NBC News report on police firefights during manhunt for Boston bombing suspects

[SweetScienceOfShooting]

http://bearingarms.com/nbc-news-police-firefights-in-boston-bomber-hunt-show-cops-were-over-gunned-undertrained/

Bearing Arms did an article on the NBC news report of the police firefights during the manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombing suspects.

From the article:


In a stunning in-depth report from NBC News, the two gunfights that resulted in the apprehension of the Boston Marathon bombers is heavily criticized for exceedingly poor command and control and reckless gunfire.

The report, entitled Too Many Guns: How Shootout With Bombing Suspects Spiraled into Chaos, shows that the initial shootout in which Tamerlan Tsarnaev was eventually killed was almost a circular firing squad, as on-duty and off-duty officers, some in uniform and some in street clothes, arrived on the scene from multiple directions and began shooting no only at the Tsarnaev brothers, but each other:

In effect, the suspects ended up at the center of a ring of cops on Laurel Street between Dexter and School streets during the 20-minute firefight, and the bullets that were fired at them often hit near the officers on the other side.

“Certainly not a good idea,” said Davis. “They see somebody shooting, so they fire at them. That’s their training.”
…

More than a dozen officers suffered minor injuries during the mayhem, but none was believed to have been wounded by the suspects. The only serious wound was suffered by Richard Donohue, a transit cop with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, who was hit in the groin by a police bullet and began to bleed profusely.

The exact number of bullets fired y the Tsarnaev’s—who had just one handgun—may have totaled less than ten rounds. The responding police fired at least 100 rounds that authorities admit during this shootout, but the reality is that a much higher number of shots fired is probable.

Presuming that Boston-area officers that participated in the shootout were likely armed with .40 S&W Glock 22s or similar handguns featuring 15-round magazines and one round in the chamber, and that officers typically carry at least two spare magazines, each officer was carrying 46 rounds of ammunition. Many officers expended most or all of their ammunition during the shootout, and there were a minimum of 12 officers on the scene because, we know that many were wounded.

Presuming that there were just these dozen officers on the scene—and there were likely twice that many—a conservative estimate that 400 rounds were fired at the Tsarnaevs from every possible angle on this crowded city street lined with homes is entirely reasonable. Is is plausible that if there were two dozen officers were involved, and averaged firing two magazines each, that 720 rounds were expended.

It was a nightmare of poor command and control and police militarization that would go on for the next 18 hours. Citizens were forced from their homes at gunpoint under the threat of being shot with automatic weapons as SWAT officers conducting warrantless searches.


It was finally up to a citizen to locate Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, hiding in a boat on a piece of property that heavily-armed officers had already searched. Agents and officers from state, federal, and local agencies swarmed the site, jockeying for position, and then all hell broke loose yet again when Tsarnaev used a fishing gaffe to lift the edge of the tarp over the boat in order to look out.

But one of the snipers on the roof saw the object and began shooting. It sparked a round of what is known as “contagious fire,” where other officers with their fingers on the trigger began peppering the boat with bullets.

The commander began shouting for the officers to cease fire, but the fusillade went on for 10 seconds. Hundreds of rounds were expended.



Even as an LEO, I am at a complete loss to describe this as anything other than a clusterkitten. After the advances in active shooter/rapid deployment training in recent years, this is what happens during the highest profile manhunt in recent history? Heaven help us all....

[GardoneVT]

http://bearingarms.com/nbc-news-police-firefights-in-boston-bomber-hunt-show-cops-were-over-gunned-undertrained/

Bearing Arms did an article on the NBC news report of the police firefights during the manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombing suspects.

From the article:





Even as an LEO, I am at a complete loss to describe this as anything other than a clusterkitten. After the advances in active shooter/rapid deployment training in recent years, this is what happens during the highest profile manhunt in recent history? Heaven help us all....

In all fairness, they're LEO's, not frontline military .Maybe I'm just the token ignorant civilian here, but IMO it's a reach to expect people trained in arrest and apprehension of suspects to suddenly adopt and execute squad level frontline military assault tactics , in the dark, and on the fly.

What's the solution here? Hand out NVGs at Roll Call?

[HopetonBrown]

In all fairness, they're LEO going after an untrained teenager. Imagine if it were a trained adversary.

[Alpha Sierra]

In all fairness, they're LEO's, not frontline military

You wouldn't know that by looking at them

https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images;_ylt=A0LEVx3SSU5Tv34AfQdXNyoA?p=boston+mara thon+bomber+swat&fr=yfp-t-747&fr2=piv-web

[Dagga Boy]

I am often heavily critical of these things. The problem can be laid in one place......Police and Municipal Executive Management. When you give people minimal training, cross your fingers and hope for the best as a management principle, this is what happens. The same folks who are not making firearms training a priority on the top end are the first to wash their hands of responsibilities when things go bad. I lived the world where everything I did to improve training was fought at the higher levels and by the city executives. My program was dismantled within months of me retiring. Trust me, when you document that shooting performance of hitting at 17% is unacceptable in writing, you become an enemy of the state. I guarantee that many in that area have been pounding their head on the wall for years trying to improve L/E training. The facts are simple, "training" is totally geared toward the lowest common denominator officer to "get them to pass" (top leadership is often those LCD shooters themselves and often relatively inexperienced at actual police work), and an emphasis on high level discretionary shooting with heavy accuracy standards is not the priority because it takes A. Time, B. Money, C. Will, D. Leadership (NOT supervision), E. dedicated personnel, F. Community support for well trained LE. Basically............unicorns in police world.

[LSP972]

You wouldn't know that by looking at them

https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images;_ylt=A0LEVx3SSU5Tv34AfQdXNyoA?p=boston+mara thon+bomber+swat&fr=yfp-t-747&fr2=piv-web

No kidding.

A whole bunch of federally-funded toys in those photos, eh?

.

[JHC]

You wouldn't know that by looking at them

https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images;_ylt=A0LEVx3SSU5Tv34AfQdXNyoA?p=boston+mara thon+bomber+swat&fr=yfp-t-747&fr2=piv-web

Equipment is the easy part I suppose. ;)

[LSP972]

I am often heavily critical of these things. The problem can be laid in one place......Police and Municipal Executive Management. When you give people minimal training, cross your fingers and hope for the best as a management principle, this is what happens. The same folks who are not making firearms training a priority on the top end are the first to wash their hands of responsibilities when things go bad. I lived the world where everything I did to improve training was fought at the higher levels and by the city executives. My program was dismantled within months of me retiring. Trust me, when you document that shooting performance of hitting at 17% is unacceptable in writing, you become an enemy of the state. I guarantee that many in that area have been pounding their head on the wall for years trying to improve L/E training. The facts are simple, "training" is totally geared toward the lowest common denominator officer to "get them to pass" (top leadership is often those LCD shooters themselves and often relatively inexperienced at actual police work), and an emphasis on high level discretionary shooting with heavy accuracy standards is not the priority because it takes A. Time, B. Money, C. Will, D. Leadership (NOT supervision), E. dedicated personnel, F. Community support for well trained LE. Basically............unicorns in police world.

Well stated. And the odds are that at least SOME of those guys were on a team that trains, has procedures down pat, and a modicum of discipline.

Imagine how a "team" from Spider Crotch, BFE, that has the toys but not the training/experience, is going to react.

I gotta quit dwelling on this stuff. I'm done, out of it, retired, etc.; but it could affect me tonight.

Definitely getting scary out there… on both sides of the coin.

.

[Dagga Boy]

Well stated. And the odds are that at least SOME of those guys were on a team that trains, has procedures down pat, and a modicum of discipline.

Imagine how a "team" from Spider Crotch, BFE, that has the toys but not the training/experience, is going to react.

I gotta quit dwelling on this stuff. I'm done, out of it, retired, etc.; but it could affect me tonight.

Definitely getting scary out there… on both sides of the coin.

.

I keep telling myself that I don't care anymore..........but I do. I honestly feel really bad for the boots out there who just don't know what they don't know, and the supervision who does know, and just don't care.

[BLR]

I keep telling myself that I don't care anymore..........but I do. I honestly feel really bad for the boots out there who just don't know what they don't know, and the supervision who does know, and just don't care.

Dude, I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but that is epidemic throughout the world. And maybe it's my blooming cynicism, but I'm convinced no one wants to know.

[LSP972]

I keep telling myself that I don't care anymore..........but I do. I honestly feel really bad for the boots out there who just don't know what they don't know, and the supervision who does know, and just don't care.

I'm right there with you; I know exactly how you feel.

