TCinVA
03-21-2016, 03:10 PM
At least according to the USSC:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-10078_aplc.pdf
The court basically rejected Mass. attempt to hold that the 2nd amendment was frozen to apply to weapons around in 1789. The concurrence of Alito and Thomas has some incredible quotes:
" While stun guns
were not in existence at the end of the 18th century, the
same is true for the weapons most commonly used today
for self-defense, namely, revolvers and semiautomatic
pistols. Revolvers were virtually unknown until well into
the 19th century,4 and semiautomatic pistols were not
invented until near the end of that century.5 Electronic
stun guns are no more exempt from the Second Amendment’s
protections, simply because they were unknown to
the First Congress, than electronic communications are
exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging
devices are exempt from the Fourth Amendment."
"First, the relative dangerousness of
a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class
of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller,
supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’”
that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘in
common use at the time’”). Second, even in cases where
dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial
Court’s test sweeps far too broadly. Heller defined the
“Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘any
thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his
hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’”
554 U. S., at 581. Under the decision below, however,
virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.”
Were there any doubt on this point, one need only look
at the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons:
“firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692. If
Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be
categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous.
554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Commonwealth’s
own witness described as “non-lethal force,” cannot be banned on that basis."
"The lower court’s ill treatment of Heller cannot stand.
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court poses a grave
threat to the fundamental right of self-defense. The Supreme
Judicial Court suggested that Caetano could have
simply gotten a firearm to defend herself. 470 Mass., at
783, 26 N. E. 3d, at 695. But the right to bear other weapons
is “no answer” to a ban on the possession of protected
arms. Heller, 554 U. S., at 629. Moreover, a weapon is an
effective means of self-defense only if one is prepared to
use it, and it is presumptuous to tell Caetano she should
have been ready to shoot the father of her two young
children if she wanted to protect herself. Courts should
not be in the business of demanding that citizens use more
force for self-defense than they are comfortable wielding."
"A State’s most basic responsibility is to keep its people
safe. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was either
unable or unwilling to do what was necessary to protect
Jaime Caetano, so she was forced to protect herself. To
make matters worse, the Commonwealth chose to deploy
its prosecutorial resources to prosecute and convict her of
a criminal offense for arming herself with a nonlethal
weapon that may well have saved her life. The Supreme
Judicial Court then affirmed her conviction on the flimsiest
of grounds. This Court’s grudging per curiam now
sends the case back to that same court. And the consequences
for Caetano may prove more tragic still, as her
conviction likely bars her from ever bearing arms for selfdefense.
See Pet. for Cert. 14.
If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect
Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the
mercy of state authorities who may be more concerned
about disarming the people than about keeping them safe."
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-10078_aplc.pdf
The court basically rejected Mass. attempt to hold that the 2nd amendment was frozen to apply to weapons around in 1789. The concurrence of Alito and Thomas has some incredible quotes:
" While stun guns
were not in existence at the end of the 18th century, the
same is true for the weapons most commonly used today
for self-defense, namely, revolvers and semiautomatic
pistols. Revolvers were virtually unknown until well into
the 19th century,4 and semiautomatic pistols were not
invented until near the end of that century.5 Electronic
stun guns are no more exempt from the Second Amendment’s
protections, simply because they were unknown to
the First Congress, than electronic communications are
exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging
devices are exempt from the Fourth Amendment."
"First, the relative dangerousness of
a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class
of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller,
supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’”
that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘in
common use at the time’”). Second, even in cases where
dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial
Court’s test sweeps far too broadly. Heller defined the
“Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘any
thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his
hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’”
554 U. S., at 581. Under the decision below, however,
virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.”
Were there any doubt on this point, one need only look
at the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons:
“firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692. If
Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be
categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous.
554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Commonwealth’s
own witness described as “non-lethal force,” cannot be banned on that basis."
"The lower court’s ill treatment of Heller cannot stand.
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court poses a grave
threat to the fundamental right of self-defense. The Supreme
Judicial Court suggested that Caetano could have
simply gotten a firearm to defend herself. 470 Mass., at
783, 26 N. E. 3d, at 695. But the right to bear other weapons
is “no answer” to a ban on the possession of protected
arms. Heller, 554 U. S., at 629. Moreover, a weapon is an
effective means of self-defense only if one is prepared to
use it, and it is presumptuous to tell Caetano she should
have been ready to shoot the father of her two young
children if she wanted to protect herself. Courts should
not be in the business of demanding that citizens use more
force for self-defense than they are comfortable wielding."
"A State’s most basic responsibility is to keep its people
safe. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was either
unable or unwilling to do what was necessary to protect
Jaime Caetano, so she was forced to protect herself. To
make matters worse, the Commonwealth chose to deploy
its prosecutorial resources to prosecute and convict her of
a criminal offense for arming herself with a nonlethal
weapon that may well have saved her life. The Supreme
Judicial Court then affirmed her conviction on the flimsiest
of grounds. This Court’s grudging per curiam now
sends the case back to that same court. And the consequences
for Caetano may prove more tragic still, as her
conviction likely bars her from ever bearing arms for selfdefense.
See Pet. for Cert. 14.
If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect
Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the
mercy of state authorities who may be more concerned
about disarming the people than about keeping them safe."