Catherine Herridge’s Interview with 3 SEALs

[Sensei]

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/navy-seals-tell-cbs-news-alleged-criminality-drug-use-exploitation/

Well, it’snice to see that none of America’s proud institutions are escaping the nation’s descent into social decay. :rolleyes:

[DrkBlue]

The SEAL thing is... unfortunate.
It is not necessarily new, as Jesse Ventura and Dick Marchinko certainly traded on SEAL cachet in the 1980-90s. Showboating and writing books is poor form but folks got to eat... Or be governor of Minnesota.

That said, the killing of a fellow service member who reportedly discovered ongoing criminal conduct is really problematic. That wasn’t one guy, it was a detachment-wide conspiracy. That is endemic of a much deeper organizational rot. I am no SEAL but appreciates those challenging that kind of failed leadership and broken culture.

Not certain where Sensei was going with this post, but the situation sickens me. Trump and now Biden are declaring GWOT dead - the game of musical chairs is just beginning.

[LittleLebowski]

My first question would be “what’s their op tempo” before just blaming them. I doubt it’s a black and white thing.

[Lex Luthier]

Maybe I'm cynical, paranoid, or a combination of the two, but I can't help but see stuff like this through the lens of certain people trying to gut every possible organization that can oppose them, so that they might take charge in every conceivable way.

I mean, the info might be true, even understated, but I don't trust the motives of the folks who are letting it see the light of day.

[Sensei]

Not certain where Sensei was going with this post, but the situation sickens me. Trump and now Biden are declaring GWOT dead - the game of musical chairs is just beginning.

I have 2 points:

1) Our military culture, like all institutions, is a reflection of our society as a whole and no branch or unit is immune. As our society rots, so will all elements of our military.

2) Reports of this particular problem are not new and I’ve been in more than one exchange on this forum about what I thought was a brewing problem. This article does not make me think that the problem is getting any better.

[JHC]

This piece includes some info about an exceptionally mysterious double murder case from Ft Bragg I've been following since late last year.
It raises a lot of troubling questions.

https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/fort-bragg-murders-1153405/

"The man on the ground, who had been dropped by a single bullet to the right temple, was 44-year-old Timothy Dumas. People who knew him tell me that in life, he fit a certain kind of American archetype: the wannabe special-forces guy, a fake operator who, in order to impress people or intimidate them, passed himself off as an ex-commando. He had served 19 years in the Army, including time in the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, but as a property book officer, a glorified supply sergeant.

The man in the bed of the truck, by contrast, didn’t have to inflate his military credentials. Not only was he a decorated Green Beret with dozens of badges and patches and medals from 14 different deployments, he was also a member of Delta Force, the most elite military unit in the United States. At age 37, William “Billy” Lavigne II was a true Tier 1 operator, a master sergeant on the Army’s most selective and clandestine task force."

[Sensei]

This piece includes some info about an exceptionally mysterious double murder case from Ft Bragg I've been following since late last year.
It raises a lot of troubling questions.

https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/fort-bragg-murders-1153405/


That article is concerning, but it comes from Rolling Stone. I have a hard time believing the reporters working for that outfit.

[JHC]

That article is concerning, but it comes from Rolling Stone. I have a hard time believing the reporters working for that outfit.

Some of the most impactful facts reported are out there previously from other reporting.

[JohnO]

I have 2 points:

1) Our military culture, like all institutions, is a reflection of our society as a whole and no branch or unit is immune. As our society rots, so will all elements of our military.

2) Reports of this particular problem are not new and I’ve been in more than one exchange on this forum about what I thought was a brewing problem. This article does not make me think that the problem is getting any better.

Years ago we got involved with a large faith based homeschooling group. As I got involved I was surprised at some of the behavior I witnessed. Both children and parents exhibiting behavior I thought I would not see in such a group. Then I quickly came to the realization that every group no matter the type is microcosm of society. There will be a normal distribution of individuals in behavior, values and morals. When being selective about all you can hope for is a shift of the Bell Curve in the "positive" direction.

[wvincent]

My first question would be “what’s their op tempo” before just blaming them. I doubt it’s a black and white thing.