I see quite a few various pedigrees of street/road types, and office pogues, come into the lab dropping off evidence.

Some times, it is heartening.

Other times… well, I try not to think about those other times.

.

[KevinB]

In all fairness, they're LEO's, not frontline military .Maybe I'm just the token ignorant civilian here, but IMO it's a reach to expect people trained in arrest and apprehension of suspects to suddenly adopt and execute squad level frontline military assault tactics , in the dark, and on the fly.

What's the solution here? Hand out NVGs at Roll Call?


Honestly I would not expect much more from non SOF Military... -- except a higher round count.

Very few departments train at night -- so they are hamstrung when dealing with issues in the dark.

A vast majority of SWAT teams don't even understand night operations - so your not going to see great deal of low light group operations go smoothly.
Several departments SWAT units do not train for it - as they pretty much see themselves as Warrant teams, and just serve them in daylight.


A Nyeti states above, if your the squeaky wheel, you often get Greased, not grease.

[BLR]

A Nyeti states above, if your the squeaky wheel, you often get Greased, not grease.

All for not nearly enough money to deal with the people you deal with.

[Dagga Boy]

All for not nearly enough money to deal with the people you deal with.

Truthfully, dealing with the crooks was far easier (and the harder the crook, the easier) than the idiots in the office that are supposed to be on the same team.

[GardoneVT]

Truthfully, dealing with the crooks was far easier (and the harder the crook, the easier) than the idiots in the office that are supposed to be on the same team.

I just finished reading Jim Cirillo's last book about the Stakeout Squad, and in it that's basically what happened to the SOU. A new ,minority-issues administration took office in NYC and was horrified at the high numbers of black and ethnic folks shot dead in violent robbery attempts, so the unit was first harassed- and then disbanded.

Seems like a law enforcement agency which is TOO good at its job also threatens the livelihoods of the superiors at City Hall.

[1slow]

Several writers over the years have speculated that some statist politicians do not want to suppress criminal gang violence.
The public fear generated by gang violence makes it easier to stir up the mob and promote socialist government programs.
They eliminate the stakeout squads because they work too well. The statists want gun/weapons control, because the more helpless the public is the easier it is to manipulate / intimidate them.

[JM Campbell]

Scrolling through some of the pics on the Google link I saw a gentleman suited up like tactical Willie and a cross draw serpa on his left thigh....

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[KeeFus]

Truthfully, dealing with the crooks was far easier (and the harder the crook, the easier) than the idiots in the office that are supposed to be on the same team.

True Statement of the day right there^^^

[HCM]

Scrolling through some of the pics on the Google link I saw a gentleman suited up like tactical Willie and a cross draw serpa on his left thigh....

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N900A using Tapatalk

taser ?

[JM Campbell]

Saw no yellow, looked like a blaster with a mag in it.

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N900A using Tapatalk

[KevinB]

Scrolling through some of the pics on the Google link I saw a gentleman suited up like tactical Willie and a cross draw serpa on his left thigh....

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N900A using Tapatalk

Could be a Taser -- many folks run them cross draw so you have to make a significantly different draw stroke from Less Lethal to Lethal.

One of the things that jumps out at me in the article is:

A member of one SWAT team tried to take up a position on a rooftop, only to find that a member of a different SWAT team was on the same roof. After an argument, neither man would budge.

Now that bothers me - as it demonstrated a complete lack of command and control on the behalf of the incident commander:
The arriving teams should have been subject to the Incident Commander - and deployed in a method that gave the command control of the ground - now you have folks jockeying about trying to get their first CONUS kill and making Command and Control nonexistent. Local entities need to train together - so in incidents like this they are not behaving like stooges - endangering themselves, the public and to a point the suspect.

[HCM]

Truthfully, dealing with the crooks was far easier (and the harder the crook, the easier) than the idiots in the office that are supposed to be on the same team.

The Boston version:

Boston police, incoming mayor clash over AR-15 proposal
Mayor-elect Walsh believes the military-style weapons will not help to establish trust with residents
http://www.policeone.com/Gun-Legislation-Law-Enforcement/articles/6702233-Boston-police-incoming-mayor-clash-over-AR-15-proposal/

[Guinnessman]

Does anyone here worry that in the unfortunate event of a home invasion, the officers that show up to your house are more like Superbad or Super Troopers, instead of the consummate professionals that we find on this forum?

http://i104.photobucket.com/albums/m162/GuinessMan/supertroopers_zps02616ff0.jpg

[jlw]

When I was a corporal, I battled my administration constantly. Finally the chief called me in and told me that despite my work product being among the best in the agency, my attitude was going to keep me from ever being in a position to have an impact on policy. I didn't accept that at first, and was then called back in and told my career was over and that I could leave or ride it out exactly where I was. I groused around for a while until finally two LTs pulled me aside and convinced me to reengage but to simply do my job but avoid direct battles with the admin. That same chief who told me my career was over later promoted me twice more. The Sheriff in the neighboring county noticed an appointed me as his Chief Deputy.

Since my appointment, our overall training hours have more than doubled. We have gone from eight to 14 instructors, nine of which are firearms instructors. We are sending people to every school we can get them into and we are hosting people like Tom Givens.

Sometimes the squeaky wheel squeaks simply to spite itself, and if it were to apply some grease on it is own; then just maybe the squeaky wheel can get into a position where it can actually make an impact on policy.

[Dagga Boy]

I got that "advice" several times over the years. It was a simple choice, SHTFU and get promoted, or keep being a pain and get the firearms training in the right direction and remain a Corporal forever............I retired as a Senior Corporal and a lot of middle of the night "thank you" calls from the people I got to train.

There is an old saying-"The way to the top is not through the range". I have found that is generally true, particularly in larger agencies. There is also a major issue with the range being a great place to hide folks on "Blue Welfare" who have zero interest in training, can't shoot themselves, and are strictly there to collect a check with minimal work and are more than happy to not rock the boat and simply qualify people at the rate dictated by the top. Every so often, the planets align and you get some insanely great people placed in a training program and great stuff happens. That is usually generational to that individual, and once they are gone, Admin learns and doesn't make that "mistake" of putting a thoroughly dedicated person there again (almost everyone I know who I have learned a ton from and were mentors to me were usually replaced with "yes" men when they retired).

The "Really Smart" ones simply do their cop job and then train and work outside there organization. Doesn't help their co-workers at all, but is good for them.

[BaiHu]

The "Really Smart" ones simply do their cop job and then train and work outside there organization. Doesn't help their co-workers at all, but is good for them.

Isn't that the aim of the statist in any organization? I find this divide and conquer mentality everywhere. Where the "yes" people stay so that they all collect the same number of rubles and the "we could do this better" people are paid less and/or "massaged" out, because you wouldn't want to fire them, that costs unemployment money :p



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[jlw]

I got promoted and as chief am getting firearms training going in the right direction....

It does not have to be an either or proposition. The choice of doing both allows one to accomplish much more in the end.


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[GardoneVT]

Isn't that the aim of the statist in any organization? I find this divide and conquer mentality everywhere. Where the "yes" people stay so that they all collect the same number of rubles and the "we could do this better" people are paid less and/or "massaged" out, because you wouldn't want to fire them, that costs unemployment money :p



Sent from my SCH-I535 using Tapatalk

Its social dynamics at work. The "yes men" make the chiefs feel smart, while the "smart men" don't. The smart guys also tend to decide that taking care of the mission/men/integrity of the organization is more important then the career of the Man at The Top.

Said "Man at The Top" solves the problem by removing said individual from the organization-yet, one cannot just mark "Was Disloyal To Boss" on the termination form. Questions might be raised about why the guy or gal with the best metrics is suddenly sacked. So enters the 'marginalization' tactics. Telling the employee they're never being promoted again or assigning them to an outhouse at the Antarctica office gets the point across while providing motivation for that person to quit-and voila, problem solved.


I got promoted and as chief am getting firearms training going in the right direction....

It does not have to be an either or proposition. The choice of doing both allows one to accomplish much more in the end.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

That depends on the culture of the organization.

Some places both in and outside of public service make it clear that if you want to advance , you will render unto Caesar first. My last squadron in the Air Force was run like Chicago- he/she who prepped the squadron parties, volunteered at the Chiefs/Commmander's pet events, and did the bosses' dirty work received the STEP promotions/recommendation letters/ advanced commendations. Airmen who tried to get ahead on merit alone got the shaft.

Not every squadron in the AF is run like that, but my last one was-sadly.

[jlw]

You don't have to be a yes man; just don't turn everything into a holy war.


