your SAS colleague. At the risk of offending, do you think that is the background and experience best equipped for mapping decades long national security policy? It may be. The question is on the level. Now you've taken this to the masters degree level already so you may well have a somewhat unique perspective on that question. I thinking of the post WW II Marshal Plan, our occupation and re-start of the R.O.K. as examples of the right plans that set in motion decades of peace and prosperity in regions.

What is the end game in The Long War? Smash, depart. Return to smash again. I do think a good argument can be made that such would be cheaper in life and treasure and the alternative we have followed may not deliver any better result. It's tough to measure going forward.

But I still think the AFG plan should have been tribal from the bottom up.

[Kevin B.]

At the risk of offending, do you think that is the background and experience best equipped for mapping decades long national security policy? It may be. The question is on the level.
No offense taken. It is a fair question and one that I do not have an answer for. I am not sure what combination of education and experience is the correct one for mapping a national security strategy. I have seen men I considered brilliant in both the DoD and DoS. I have also seen some of the most incompetent people imaginable in both organizations. At the risk of sounding arrogant, I can say with certainty that I am better equipped than some of the people who are designing/managing our strategy for Afghanistan.

Regarding the idea of the bottom up/tribal development; that is really the direction we tried to steer the Afghans in 2002 with the first Loya Jirga. I was skeptical then and I am even more skeptical now. It s not a country in the same sense that America is a country. It really lacks a national identity and I do not think we can cultivate a national identity to the degree that it supplants tribal and ethnic allegiances.

I would add that there are a few Afghans who "get it." They tend to be our "go to" guys. They also tend to be ostracized by the fellow Afghans for being to westernized.

[JHC]

I am immensely grateful for your contributions to this discussion, not to mention God knows what else. ;)

[Kyle Reese]

No offense taken. It is a fair question and one that I do not have an answer for. I am not sure what combination of education and experience is the correct one for mapping a national security strategy. I have seen men I considered brilliant in both the DoD and DoS. I have also seen some of the most incompetent people imaginable in both organizations. At the risk of sounding arrogant, I can say with certainty that I am better equipped than some of the people who are designing/managing our strategy for Afghanistan.

Regarding the idea of the bottom up/tribal development; that is really the direction we tried to steer the Afghans in 2002 with the first Loya Jirga. I was skeptical then and I am even more skeptical now. It s not a country in the same sense that America is a country. It really lacks a national identity and I do not think we can cultivate a national identity to the degree that it supplants tribal and ethnic allegiances.

I would add that there are a few Afghans who "get it." They tend to be our "go to" guys. They also tend to be ostracized by the fellow Afghans for being to westernized.

Of all the Afghans that I got to work with, I liked the Hazaras the most.