I disagree with the using ops tempo as an out.
All success and failures reside with Command. From the Chiefs on up, it's their job to manage it. Op's tempo causing too much burn out or unit degradation? The Senior NCO's are your "frontline managers", they need to send it up the chain, and higher needs to listen.

Start treating these operators like they are actually human, and not a mechanical weapons system, and I think you would find it a betterment for the entire force.

Also, and just speculation on my part, but if folks made it past selection because we need the bodies, and not because they met the actual standards, then that is the recipe for a shit sandwich.

[JRB]

I disagree with the using ops tempo as an out.
All success and failures reside with Command. From the Chiefs on up, it's their job to manage it. Op's tempo causing too much burn out or unit degradation? The Senior NCO's are your "frontline managers", they need to send it up the chain, and higher needs to listen.

Start treating these operators like they are actually human, and not a mechanical weapons system, and I think you would find it a betterment for the entire force.

Also, and just speculation on my part, but if folks made it past selection because we need the bodies, and not because they met the actual standards, then that is the recipe for a shit sandwich.

I honestly laughed out loud at the part I bolded.

With the downdraw of conventional forces across the board, and the overall visibilty/big Army sorts of bureaucratic hurdles to getting stuff done, more and more SF/SOF types of elements are being tasked with more and more work. I can only speak to the Army side, but fewer and fewer applicants are passing the requirements for on 18X selection contracts or any other internal transfers from other Army elements.

So we have an increasing op tempo, a wider AOR, more missions than ever, and fewer genuinely qualified folks to do it.
I promise you that leadership will never, ever say "No, my guys can't do this mission that's a 'time now' requirement because we were just gone for 6 months and they've been back home three weeks."

You're 100% right about everything in your post, but it's not a realistic goal, especially with the current administration.

[wvincent]

I honestly laughed out loud at the part I bolded.

With the downdraw of conventional forces across the board, and the overall visibilty/big Army sorts of bureaucratic hurdles to getting stuff done, more and more SF/SOF types of elements are being tasked with more and more work. I can only speak to the Army side, but fewer and fewer applicants are passing the requirements for on 18X selection contracts or any other internal transfers from other Army elements.

So we have an increasing op tempo, a wider AOR, more missions than ever, and fewer genuinely qualified folks to do it.
I promise you that leadership will never, ever say "No, my guys can't do this mission that's a 'time now' requirement because we were just gone for 6 months and they've been back home three weeks."

You're 100% right about everything in your post, but it's not a realistic goal, especially with the current administration.
How many missions are they rolling SF on that conventional troops could be used? Serious question.

What really pisses me off is the fact that they are won't say no, they would rather break these people physically and mentally.
Operators or not, they're just like the rest of us, all they want is to serve honorably.

[JRB]

How many missions are they rolling SF on that conventional troops could be used? Serious question.

I'm out of that loop, and even if I wasn't, I doubt there's any of that information that could be shared on a public forum.

What I can say is that 2+2 = 4, and here's the 2+2:

- Record numbers of contractors both American and OCN/TCN are being used anywhere they can replace Soldiers, especially in maintenance/sustainment operations. This is done to keep the 'boots on ground' numbers lower. Takes three contractors to do the same as one American Soldier? Oh well. Sadly, in some cases one skilled prior service contractor can do the work of three Soldiers, particularly in fields like aviation maintenance, etc.

- Large conventional units require more time to 'spool up' and get logistics organized etc and actually get deployed. That's expensive and largely unpopular in a lot of circles.

- Our Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and SF types are the exception. They can also reset and redeploy back stateside in a faster fashion as well. They have more independent control of their logistics, their budgets, and their missions. They also have a 'leaner' chain of command and more operational flexibility.
As we all know, the more staff officers present that count beans, the more lag time, cost, complication, and problems that exist in moving quickly and effectively.


Said another way, imagine that the mission is to move some stuff, and a regular deploying conventional element is a 53ft semi truck with a 30mph speed limiter and very specific rules on when, where, and what can be loaded into the back and how it can be loaded into the back, and where it's allowed to pick up and drop stuff off. There's also rules on inspecting the truck, ensuring it's maintained to a specific standard, and the truck doesn't move at all unless all those conditions are met. But when all those conditions are met, we can move a LOT of shit and move some of the biggest shit around - just slowly and with a lot of paperwork and other crap.