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[Jack Ryan]

You wouldn't know that by looking at them

https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images;_ylt=A0LEVx3SSU5Tv34AfQdXNyoA?p=boston+mara thon+bomber+swat&fr=yfp-t-747&fr2=piv-web

Ain't that the truth.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-uRzlxmlUq1g/UxYR79yXbXI/AAAAAAAANYg/yzR-yszwyBA/s1600/russians_in_ukraine.jpg

[Jack Ryan]

I am often heavily critical of these things. The problem can be laid in one place......Police and Municipal Executive Management. When you give people minimal training, cross your fingers and hope for the best as a management principle, this is what happens. The same folks who are not making firearms training a priority on the top end are the first to wash their hands of responsibilities when things go bad. I lived the world where everything I did to improve training was fought at the higher levels and by the city executives. My program was dismantled within months of me retiring. Trust me, when you document that shooting performance of hitting at 17% is unacceptable in writing, you become an enemy of the state. I guarantee that many in that area have been pounding their head on the wall for years trying to improve L/E training. The facts are simple, "training" is totally geared toward the lowest common denominator officer to "get them to pass" (top leadership is often those LCD shooters themselves and often relatively inexperienced at actual police work), and an emphasis on high level discretionary shooting with heavy accuracy standards is not the priority because it takes A. Time, B. Money, C. Will, D. Leadership (NOT supervision), E. dedicated personnel, F. Community support for well trained LE. Basically............unicorns in police world.

Lack of training is not the problem. Over funded and over authorized us the problem with most police agency today.

[Drang]

It does not have to be an either or proposition. The choice of doing both allows one to accomplish much more in the end.


You don't have to be a yes man; just don't turn everything into a holy war.
There's an art to being successful at both.
Just like there's a reason I made Sergeant First Class in under 12 years, and retired at that rank.
If only someone had published a self-help book called something like "How to get ahead while being your own man." ("Step one: Don't stand up at NCO Call and tell the Sergeant Major it's a stupid policy...")("Especially if you're an SFC in a First Sergeant slot.")

[LittleLebowski]

Lack of training is not the problem. Over funded and over authorized us the problem with most police agency today.

Do you really think LE has enough training? Really?

[Dagga Boy]

Lack of training is not the problem. Over funded and over authorized us the problem with most police agency today.

Okay....:confused:. You win, I am part of the government conspiracy to hide the truth.....:roll eyes:.

[LittleLebowski]

Dude, I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but that is epidemic throughout the world. And maybe it's my blooming cynicism, but I'm convinced no one wants to know.

I listen to this song (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00CLDDZL0/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=B00CLDDZL0&linkCode=as2&tag=ratio07-20) a lot. I think you'll like the lyrics (with apologies to Mr Kristofferson).


"If you waste your time a-talking to the people who don't listen,
"To the things that you are saying, who do you think's gonna hear.
"And if you should die explaining how the things that they complain about,
"Are things they could be changing, who do you think's gonna care?"

There were other lonely metallurgical engineers in a world turned deaf and blind,
Who were crucified for what they tried to show.
And their voices have been scattered by the swirling winds of time.
Because the truth remains that no-one wants to know.

[KevinB]

Lack of training is not the problem. Over funded and over authorized us the problem with most police agency today.

Dude - what color is the sky in your world?

Policing is a thankless business -- how fun is it to work in the only business where the customer is always wrong ;)

Folks rant against Militarization of Police - then bitch and moan when Police are outgunned or do not have the tools to conduct their job.

That BearCat or MRAP that is viewed as a "Evil Tool of Oppression" can be a life saving tool if confronted with a barricaded suspect to both the general public and officers.
Despite belief to the contrary no one I know joined to oppress the public, but to uphold the constitution and provide service to the communities we serve.

[Gadfly]

Dude - what color is the sky in your world?

Policing is a thankless business -- how fun is it to work in the only business where the customer is always wrong ;)

Folks rant against Militarization of Police - then bitch and moan when Police are outgunned or do not have the tools to conduct their job.

That BearCat or MRAP that is viewed as a "Evil Tool of Oppression" can be a life saving tool if confronted with a barricaded suspect to both the general public and officers.
Despite belief to the contrary no one I know joined to oppress the public, but to uphold the constitution and provide service to the communities we serve.

^^THIS^^

I get crap from some people constantly that I am in LE just to “oppress folks”. Working for DHS, all the conspiracy theory crap gets old. I guess I missed the meeting where I am supposed to round up folks for Obamas “FEMA death camps”. Chasing dope and aliens keeps me plenty busy...

On the subject of the OP, I have a co worker who was on scene at the second Boston shootout. Over a few beers one night, I heard more than I would want to know. That was a 20 agency deep clusterkitten of disorganization, turf war pissing matches, and confusion of epic proportion.

[BaiHu]

That was a 20 agency deep clusterkitten of disorganization, turf war pissing matches, and confusion of epic proportion.

This is the worst type of news for RKBA folks and a wet dream for the anti-gun crowd. "If the police can't safely handle guns/tactics/strategems/shooting/FF issues, then we certainly can't let Joe Citizen take" the law" into his own hands. They're way too dangerous."

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[jlw]

There's an art to being successful at both.
Just like there's a reason I made Sergeant First Class in under 12 years, and retired at that rank.
If only someone had published a self-help book called something like "How to get ahead while being your own man." ("Step one: Don't stand up at NCO Call and tell the Sergeant Major it's a stupid policy...")("Especially if you're an SFC in a First Sergeant slot.")


LOL. I suspect that would do it...

There was a lightbulb moment for me along the way. The chief found some money somewhere to buy boots for everyone, and he worked a deal with a supplier to get two different versions of boots. All the personnel had to do was go to the local uniform store, try them on, and then report their size for the order.

It was ridiculous the amount of griping and complaining that went on over getting free boots. Some folks are just determined to make a fight out of anything.

[Glenn E. Meyer]

Just for info:

1. The reluctance to issue AR's is well known. It's happened in a few cities. The argument is the militarization of the police and intimidating nature of the guns. It was the drive for the Remington pump 223. It was said that it looked nice and the officers could do positive transfer of training from the 870s. The more powerful reason was appearance.

Some of our research found that some police had negative views of ARs.

2. The pistol round carbines by Ruger - same issue. Not evil ARs. When faced with the North Hollywood shootout as evidence against pistol rounds, some gun rag (don't remember) agree with that point but gave the gun a positive review as at least you would be more accurate if you had to shoot someone in the leg - as they were wearing torso body armor. I guess the ads paid for that.

3. Contagious or sympathetic shooting - from the violence literature - it's sometimes called a forward panic. There is a tendency to not want to engage in personal violence and that tension must be overcome. However, when it is pushed through you get an over application of violence. Seen in over application of force in many circumstances. Comes from Collin's book Violence. If you can use the term, fine - if you don't like social science terms - well, I didn't charge you for this tidbit. The flip side is when you could use force and can't bring yourself to do it. The book documents instances of armed officers or military getting the crap kicked out of them and seemingly unable to respond with their firearms.

[Trooper224]

I got that "advice" several times over the years. It was a simple choice, SHTFU and get promoted, or keep being a pain and get the firearms training in the right direction and remain a Corporal forever............I retired as a Senior Corporal and a lot of middle of the night "thank you" calls from the people I got to train.

I feel you. I hold the rank of Master Trooper within my agency and fully expect to retire there. When you're asked for your opinion in a meeting and reply, "Well, the first thing that needs to happen is everyone at the front of the room needs to pull their heads out of their ass." You don't do your promotional prospects a lot of good. Twenty years ago I joined what was one of the finest agencies of its kind. Over the last decade I've watched sycophants and yes-men slowly populate our upper chain of command. You know the kind: people who want to be in charge but can't lead. When asked why I think this has happened I usually reply, "Because sh!! floats to the top and it sticks together." When I sat in a meeting and listened to the current superintendent of my agency refer to us as, "You inferiors on the bottom." I knew the club I joined back when was dead and buried.

[Trooper224]

It was ridiculous the amount of griping and complaining that went on over getting free boots. Some folks are just determined to make a fight out of anything.

I've come to the conclusion you can give some folks ice cream and they'll complain it's cold.

[SeriousStudent]

......

3. Contagious or sympathetic shooting - from the violence literature - it's sometimes called a forward panic. There is a tendency to not want to engage in personal violence and that tension must be overcome. However, when it is pushed through you get an over application of violence. Seen in over application of force in many circumstances. Comes from Collin's book Violence. If you can use the term, fine - if you don't like social science terms - well, I didn't charge you for this tidbit. The flip side is when you could use force and can't bring yourself to do it. The book documents instances of armed officers or military getting the crap kicked out of them and seemingly unable to respond with their firearms.