Meanwhile, SF/SOF elements are a 650hp pickup truck with an 8ft bed and basically no other rules beyond 'don't lose any of the shit you're carrying'.
For awhile now, it has been much faster to make multiple trips to everything, filling that 8ft bed every time and blasting around the desert at 100mph, and thereby driving the wheels off that truck.
Except now the check engine light is on, it's leaking oil, the tires are bald, and it's making some weird noises. Leadership will pay lip service to those concerns and maybe get it a new set of tires and make sure there's enough oil to keep it topped off. But they're not going to think it's a real problem until they're driving that truck somewhere and it breaks down.

At which point the leadership will say 'what a piece of shit truck' and wonder why it broke because it was working just fine with the check engine light and bad tires etc just 15 minutes ago.

[wvincent]

I'm out of that loop, and even if I wasn't, I doubt there's any of that information that could be shared on a public forum.

What I can say is that 2+2 = 4, and here's the 2+2:

- Record numbers of contractors both American and OCN/TCN are being used anywhere they can replace Soldiers, especially in maintenance/sustainment operations. This is done to keep the 'boots on ground' numbers lower. Takes three contractors to do the same as one American Soldier? Oh well. Sadly, in some cases one skilled prior service contractor can do the work of three Soldiers, particularly in fields like aviation maintenance, etc.

- Large conventional units require more time to 'spool up' and get logistics organized etc and actually get deployed. That's expensive and largely unpopular in a lot of circles.

- Our Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and SF types are the exception. They can also reset and redeploy back stateside in a faster fashion as well. They have more independent control of their logistics, their budgets, and their missions. They also have a 'leaner' chain of command and more operational flexibility.
As we all know, the more staff officers present that count beans, the more lag time, cost, complication, and problems that exist in moving quickly and effectively.


Said another way, imagine that the mission is to move some stuff, and a regular deploying conventional element is a 53ft semi truck with a 30mph speed limiter and very specific rules on when, where, and what can be loaded into the back and how it can be loaded into the back, and where it's allowed to pick up and drop stuff off. There's also rules on inspecting the truck, ensuring it's maintained to a specific standard, and the truck doesn't move at all unless all those conditions are met. But when all those conditions are met, we can move a LOT of shit and move some of the biggest shit around - just slowly and with a lot of paperwork and other crap.

Meanwhile, SF/SOF elements are a 650hp pickup truck with an 8ft bed and basically no other rules beyond 'don't lose any of the shit you're carrying'.
For awhile now, it has been much faster to make multiple trips to everything, filling that 8ft bed every time and blasting around the desert at 100mph, and thereby driving the wheels off that truck.
Except now the check engine light is on, it's leaking oil, the tires are bald, and it's making some weird noises. Leadership will pay lip service to those concerns and maybe get it a new set of tires and make sure there's enough oil to keep it topped off. But they're not going to think it's a real problem until they're driving that truck somewhere and it breaks down.

At which point the leadership will say 'what a piece of shit truck' and wonder why it broke because it was working just fine with the check engine light and bad tires etc just 15 minutes ago.

You know, I get what you're saying. I have personal, though dated experience with what it looks like when Big Green starts lumbering around, getting ready to do something. I've also sat strip alert, and actually launched and deployed while on strip alert while on Team Big Blue.

My thought process is that maybe not every quick deploy requires DEVGRU or DELTA. It seems like SF and Seals have become have become favorite use toys, and I'm sure it's probably very satisfying to "flex" with them.

I understand there will always be a need for a rapidly deployable top tier unit for Americans in extremis, HVT's and such. There just has to be a better way to do this that leaves our personal intact and healthy at the end of their career.

Took me a while to figure out it was more efficient to perform maint. than to have to do repairs. Leadership needs to get that clue.

[Sensei]

Having read the article and watched the interview, I didn’t recall deployment tempo being mentioned as a a major factor. In fact, the SEALs being interviewed described a significant minority of their teammates as fundamentally flawed (evil to use their term), not as once good guys who were corrupted by the pressures of the job. I would think that the three SEALs being interviewed would have specified their deployment tempo had it been the root of the issue.

[JRB]

Having read the article and watched the interview, I didn’t recall deployment tempo being mentioned as a a major factor. In fact, the SEALs being interviewed described a significant minority of their teammates as fundamentally flawed (evil to use their term), not as once good guys who were corrupted by the pressures of the job. I would think that the three SEALs being interviewed would have specified their deployment tempo had it been the root of the issue.

I made it about 10% through the interview before I switched it off.

A tendency I personally observed in my brief and limited interactions with a repeatedly deployed SF/SOF element was a seeming lack of empathy or 'fucks to give' for want of a better term. Fundamentally, at least to my layman perspective, it seemed very similar to the 'burnout' and lack of empathy in overworked ER/Urgent Care providers and teachers in low-income schools.

In absolutely any element of service members, be it Navy Seals or Army Cooks, you will be able to find three whiny assholes that honestly think some of their superiors or peers are evil/fucked up/etc and they'd be delighted to tell anyone that will listen.
Given a chance to cry about it into a mic, I could easily see how you can find three dudes that didn't like a particular few guys and would mistake not giving a fuck for being evil.


Not to say what they're saying in that interview is impossible - just that I'm highly skeptical of their assessment being a dispassionate and accurate interpretation, given the egos and publicity involved, and military tendencies as a whole.

Also, worth mentioning, is that SEALS enjoy a different op tempo than many similar or near-similar Army elements.

[LittleLebowski]

Having read the article and watched the interview, I didn’t recall deployment tempo being mentioned as a a major factor. In fact, the SEALs being interviewed described a significant minority of their teammates as fundamentally flawed (evil to use their term), not as once good guys who were corrupted by the pressures of the job. I would think that the three SEALs being interviewed would have specified their deployment tempo had it been the root of the issue.

I don’t know, I wasn’t there; but having dealt with some serious lingering stuff from deployments in my family, I would not write anything off to such a black and white concept as just “evil” without asking a lot of hard questions. Always listen to the man on the ground is what Pete Blaber (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003XQEVWQ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1) preaches. Were these guys always “evil”? Are the guys diming them out getting a plea deal of some sort? Was Luke Shawley (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003XQEVWQ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1) “evil” or having a psychotic break? I’m not dismissing completely that these are just bad actors, but I’d like to know the whole story before passing judgement.

[JRB]

I don’t know, I wasn’t there; but having dealt with some serious lingering stuff from deployments in my family, I would not write anything off to such a black and white concept as just “evil” without asking a lot of hard questions. Always listen to the man on the ground is what Pete Blaber (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003XQEVWQ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1) preaches. We’re these guys always “evil”? Are the guys diming them out getting a plea deal of some sort? Was Luke Shawley (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003XQEVWQ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1) “evil” or having a psychotic break? I’m not dismissing completely that these are just bad actors, but I’d like to know the whole story before passing judgement.

I was trying to avoid that whole can of worms for a lot of reasons.

But you can't repeatedly deploy people to the same shitty places year after year after year to kill the same neverending stream of bad guys, and see the same never ending circle jerk of corruption and depravity with minimal if any tangible improvement to be seen, and expect them NOT to form some seriously non-PC stereotypes, and become skeptical of any actual path to solving those problems that doesn't involve just glassing everything and starting over from scratch.
If bitterness and resentment of the blood, treasure, and time spent in a futile pursuit makes someone evil, there's a fuckload of OEF and OIF veterans that are 'evil' by that standard.

[Sensei]

In absolutely any element of service members, be it Navy Seals or Army Cooks, you will be able to find three whiny assholes that honestly think some of their superiors or peers are evil/fucked up/etc and they'd be delighted to tell anyone that will listen.
Given a chance to cry about it into a mic, I could easily see how you can find three dudes that didn't like a particular few guys and would mistake not giving a fuck for being evil.


Not to say what they're saying in that interview is impossible - just that I'm highly skeptical of their assessment being a dispassionate and accurate interpretation, given the egos and publicity involved, and military tendencies as a whole.


Two years ago, the Commander and top NCO of Naval Special Warfare penned a letter that their command had “a problem.” That was in response to allegations mirroring the CBS interview.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.businessinsider.com/top-navy-seal-commander-seal-scandals-reveal-big-problems-2019-8%3famp

The prevailing response from this forum at that time was that the Command for that community was somehow detached from the reality on the ground, and was over stating the problem. Now, the same warning is being repeated from below. I’m reluctant to chalk it up to bitching from the rank and file or a few disgruntled troops. Unlike Rolling Stone, Catherine Herridge has a record of accuracy and getting in front of issues. She also doesn’t have an axe to grind with the military which is unique among mainstream reporters.