Is this the book you are referring to?

http://www.amazon.com/Violence-Micro-sociological-Theory-Randall-Collins/dp/0691143226

Just checking before I click on "Buy it now."

Thanks very much.

[Drang]

I feel you. I hold the rank of Master Trooper within my agency and fully expect to retire there. When you're asked for your opinion in a meeting and reply, "Well, the first thing that needs to happen is everyone at the front of the room needs to pull their heads out of their ass." You don't do your promotional prospects a lot of good. Twenty years ago I joined what was one of the finest agencies of its kind. Over the last decade I've watched sycophants and yes-men slowly populate our upper chain of command. You know the kind: people who want to be in charge but can't lead. When asked why I think this has happened I usually reply, "Because sh!! floats to the top and it sticks together." When I sat in a meeting and listened to the current superintendent of my agency refer to us as, "You inferiors on the bottom." I knew the club I joined back when was dead and buried.

You must be the long-lost brother my parents never told me about.

[Trooper224]

You must be the long-lost brother my parents never told me about.

If there's an inheritance involved I'd be willing to give it a shot. ;)

I was one of the founding members of our Special Response Team. Several years in we had a new team leader show up who I used to call "Capt. Hand Wringer". The man lived in abject fear of confrontation and couldn't wipe his sphincter without getting permission from the major. Just the kind of guy to put in charge of the run jump and play squad. Once, before fast roping out of a helo during training I could visibly see him shaking. As I went out the door, I suggested he join us on the ground when his balls dropped.

Years ago I taught traffic stop techniques and officer survival at our academy. Everything went fine for a few years, then we started getting generation X onboard and the pussification of the agency commenced. Strangely enough, the recruits that passed never had a problem with me. It was the ones who washed out that had complaints, go figure. I could see the hand writing on the wall and wasn't surprised when summoned to the Lieutenants office. He told me, "We don't think your mindset fits with our current training philosophy." I told him I agreed, then bent over and blew out the aromatherapy candle burning on his desk before walking out.

Needless to say, there's not a lot of love for "Ol' Crusty" in general headquarters.

[jlw]

I've come to the conclusion you can give some folks ice cream and they'll complain it's cold.

Or they will complain that nobody asked them about what ice cream they should have gotten; and they really shouldn't have gotten ice cream at all. It should have been pie instead.

[ford.304]

If only someone had published a self-help book called something like "How to get ahead while being your own man."

I honestly think that would be one of the best books anyone could write for getting along in life in general.

On the Militarization issue... I always feel like this goes off on a dumb tangent. The problem isn't gear (although we can talk about whether its efficient to pay the maintenance on a Bearcat *instead of* paying for proper training) or pie in the sky FEMA death camps. The problem is the mission some agencies have assigned themselves, and their ways of solving that mission.

Sending half-trained yahoos armed with the latest in second-hand military technology on no-knock raids in the middle of the night is not going to work out well for anyone involved. Especially when the only justification for the raid is that someone might flush some powder. I know this isn't what the good organizations do, but it's what the crappy ones do, and there are plenty of those.

The fun question is, how do we stop that mess without stripping the good guys who actually need those tools of the ability to do their job.

[Tamara]

The report, entitled Too Many Guns: How Shootout With Bombing Suspects Spiraled into Chaos, shows that the initial shootout in which Tamerlan Tsarnaev was eventually killed was almost a circular firing squad, as on-duty and off-duty officers, some in uniform and some in street clothes, arrived on the scene from multiple directions and began shooting no only at the Tsarnaev brothers, but each other:

A quote worth remembering if ever I, as Suzy Civilian, find myself stuck returning fire in an active shooter situation. I think dropping guns briskly might be an under-rehearsed skill set.

[GardoneVT]

A quote worth remembering if ever I, as Suzy Civilian, find myself stuck returning fire in an active shooter situation. I think dropping guns briskly might be an under-rehearsed skill set.

IMO- and this is just a hypothesis- the lack of a thriving civil gun culture spells doom for the competency of LEO's in that jurisdiction. Why? Because then the police know only about shooting from what the guy at HQ approves of, instead of Mom, Dad, or Uncle Bob the family pistol competitor. For the first three years of my military career I only knew what Uncle Sam taught me, which was basically nothing.I learned more about handguns in the last 12 months of my service shooting with an NCO off duty at the local range then I did the entire rest of my military service. None of that knowledge transfer would have been possible in MA or any other Blue Zone .

Example:two off duty reserve officers in different classes separately went to their cars, retrieved their handguns, and engaged a spree shooter at the Kentucky School of Law, and managed to not only avoid perforating each other, but took down the spree killer together after de-conflicting when they both travelled to the sound of gunfire. IMO,gun culture matters: I shudder to think of how that would have turned out at NYU.

[Jack Ryan]

I can't imagine how all those armed civilians at Clive Bundy's ranch managed to wander around with guns for days with no paramilitary funding or federal grants at all we know of with out even once forming the tactical circular firing squad. Maybe they just lacked the enthusiasm for shooting people. Enthusiasm and permission.

[Tamara]

I can't imagine how all those armed civilians at Clive Bundy's ranch managed to wander around with guns for days with no paramilitary funding or federal grants at all we know of with out even once forming the tactical circular firing squad.

The same way armed civilians aren't shooting each other in cop shops all over America every day. Throw a firecracker into the middle of the Cletus militia in the dark and things might have gotten interesting.

[TR675]

I can't imagine how all those armed civilians at Clive Bundy's ranch managed to wander around with guns for days with no paramilitary funding or federal grants at all we know of with out even once forming the tactical circular firing squad. Maybe they just lacked the enthusiasm for shooting people. Enthusiasm and permission.

Maybe they are just regular stupid instead of the kind of effing stupid it takes to start a gunfight with the feds over a jackwagon who won't pay his rent.

[Glenn E. Meyer]

Is this the book you are referring to?

http://www.amazon.com/Violence-Micro-sociological-Theory-Randall-Collins/dp/0691143226

Just checking before I click on "Buy it now."

Thanks very much.

Yes, that's the book. It is an interesting read for students of such.

[SeriousStudent]

Thank you very much, I've ordered it.

[LtDave]

Truthfully, dealing with the crooks was far easier (and the harder the crook, the easier) than the idiots in the office that are supposed to be on the same team.

Truer words....

[LSP972]

Sending half-trained yahoos armed with the latest in second-hand military technology on no-knock raids in the middle of the night is not going to work out well for anyone involved. Especially when the only justification for the raid is that someone might flush some powder. I know this isn't what the good organizations do, but it's what the crappy ones do, and there are plenty of those.

The fun question is, how do we stop that mess without stripping the good guys who actually need those tools of the ability to do their job.

BEAUTIFULLY stated. Those word sum up the issue quite nicely. And that Irish firing squad in Boston just proves it.

.

[TheTrevor]

Well stated. And the odds are that at least SOME of those guys were on a team that trains, has procedures down pat, and a modicum of discipline.

Imagine how a "team" from Spider Crotch, BFE, that has the toys but not the training/experience, is going to react.

I gotta quit dwelling on this stuff. I'm done, out of it, retired, etc.; but it could affect me tonight.

Definitely getting scary out there… on both sides of the coin.

.

UNC Charlotte decided to stand up a SWAT team from their campus PD force back in 2011. Keep in mind that 60-70% of UNCC students disappear on the weekends because they head home, live off campus, etc, so it's not exactly a challenging LE environment. This is their feature photo that was a big part of their PR push:

2271

Sigh. At least they aren't posed on a milsurp MRAP or something, I guess. Bet they have shiny new full-auto M4s in the armory, though. Because tacticool.

ETA: The issue I have is that this is a bored bunch of second-tier campus LE getting all tooled up, but the extent of their training is whatever train-the-trainer stuff they pick up from the state level NC counterterror guys. Which is not going to be much, or of high quality, from everything that I've heard.

[SeriousStudent]

That guy in the front row, second from the left, is wearing his ankle holster too high.

That's just my opinion, though, I almost never wear an ankle holster. I could be wrong.

[jlw]

UNC Charlotte decided to stand up a SWAT team from their campus PD force back in 2011. Keep in mind that 60-70% of UNCC students disappear on the weekends because they head home, live off campus, etc, so it's not exactly a challenging LE environment. This is their feature photo that was a big part of their PR push:

Sigh. At least they aren't posed on a milsurp MRAP or something, I guess. Bet they have shiny new full-auto M4s in the armory, though. Because tacticool.