Perhaps it’s time to acknowledge that the problem exists and we need to fix it before a country like China starts stacking American bodies.

[JDB]

I made it about 10% through the interview before I switched it off.


Also, worth mentioning, is that SEALS enjoy a different op tempo than many similar or near-similar Army elements.


Slower or faster op tempo than similar Army elements? I genuinely don't know.

[Wake27]

My experience with NSW is limited and outdated, but I doubt this is overblown or due to OPTEMPO. Fame with these units is problematic because it attracts more recruits - the good and bad ones. Some guys join because they want to have a direct effect on our country's strategic goals, some because they just want a challenge and/or rush, and some because they like that these units operate outside of societal norms and many rules. Often, its a bit of everything. I'm not saying that evil guys joined, but I guarantee it exists in at least the NSW ranks. Even a very small amount of that type of evil is extremely toxic.

Operators live outside of societal norms and many times have to break rules for good reasons. It makes sense that lines can become blurred and after too long, disappear all together. But none of that excuses Logan's incident. That was a narcissistic, entitled, invincibility issue that SOF can breed and is clearly out of control in the Navy's most elite circle because those guys must have been operating without rules for far too long to get to that point. I don't have the full picture of the incident but from what I do have, I really can't think of a defense for anyone in that room. To me, unless there are significant facts that have not been released, they all deserve to be tried for treason and executed. They're supposed to be some of America's most elite and therefore most trusted, and yet they killed an American GB in super sketchy circumstances.

[Wake27]

With the downdraw of conventional forces across the board, and the overall visibilty/big Army sorts of bureaucratic hurdles to getting stuff done, more and more SF/SOF types of elements are being tasked with more and more work.

Are they? I'm not saying its slowing down significantly, but I'm not sure its increasing. I do know that future uncertainty is a problem. Us leaving AFG is absolutely causing strong, mixed emotions both about the past and also about what's ahead. Hopefully it'll help ensure the best guys stay, because they are truly dedicated. But we'll lose a lot of good guys as well.

[breakingtime91]

Interesting, I am living right outside an area that houses a Special Forces element of a specific branch. They are under investigation by their branches detectives and local police for drugs, selling military gear, intimidation, and threatening people who "rat" on their conduct. After attending a range where some were blatantly stating "no one can touch us", I believe it is a big issue. I am not one to downplay op tempo and PTSD. I have lost almost ten guys I deployed with to suicide after harsh deployments and experienced and witnessed the burn out that happens when you see and do certain things. I think there are some guys with legitimate and understandable psychological issues from TBI and the stress of doing what is asked of men like them. Then there is another element that reach a certain "mindset" that they are special and the arrogance/ untouchability factor comes into play.

Fuck Marine Corps Infantryman, which I was, have the same attitudes sometimes. "We fight, fuck what you guys think. Your rules don't apply, I'm special."

[HCM]

How many missions are they rolling SF on that conventional troops could be used? Serious question.

What really pisses me off is the fact that they are won't say no, they would rather break these people physically and mentally.
Operators or not, they're just like the rest of us, all they want is to serve honorably.

Re: using conventional troops in traditional SF missions: In addition to what JRB wrote, the Army tried that directly with the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). JRB and others may know better but my understanding is they have not been a success.

Nor can you simply crank out more SF operators like widgets. It's been tried and it didn't work.

Re: your second point, that's not how paramilitary organizations (or service) work in practice. Churchill said it best: “Sometimes doing your best is not good enough. Sometimes you must do what is required.”

I could type out a lengthy response but this is nothing new. If you really want an answer watch the 1949 film "Twelve O'Clock High."

[HCM]

Fame with these units is problematic because it attracts more recruits - the good and bad ones. Some guys join because they want to have a direct effect on our country's strategic goals, some because they just want a challenge and/or rush, and some because they like that these units operate outside of societal norms and many rules. Often, its a bit of everything. I'm not saying that evil guys joined, but I guarantee it exists in at least the NSW ranks. Even a very small amount of that type of evil is extremely toxic.