ETA: The issue I have is that this is a bored bunch of second-tier campus LE getting all tooled up, but the extent of their training is whatever train-the-trainer stuff they pick up from the state level NC counterterror guys. Which is not going to be much, or of high quality, from everything that I've heard.

I don't know anything about the UNC-Charlotte guys, but Campus Police does not mean bored or second tier. The University of Georgia Police SRT is top notch, and we have an agreement with them to respond to assist us if needed, and we had the option to go with the GBI, the GSP, and several other teams. They are that good. Their entry guns are Daniel Defense MK18s. UGA's bomb squad also covers 32 counties in GA. Their K9 unit regularly responds to assist other agencies including high profile events.

[TheTrevor]

I was afraid I was going to step on your toes with that one. Thought I included enough context clues to head that off. I was trying to avoid disclosing too much personal info.

I went to UNCC and still know folks at that campus. I didn't pick a news story and lob unfair stereotypes at the subjects, I actually have up to date info from folks who interact with them.

I wish the UNCC force were as you describe, but they're not.

[Alpha Sierra]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

There is no kitten way in hell anyone can justify that with a straight face. Is there no police presence from the municipality where the uni is located, to even begin with?

Give me a kitten break

[Tamara]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

There is no kitten way in hell anyone can justify that with a straight face. Is there no police presence from the municipality where the uni is located, to even begin with?

Give me a kitten break

And yet nobody would bat an eye if the police department of an 800 acre town with a population of 40,000 had a SWAT team, which is kinda weird when you think about it.

ETA: I just checked, and the principality of Monaco is slightly smaller and has a lower population (at least from 9-to-5) and it has an actual army. ;)

[Dagga Boy]

Several years ago a Sheriff of a small department sent all of his deputies to Basic Swat school. Instead of having a half ass SWAT team, he built a very squared away patrol division that was able to operate at a very high level in a place most would not expect. Instead if gear they would never is, they invested in training they could employ everyday...that is refreshing leadership.

[Tamara]

Several years ago a Sheriff of a small department sent all of his deputies to Basic Swat school. Instead of having a half ass SWAT team, he built a very squared away patrol division that was able to operate at a very high level in a place most would not expect. Instead if gear they would never is, they invested in training they could employ everyday...that is refreshing leadership.

The next county north of here is Boone Co.

From all I've seen, I pity the fool that wants to get cross-threaded with the BCSD. They're pretty big on training (http://www.boonecountyindianasheriff.com/c/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=42&Itemid=85). ;)

[LSP552]

It all comes down to training, upper management and incident command. Major events are absolutely no place to free lance, which is a common problem when every agency within driving distance wants to participate. Worse, they often simply show up and start doing stuff without being fit into an overall plan where everyone knows what is happening. Failure to establish proper incident management guarantees a lack of situational awareness, uncoordinated response, and resulting problems.

Most agencies, despite what they think, simply don't have the resources to sustain a comprehensive SWAT program. The personnel selection, training time, financial cost for training resources, etc. all make SWAT a very costly thing when done correctly. It's even more costly when done incorrectly, but that cost is usually paid in lives and lawsuits. Anyone who thinks their 5 - 7 man SWAT team is completely mission capable lacks understanding of the business. Small teams gained a foothold through federal grant funds, fueled by individual egos and chiefs/sheriffs who had to have their own SWAT. There are a lot of things that 7 trained folks can accomplish, but there is a lot they can't. The problem with small agency teams is that many don't understand what their limits should be. In addition to federal grants for toys, I've seen this reinforced through federally funded SWAT training made available free under the guise of counter-drug training.

Shooting at each other simply indicates untrained and undisciplined personnel, compounded by an apparent lack of overall control by senior officials. You learn discipline in proper force and force training and by living in a shoothouse. The lack of this isn't just for small agencies. I've seen larger agencies with SWAT teams that were clueless also.

One key thing many agencies never understand is that not every senior leader is a crisis leader. Rank alone doesn't prepare senior officials for crisis management. Many senior officials, even with training, simply won't be functional. It usually takes a mistake to learn this. LSP learned this in the early 90s when an idiot Region Major interfered with SWAT resources at a hostage incident. That cluster led to a separate chain of command for such things in my old agency.

Ken

[jlw]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

There is no kitten way in hell anyone can justify that with a straight face. Is there no police presence from the municipality where the uni is located, to even begin with?

Give me a kitten break


Because the University here is able to provide such good service in specialty teams, several county agencies adjoining have actually shut down their own teams and are relying on the UPD. They are that good.

I personally made such a decision.


You know, it's not like a university will ever have any major incident happen amongst the ivory Texas bell towers....


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[Tamara]

You know, it's not like a university will ever have any major incident happen amongst the ivory Texas bell towers....

Technically, it could happen in Virginia, too...

[LSP552]

Several years ago a Sheriff of a small department sent all of his deputies to Basic Swat school. Instead of having a half ass SWAT team, he built a very squared away patrol division that was able to operate at a very high level in a place most would not expect. Instead if gear they would never is, they invested in training they could employ everyday...that is refreshing leadership.

Wisdom!

Ken

[Drang]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

There is no kitten way in hell anyone can justify that with a straight face. Is there no police presence from the municipality where the uni is located, to even begin with?
Many college towns are pretty much deserted during school breaks, and many major universities are Big Deals in otherwise small towns.
The legal status of the college/college campus may also be specified in state law.

[GardoneVT]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

There is no kitten way in hell anyone can justify that with a straight face. Is there no police presence from the municipality where the uni is located, to even begin with?

Give me a kitten break

In my college town, the college essentially IS the town. If we had to depend exclusively on local law enforcement , the department would be woefully overstretched.

Further, there are some regulations on campus which don't apply to the town, and vice versa. Asking the local LE agency to enforce two sets of parking regulations, two sets of conduct regulations ( as the campus PD also enforces University regulations which apply to students and faculty , not town residents) is an unnecessary complication.

As to the need for a University PD SWAT team, many of the campus buildings here look like a mass shooter's wet dream. A trained bad guy could do heinous damage , and I can see why a university would need a specialized SWAT team which was VERY intimate with the campus layout. If you don't believe me, visit your local community college sometime and take a look around.

[Glenn E. Meyer]

Ditto on that. Working at a university and in a very complex building, the local SWAT team would arrive to find many 10's of students and staff DRT. As I testified to the Texas House during the campus carry debate, if you have a marginally competent bad guy - you will lose the first thirty. However, no reason to lose the first 60 waiting for the local PD. Our folks have a pretty good training regime. Of course, the administration doesn't like to hear me say that the first thirty are dead unless someone is armed on the spot (assuming you aren't killed first). The campus carry debate is for another thread though.

Two minute response is better than about 10 minutes.

[TheTrevor]

The next county north of here is Boone Co.

From all I've seen, I pity the fool that wants to get cross-threaded with the BCSD. They're pretty big on training (http://www.boonecountyindianasheriff.com/c/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=42&Itemid=85). ;)

Some crusty older dude from Boone County SD did pretty well at Rogers this week... with two broken ribs, FFS. After getting to know him a bit, I'm 100% willing to believe he runs a squared-away operation.

[TheTrevor]

One key thing many agencies never understand is that not every senior leader is a crisis leader. Rank alone doesn't prepare senior officials for crisis management. Many senior officials, even with training, simply won't be functional. It usually takes a mistake to learn this. LSP learned this in the early 90s when an idiot Region Major interfered with SWAT resources at a hostage incident. That cluster led to a separate chain of command for such things in my old agency.

Ken and others have come close to pointing out the crux of the problem here, but I haven't seen anyone call out the well-proven solution by name: the Incident Command System (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incident_Command_System).

I have been a huge proponent of ICS as a structured means of handling critical incidents in the Internet services sector, as my career focus has been on designing/building/delivering stuff that has to meet >99.99% availability requirements. My first exposure to ICS was actually during some hard-core volunteer disaster-response training, where we were actually taught the full ICS curriculum by mistake -- the volunteers were apparently supposed to get some weaksauce short-form version instead, but we got the whole monty. I not only took to ICS naturally, as it was very similar to how I'd been running Operations teams for years at that point, but (along with others) did a lot of work on how to apply ICS effectively in the context of critical Internet services vs. its origin managing public safety problems.

To Ken's point, the flow of control in ICS may or may not align cleanly with normal command structure. This is because incident management is, by definition, different from the everyday business of the agencies involved. Under ICS the command structure is role-based, not politics-based, and does not necessarily leave room for command staff (e.g. Region Majors) to feel like they are Contributing Meaningfully To Team Success by Issuing Important Orders.

Few things shock me these days, but when I run into an agency that doesn't have at least two operating modes (everyday and ICS) it really bugs the crap out of me. If I ever get tired of doing the technology thing, I'm pretty sure I could make a very good living as an independent consultant doing agency-level ICS training, despite all the free resources out there on how to apply ICS in the public safety context.

[jlw]

Ken and others have come close to pointing out the crux of the problem here, but I haven't seen anyone call out the well-proven solution by name: the Incident Command System (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incident_Command_System).

I have been a huge proponent of ICS as a structured means of handling critical incidents in the Internet services sector, as my career focus has been on designing/building/delivering stuff that has to meet >99.99% availability requirements. My first exposure to ICS was actually during some hard-core volunteer disaster-response training, where we were actually taught the full ICS curriculum by mistake -- the volunteers were apparently supposed to get some weaksauce short-form version instead, but we got the whole monty. I not only took to ICS naturally, as it was very similar to how I'd been running Operations teams for years at that point, but (along with others) did a lot of work on how to apply ICS effectively in the context of critical Internet services vs. its origin managing public safety problems.

To Ken's point, the flow of control in ICS may or may not align cleanly with normal command structure. This is because incident management is, by definition, different from the everyday business of the agencies involved. Under ICS the command structure is role-based, not politics-based, and does not necessarily leave room for command staff (e.g. Region Majors) to feel like they are Contributing Meaningfully To Team Success by Issuing Important Orders.

Few things shock me these days, but when I run into an agency that doesn't have at least two operating modes (everyday and ICS) it really bugs the crap out of me. If I ever get tired of doing the technology thing, I'm pretty sure I could make a very good living as an independent consultant doing agency-level ICS training, despite all the free resources out there on how to apply ICS in the public safety context.

ICS works much better for the fire service, where it originated, than it does for badge toters.

[LSP972]

Ken and others have come close to pointing out the crux of the problem here,

Close? No he carefully articulated THE problem.

What you don't know (and couldn't be expected to) is this: when the decision was made in 1990 to completely re-vamp LSP's "tactical team" (what it was called then) program, one man was chosen to do it. He pretty much had carte blanche, except in a few areas like the upper command structure thing, and after the afore-mentioned incident that was changed to reflect proper doctrine. This guy studied the problem, selected three "assistants"- one of whom was me- and proceeded to build a program.

We went to LAPD Metro D platoon, we went to the Range 19 complex on Fort Bragg, we went to a bunch of places; learning, , stealing, and adapting ideas and concepts. By 1996, we had built a 3 platoon/70 man unit that had several actual for-real hostage rescues to its credit.

In case you haven't figured it out yet, Ken was that man. He guided the program through the early years, through the minefields of politics and upper rank shiesskopfs whose toes got stepped on frequently.

The point I'm trying to make here is that he is aware of the civilian-oriented management programs like you mention… and he is also aware they rarely, if ever, successfully translate to military-based organizations.

An excellent example is the Lean Six Sigma Program. Looks great on paper, and actually seems to work as advertised in the DNA section at our lab. But another state agency, one with minimal enforcement/arrest authority, has implemented it… and it has been a total disaster there.

Not throwing rocks at you personally, but I am reminded of the classic definition of a consultant… one who borrows your watch to tell you what time it is.

.

[TheTrevor]

ICS works much better for the fire service, where it originated, than it does for badge toters.

I have heard everything from enthusiasm to outright hostility from LE agencies regarding ICS. In my limited experience, this seems closely coupled to whether there are one or more folks in leadership who are (for whatever reason) strongly motivated to adapt ICS to the LE context at their agency. Not saying it's good or bad for LE as you're the SME on that, not me, just observing that some places have made it work while others don't even want to talk about ICS or NIMS.

To your point, it would surprise me to find agencies using ICS in its "off the shelf" form outside of fire/rescue. It does require tailoring to the environment at hand, whether that's LE critical incidents with extensive inter-agency coordination, or IT crisis management in a "five nines" 99.999% uptime environment. If there's a competing standardized and well proven system that's more accepted by LE I'd be interested in hearing about it.

[TheTrevor]

Close? No he carefully articulated THE problem.

What you don't know (and couldn't be expected to) is this: when the decision was made in 1990 to completely re-vamp LSP's "tactical team" (what it was called then) program, one man was chosen to do it. He pretty much had carte blanche, except in a few areas like the upper command structure thing, and after the afore-mentioned incident that was changed to reflect proper doctrine. This guy studied the problem, selected three "assistants"- one of whom was me- and proceeded to build a program.

We went to LAPD Metro D platoon, we went to the Range 19 complex on Fort Bragg, we went to a bunch of places; learning, , stealing, and adapting ideas and concepts. By 1996, we had built a 3 platoon/70 man unit that had several actual for-real hostage rescues to its credit.

In case you haven't figured it out yet, Ken was that man. He guided the program through the early years, through the minefields of politics and upper rank shiesskopfs whose toes got stepped on frequently.

The point I'm trying to make here is that he is aware of the civilian-oriented management programs like you mention… and he is also aware they rarely, if ever, successfully translate to military-based organizations.

An excellent example is the Lean Six Sigma Program. Looks great on paper, and actually seems to work as advertised in the DNA section at our lab. But another state agency, one with minimal enforcement/arrest authority, has implemented it… and it has been a total disaster there.

Not throwing rocks at you personally, but I am reminded of the classic definition of a consultant… one who borrows your watch to tell you what time it is.

.

Makes sense. I'm interested in learning why ICS does or doesn't work in the LE context, not shoving it down anyone's throat. I was half kidding about the consultant thing, apologies as that was likely unclear.

The more complex and structured any system becomes, the more likely it will turn into a Lean Six Sigma horror show. Been there done that.

Given my own success in adapting ICS to multiple mission critical environments which were decidedly not fire/rescue operations, and my understanding that at least some LE agencies have had success with it, I'm not going to roll over and play dead just yet.

There's room in the world for more than one solution to a problem, especially if those solutions don't conflict in damaging ways. I would be interested in hearing more about the system that you and Ken designed and implemented, rather than just being told "silly civilian with your cute disaster management protocols, run along while the grown-ups get real work done here..."

[TheTrevor]

Never mind. I'm bowing out of this thread. I should know better than to get involved in contentious topics like emergency incident command, even if I do have non-LE professional experience and perspective which could have made for an interesting conversation. Not worth getting into it with folks I like and respect.

[LSP552]

Never mind. I'm bowing out of this thread. I should know better than to get involved in contentious topics like emergency incident command, even if I do have non-LE professional experience and perspective which could have made for an interesting conversation. Not worth getting into it with folks I like and respect.

Don't leave. I don't have time now, but will share some perspective later this evening. The concepts are good, the implementation is generally what's lacking.

Ken

[TCinVA]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

There is no kitten way in hell anyone can justify that with a straight face. Is there no police presence from the municipality where the uni is located, to even begin with?

Give me a kitten break

In an active shooter situation, time is everything. Having guys actually on scene rolling with the necessary equipment to get on scene of the incident as quickly as possible is going to save time. That saved time will be fewer dead bodies.

There's nothing special about a university. It's full of people who will behave exactly the same as the people who exist outside the boundaries of university property. Occasionally one of the people who isn't part of the university will show up and cause all manner of problems. Having the capacity to deal with an active shooter or barricaded suspect with hostages isn't a bad thing...especially since the university police are more likely to know the layout of facilities far better than a town/city/regional SWAT team that doesn't live in the environment every day.

Having officers on the university PD who can show up first in an AS situation to try and deal with the threat or fall into an element from the regional tac team in case of some other form of emergency is a pretty smart idea in theory.

Some universities absolutely suck at the execution of that theory, but that's a different thread.

[Erick Gelhaus]

Cops & ICS / SIMS & NIMS ...

The Harvard report on the bombings and all of the enforcement events afterwards emphasized the importance of ICS. The authors mentioned that ICS worked quite nicely for the marathon itself and the immediate response to the bombings in & around that area. As the event continued and evolved, ICS didn't really seem to happen ... if my recollection of the Harvard report is correct (sorry, I'm down to my last week of undergrad work so my brain might be a wee bit fried by that and other things).