Operators live outside of societal norms and many times have to break rules for good reasons. It makes sense that lines can become blurred and after too long, disappear all together.

I think you are on to something here. Taking what you wrote a step further, I think the recruits these units attract are a bell curve like anyone else, only more so. But that doesn't explain why some of these units seem to have more / less of these issues than others. The answer to that is the differences in what/who those units select, train and retain for though they all draw from a similar pool of recruits.

I've seen the same thing play out with selection, training and retention in LE. Just like dog breeding you get more of what you select for but you also get more of the second or third order effects of what you select for.

[HCM]

Fuck Marine Corps Infantryman, which I was, have the same attitudes sometimes. "We fight, fuck what you guys think. Your rules don't apply, I'm special."

You start with that group and then select for the most "Fuck You" of the group there will be second and third order effects. Some units seem to do a better job mitigating those second and third order effects via selection, training, culture and retention than others.

[LittleLebowski]

Interesting, I am living right outside an area that houses a Special Forces element of a specific branch. They are under investigation by their branches detectives and local police for drugs, selling military gear, intimidation, and threatening people who "rat" on their conduct. After attending a range where some were blatantly stating "no one can touch us", I believe it is a big issue. I am not one to downplay op tempo and PTSD. I have lost almost ten guys I deployed with to suicide after harsh deployments and experienced and witnessed the burn out that happens when you see and do certain things. I think there are some guys with legitimate and understandable psychological issues from TBI and the stress of doing what is asked of men like them. Then there is another element that reach a certain "mindset" that they are special and the arrogance/ untouchability factor comes into play.

Fuck Marine Corps Infantryman, which I was, have the same attitudes sometimes. "We fight, fuck what you guys think. Your rules don't apply, I'm special."

Well, that goes against the popular narrative regarding this only being an NSW problem.

[Wake27]

Re: using conventional troops in traditional SF missions: In addition to what JRB wrote, the Army tried that directly with the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). JRB and others may know better but my understanding is they have not been a success.

Nor can you simply crank out more SF operators like widgets. It's been tried and it didn't work.

I think its too early to say the SFABs have been a success or a failure. They definitely have growing pains, and started out with some issues, but their premise is good. Its just important that the whole Army, including them, remember that they have one primary mission that has some overlap with a small part of what SF does but they're not SOF and they don't replace SF (who has a far larger mission set).

Your number two point is mostly understood as its one of the SOF truths. But there are always those that try anyways.


Well, that goes against the popular narrative regarding this only being an NSW problem.

Its definitely not just NSW, but I do think they are the worst, or at least the most visibile.

[fixer]

I'm out of that loop, and even if I wasn't, I doubt there's any of that information that could be shared on a public forum.

What I can say is that 2+2 = 4, and here's the 2+2:

- Record numbers of contractors both American and OCN/TCN are being used anywhere they can replace Soldiers, especially in maintenance/sustainment operations. This is done to keep the 'boots on ground' numbers lower. Takes three contractors to do the same as one American Soldier? Oh well. Sadly, in some cases one skilled prior service contractor can do the work of three Soldiers, particularly in fields like aviation maintenance, etc.

- Large conventional units require more time to 'spool up' and get logistics organized etc and actually get deployed. That's expensive and largely unpopular in a lot of circles.

- Our Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and SF types are the exception. They can also reset and redeploy back stateside in a faster fashion as well. They have more independent control of their logistics, their budgets, and their missions. They also have a 'leaner' chain of command and more operational flexibility.
As we all know, the more staff officers present that count beans, the more lag time, cost, complication, and problems that exist in moving quickly and effectively.


Said another way, imagine that the mission is to move some stuff, and a regular deploying conventional element is a 53ft semi truck with a 30mph speed limiter and very specific rules on when, where, and what can be loaded into the back and how it can be loaded into the back, and where it's allowed to pick up and drop stuff off. There's also rules on inspecting the truck, ensuring it's maintained to a specific standard, and the truck doesn't move at all unless all those conditions are met. But when all those conditions are met, we can move a LOT of shit and move some of the biggest shit around - just slowly and with a lot of paperwork and other crap.