In the aftermath of a northern California rural manhunt for a rather disturbed multiple murder suspect, the lead agency talked freely about how they should have shifted to ICS much earlier. They did it about Day 15 of a 30ish day operation. When the search went mutual aid with agencies from all over CA and a couple Fed entities was the catalyst they needed to go that route.

When the 2011 Occupy protest at U.C. Davis and the widely publicized pepper spray incident was reviewed by consultants and a commission, a report was issued. One of the points the consultants and (I think) the commissioners hit on was the failure by the college PD to utilize ICS. This was not only on the operational side but on the planning and briefing sides too. There was a major command & control failure coupled with the usual wishy-washy-ness found in academia that led to the drama.

So, the profession is getting told that we need to embrace ICS. Two immediate problems with it: Unlike Fire & EMS, our admin / command has not bought into; We do not have organization history with it. (Telling your admin we need to learn to embrace it and get good at it is not career enhancing.)

I believe ICS can work, wait, no, I believe cops can learn to work within ICS. Initially, it'll take a serious slowing down of things for a while coupled with a force-fed use of it. And I think that will be awkward given that an awful lot of what we do daily involves one, maybe two cops and no other resources. Another issue is the percentages of supervisors, etc. The cop world can work very de-centralized with few supervisors (one agency I know of has fifteen plus people out covering over 1500 sq miles with one lone supervisor per shift) in contrast, the fire service has a supervisor (captain) seemingly on every piece of equipment. Then there are the use of incoming resources and the roles of additional responders.

Just my thoughts.

[jlw]

I have heard everything from enthusiasm to outright hostility from LE agencies regarding ICS. In my limited experience, this seems closely coupled to whether there are one or more folks in leadership who are (for whatever reason) strongly motivated to adapt ICS to the LE context at their agency. Not saying it's good or bad for LE as you're the SME on that, not me, just observing that some places have made it work while others don't even want to talk about ICS or NIMS.

To your point, it would surprise me to find agencies using ICS in its "off the shelf" form outside of fire/rescue. It does require tailoring to the environment at hand, whether that's LE critical incidents with extensive inter-agency coordination, or IT crisis management in a "five nines" 99.999% uptime environment. If there's a competing standardized and well proven system that's more accepted by LE I'd be interested in hearing about it.


The Feds made NIMS training and ICS requirements to get grant money.

Within an agency it is not an issue. It's when multiple agencies get involved, especially if those agencies are different types, especially if constitutional and jurisdictional issues come into play.

There was an incident in neighboring county where they pretty much ceded operational command to the Feds. The Feds then tried to send my guys through a door. I was not satisfied with the information we were being given and refused to give the to order.

The agent in question got all indignant and kept yelling, "I'm federal!!!"

My response: "I'm not."

My guys adapted and accomplished what needed to be done in a much better manner that what "Mr. Federal" wanted us to do, and we did it on our own terms.



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[BaiHu]

Great posts guys. I'm enjoying the dialog. Anyone see NatGeo's "Hunt for Boston Bombers"? Just watching the end of it now.

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[LSP972]

..... Rather than just being told "silly civilian with your cute disaster management protocols, run along while the grown-ups get real work done here..."

Relax... I wasn't telling you that. Obviously You got that impression, so I didn't do a good job of conveying my thoughts.

I was trying to illustrate that many of those "cute disaster management protocols" HAVE been tried in LE applications, with generally poor results. I do not know anything about the specific plan you referenced.

Perhaps Ken does; he was the boss and had to deal with such things. I was responsible for the firearms training program and in-the-stack operational considerations/applications.

I think we've already seen here how too many fingers in the pie can cause problems. Lord knows we saw it enough in our little corner of the universe.

.

[Drang]

My one and a half cents here:
...
I believe ICS can work, wait, no, I believe cops can learn to work within ICS. Initially, it'll take a serious slowing down of things for a while coupled with a force-fed use of it. And I think that will be awkward given that an awful lot of what we do daily involves one, maybe two cops and no other resources.
As noted, there are structural/organizational issues with LE implementing ICS.
Yet, one of my instructors for ICS300 was a Police Captain, who said, essentially, "we use it when it makes sense", and gave examples such as "multiple agencies deploying in remote areas", which we do have plenty of here in Pugetopolis. (Mutual aid agreements are essential here.)

FWIW, when I deployed for Hurricane Sandy, I was not very impressed by the ability of the Feds to implement ICS.

[jlw]

I believe ICS can work, wait, no, I believe cops can learn to work within ICS. Initially, it'll take a serious slowing down of things for a while coupled with a force-fed use of it. And I think that will be awkward given that an awful lot of what we do daily involves one, maybe two cops and no other resources. Another issue is the percentages of supervisors, etc. The cop world can work very de-centralized with few supervisors (one agency I know of has fifteen plus people out covering over 1500 sq miles with one lone supervisor per shift) in contrast, the fire service has a supervisor (captain) seemingly on every piece of equipment. Then there are the use of incoming resources and the roles of additional responders.

Just my thoughts.


My one and a half cents here:
As noted, there are structural/organizational issues with LE implementing ICS.
Yet, one of my instructors for ICS300 was a Police Captain, who said, essentially, "we use it when it makes sense", and gave examples such as "multiple agencies deploying in remote areas", which we do have plenty of here in Pugetopolis. (Mutual aid agreements are essential here.)

FWIW, when I deployed for Hurricane Sandy, I was not very impressed by the ability of the Feds to implement ICS.

To go along with what Drang posted:

I am a Deputy Sheriff. As Chief Deputy, the only person who has command authority over me is my Sheriff. I am not obligated to follow the orders of the President, the U.S. Attorney General, the Governor of my state, the Commissioner of Public Safety, the Director of the GBI, or the Board of Commissioners in the county where I am employed, and neither is any other Deputy Sheriff in my state.

Whoever wants to can set up all the flippin' ICS they want to, but it doesn't amount to anything unless my Sheriff instructs me or any of his other deputies to adhere to it.

[LHS]

Over the past few years, I've gotten a first-hand look at how two different organizations implemented what was intended to be the same organizational systems, to greatly different results.

About five years ago, the company at which I worked (Let's call it "Company A") got a new CIO. This CIO immediately began to aggressively implement the Information Technology Infrastructure Library across the IT infrastructure organization, without any thought for the subtle nuances of what our company did or the specific political/organizational aspects of the company. It was met with resistance both from within the IT infrastructure organization as well as our primary partners in software development and business units. But the CIO was bound and determined to get his way, and through a system of patronage and outright corruption, shoved his methods into place. For example, he decreed that no work on production systems would be allowed without an approved change ticket, and violating that was a potential fireable offense. That's somewhat harsh, but not overly so by industry standards. The problem was that the change ticket system was completely broken, and the CIO didn't care. He openly admitted that it was completely non-functional, but said it was required anyway. What happened? People stopped doing any work, because anything they did could get them fired. Eventually they got the ticketing system somewhat operational (if you can call it that), and then the CIO dropped a new bombshell: any failed ticket could be retroactively UNauthorized, leaving the implementer subject to being fired as if he'd done the work without approvals. Guess what happened: people just stopped doing tickets. If you could get fired even with authorization, it just made more sense to do the work without any paper trail leading back to you. A few notable incidents of the CIO's yes-men throwing folks under the bus for the managers' mistakes made sure of that. The environment got so bad that I couldn't put up with it any more, and I left for better pastures (though I did elevate bus-dodging to an Olympic-grade art).

When I got to my new job (let's call them Company B), I discovered that Company A's CIO had worked there as a mid-level executive. The entire setup was very similar to the one at Company A, but it WORKED. It worked because it had buy-in from all aspects of the business, it was applied evenly and fairly to everyone rather than just the peons, it took into consideration organizational and business aspects of the environment, and the people involved in implementing it weren't raging kittenholes. Suddenly I saw that the CIO of Company A had been trying to shoehorn Company B's familiar processes into Company A, but didn't understand WHY they had worked there in the first place. He was simply trying to read a script and wondering why it didn't work.

Thus, I no longer blame ITIL in general for the idiocy at Company A, I blame the idiot who had no clue how to be a leader. I later found out he'd done the same thing at another company, and literally ran its IT division into the ground. He and his whole management team got hired on at Company A in the aftermath (which tells you something about Company A's senior leadership), ran Company A's IT into the ground, and then got demoted to some purely symbolic position. Why they didn't fire him, I'll never know. They walked out all his cronies, but he's still there, drawing a paycheck but unable to do any more damage. Maybe he knows where some figurative bodies are buried.

[MDS]

Only in America do kitten universities have full blown police departments with SWAT teams.