Meanwhile, SF/SOF elements are a 650hp pickup truck with an 8ft bed and basically no other rules beyond 'don't lose any of the shit you're carrying'.
For awhile now, it has been much faster to make multiple trips to everything, filling that 8ft bed every time and blasting around the desert at 100mph, and thereby driving the wheels off that truck.
Except now the check engine light is on, it's leaking oil, the tires are bald, and it's making some weird noises. Leadership will pay lip service to those concerns and maybe get it a new set of tires and make sure there's enough oil to keep it topped off. But they're not going to think it's a real problem until they're driving that truck somewhere and it breaks down.

At which point the leadership will say 'what a piece of shit truck' and wonder why it broke because it was working just fine with the check engine light and bad tires etc just 15 minutes ago.


GODDAMN this is a good post and this crap goes on in many other areas outside of military.

What I call it is being a "victim of your own success".

[LittleLebowski]

Its definitely not just NSW, but I do think they are the worst, or at least the most visibile.

I don’t dispute that.

[Borderland]

GODDAMN this is a good post and this crap goes on in many other areas outside of military.

What I call it is being a "victim of your own success".

NFL?

[JRB]

Well, that goes against the popular narrative regarding this only being an NSW problem.


Low morale and little/no faith in the mission breeds resentment, resentment breeds insubordination and mentally justifying rule-breaking, which in turn breeds criminality. Criminality can hide a lot longer in smaller elements with less oversight and more flexibility in logistics and everything else. This isn't in-flight missile repair.

It's not even limited to an SF/SOF problem - look at the the grand royal CID clusterfuck happening at Ft Hood with III Corps. That's a true 'Big Army' mess that is the end result of having essentially two different sets of rules for leadership over the past 20+ years. Rule set #1 talks all about Soldier care and pride in your mission and looks great in G.O.'s command philosophy memos and what not. Rule set #2 you'll never see in a memo, but it's basically 'you better not be the guy in charge if something goes wrong'. Essentially an unspoken demand for a zero-defect formation regardless of who's in that formation. This strongly encourages leadership to minimize, downplay, and straight-up hide shit as much as possible to literally save their careers.

Until we're ready to acknowledge that senior leaders can't be expected to fully control their E4's 24/7/365, and that sometimes that E4 is the only one at fault, and thereby the only one whose balls should be in front of the band saw, we're never going to fix that problem. But the current political/social climate demands blood from anyone with position or authority if anything goes wrong, so that's not likely to happen any time soon.



I think its too early to say the SFABs have been a success or a failure. They definitely have growing pains, and started out with some issues, but their premise is good. Its just important that the whole Army, including them, remember that they have one primary mission that has some overlap with a small part of what SF does but they're not SOF and they don't replace SF (who has a far larger mission set).

Your number two point is mostly understood as its one of the SOF truths. But there are always those that try anyways.



Its definitely not just NSW, but I do think they are the worst, or at least the most visibile.

From what I've seen, the Army's still figuring out what they're allowed to do with SFAB's and how well they work in those roles. Morale in SFAB's tends to be low - a 'worst of both worlds' sort of thing to hear their guys tell it. Which I can totally understand.

[JDD]

Well, that goes against the popular narrative regarding this only being an NSW problem.

It's not just a NSW problem (they do seem to have a pretty great opinion of themselves) It does however, seem to be a unit culture thing. I have firsthand personal experience with a fairly wide swath of operatour-y types. Some of them are dangerous professionals who I trust implicitly - no questions asked. Some of them were certainly dangerous, but were severely under-supervised and could not be trusted not to get into some pretty significant trouble when left to their own devices (many of the problems being ones I was personally responsible for fixing/investigating).

I am not sure if it is a problem with op-tempo, or poor screening to eliminate the personalities who are not suited for independent operations. But stuff like the murder of Logan Melgar and guys smuggling commercial quantities of coke (https://www.businessinsider.com/army-green-beret-pleads-guilty-to-smuggling-over-1-million-in-cocaine-2019-1) are not simply dudes being over worked, they are fundamental failures of character. These guys may be the worlds best killers, but a bit fuzzier on the abstract concepts like discipline - I'm not talking about parade deck, uniform policy, pog fobbit attention to meaningless detail discipline, I mean the depth of character that shows you can be trusted to operate independent of over-site and be trusted to do the things you are sent to do (and nothing else).