I know, right? I friggin LOVE thus country!

[SeriousStudent]

I hate ITIL with the passionate heat of a thousand burning suns. I have three ITIL certifications, and two copies of that stupid yellow and black book. But I hate it more than watered down Scotch, root canals, and Bubba's reloaded ammo put together.

I would be very interested if there is an open-source version of ICS, that could be used for a private business. The organization that I work for does a very good job of crisis management, in my humble opinion. Maybe it's because we get so much practice at it.

But I'd be very appreciative of any recommended book I could buy, that folks might consider a good starting point. We don't shoot folks in the face, we just fix assorted problems that happen with IT geekery.

Thanks very much and I apologize for the sidetrack. (Even though LHS started it.....)

[TheTrevor]

I hate ITIL with the passionate heat of a thousand burning suns. I have three ITIL certifications, and two copies of that stupid yellow and black book. But I hate it more than watered down Scotch, root canals, and Bubba's reloaded ammo put together.

I would be very interested if there is an open-source version of ICS, that could be used for a private business. The organization that I work for does a very good job of crisis management, in my humble opinion. Maybe it's because we get so much practice at it.

But I'd be very appreciative of any recommended book I could buy, that folks might consider a good starting point. We don't shoot folks in the face, we just fix assorted problems that happen with IT geekery.

Thanks very much and I apologize for the sidetrack. (Even though LHS started it.....)

I've both implemented (from time of startup incorporation) and retrofitted ICS in four-nines and five-nines environments. Drop me a PM -- short version is that it's effectively open source because it's promulgated by the Feds, and so there's no book but tons of reference materials available. Glad to answer questions.

[LHS]

I hate ITIL with the passionate heat of a thousand burning suns. I have three ITIL certifications, and two copies of that stupid yellow and black book. But I hate it more than watered down Scotch, root canals, and Bubba's reloaded ammo put together.

I would be very interested if there is an open-source version of ICS, that could be used for a private business. The organization that I work for does a very good job of crisis management, in my humble opinion. Maybe it's because we get so much practice at it.

But I'd be very appreciative of any recommended book I could buy, that folks might consider a good starting point. We don't shoot folks in the face, we just fix assorted problems that happen with IT geekery.

Thanks very much and I apologize for the sidetrack. (Even though LHS started it.....)

I'm automatically suspicious of anyone who praises ITIL, or any other corporate religion, without understanding why it's to be praised. That said, my intent wasn't to sodomize ITIL and/or its adherents (though that's always a fun side-benefit), but rather to point out that even a great system is only as good as the people implementing it. And that's ironic, since systems are meant to reduce the 'human factor' that leads to mistakes and problems. But if you have bad people, they will just use the system to their own benefit and then the system itself becomes a lever to push good folks out. Wow. When you look at it that way, it kind of reminds me of the US government...

[TheTrevor]

Don't leave. I don't have time now, but will share some perspective later this evening. The concepts are good, the implementation is generally what's lacking.

Ken

Fair enough.

[Drang]

I would be very interested if there is an open-source version of ICS, that could be used for a private business.

Are you talking about the Incident Command System, originated by CalFire and adopted by Uncle Sam (FEMA) and mandated for use in disaster/emergency response by any municipal or state government agency desirous of Federal funding? (FEMA Independent Study Program (http://training.fema.gov/IS/))
Or some IT-related thing with the same initials?

[SeriousStudent]

Drang, I'm hoping to learn more about the Incident Command System that you posted links to. Thanks for those, I appreciate it.

I actually was not damning with faint praise. I feel that my org does an excellent job in a crisis, I have seen us pull off some truly amazing things. Part of that is having a very few people at the top who are smart enough to unleash the engineers at the appropriate times. Sadly, it's the daily stuff that we often turn into a flaming bag of poo.

But, we have a new overseer at the plantation, and hope springs eternal. He has this bizarre habit of actually listening to the worker bees, and I might catch him in such a moment of weakness someday. I'd like to be ready for that occasion.

[SeriousStudent]

I've both implemented (from time of startup incorporation) and retrofitted ICS in four-nines and five-nines environments. Drop me a PM -- short version is that it's effectively open source because it's promulgated by the Feds, and so there's no book but tons of reference materials available. Glad to answer questions.

Thank you very much, I'll take you up on that kind offer.

Unfortunately, my immediate supervisor has difficulty counting to just nine, even if he moves his lips and you take off his shoes. Progress is therefore slow.

[LSP552]

The ICS is a framework that works well for some things and less well for others. It originated with the fire service and has become the national standard for emergency response. I’m going to talk in generalities. Certainly there are exceptions to everything.

The key to making ICS work for law enforcement is having the right people in the right place. Like everything else, the right people in the right job leads to success or failure.

I think it’s fair to say that senior fire officials understand fires and fire fighting. That doesn’t always translate well to senior law enforcement officials understand every type of emergency they may be participating with under an ICS. LE ICS can range from protective details, major criminal actions, National Special Security Events, hurricane response, SWAT operations, and the list is almost endless.

As JLW pointed out, ICS generally works fine in a single agency, providing the appropriately trained people staff the key roles. In my old agency, major SWAT events were ICS affairs, but the SWAT LT (Me and others to follow) was the Incident Commander. Having a non-specialized IC over an incident involving specialized operations such as SWAT, Haz-Mat, etc. is, IMO, a road map for disaster. If you don’t understand the business, you can’t make appropriate business decisions, regardless of the business you are in.

The real problems tend to crop up when you have multi-agency Unified Command combined with a rapidly changing or moving situation. While a particular agency might be the lead agency, that doesn’t automatically void an assisting agency’s policies, procedures, responsibilities, etc. The supporting agencies will likely have a command level representative as part of a Unified Command structure. This command by committee can struggle to keep up with a rapidly changing need.

A couple of key points here about many senior officials, generally speaking. Most did not get there by being risk takers and decision makers. They got there by being risk avoiders. There is nothing worse in an emergency that a commander who can’t make a timely decision and who keep their subordinates from making them either.

Right up there with Commanders who can’t make decisions are senior officials who try and micro-manage from a long distance, generally to prevent someone making a decision that might embarrass them. I remember a hostage incident were I was pointedly told by a very senior fed that it would require Wash DC approval for any hostage rescue assault. That was a bit funny because the only tactical assests for 2 days were LSP. I’m not going to talk about procedures, but even an idiot should understand that an emergency response to prevent the immediate killing of hostages wouldn’t work if it takes 10 minutes to initiate. I'm not picking on the feds, there were plenty of long-distance mico-management attempts from Baton Rouge during hurricane Katrina.

It all falls back to putting the right people in the right places. IMO, this is harder to do with LE than the fire service due to the variety of missions and their rapidly changing nature.

Can ICS work? Yes, if done correctly and staffed accordingly it works very well. However, it's not some magical cure all for poor performance.

Ken

[TheTrevor]

As JLW pointed out, ICS generally works fine in a single agency, providing the appropriately trained people staff the key roles. In my old agency, major SWAT events were ICS affairs, but the SWAT LT (Me and others to follow) was the Incident Commander. Having a non-specialized IC over an incident involving specialized operations such as SWAT, Haz-Mat, etc. is, IMO, a road map for disaster. If you don’t understand the business, you can’t make appropriate business decisions, regardless of the business you are in.

The real problems tend to crop up when you have multi-agency Unified Command combined with a rapidly changing or moving situation. While a particular agency might be the lead agency, that doesn’t automatically void an assisting agency’s policies, procedures, responsibilities, etc. The supporting agencies will likely have a command level representative as part of a Unified Command structure. This command by committee can struggle to keep up with a rapidly changing need.

This is a great point. In the mission-critical IT operations context, critical incidents are likely to include teams/departments which may not even share a command structure below the CEO, and in many cases, key teams may be from outside organizations. One of the most important lessons I learned in implementing ICS early on was not only to have a well-defined process for sorting out who should be IC, but also to plan for the need to switch the IC role to other folks on the fly as needed, and how to communicate this effectively to all of the involved teams.

My strong preference has always been to immediately put a hands-on senior director (LT equivalent) in the IC role and then take the command-liaison role myself. The basis for this is that my job is to enable my people to succeed, and it gives me the freedom to go get them whatever they need while they keep their heads in the game. To Ken's point, it also puts me in a position to continuously watch for when immediate action is required to shift the IC role to someone else.

Sometimes (unfortunately) that has meant taking over IC myself, generally when the scope/duration/complexity of a critical incident exceed what one of my guys can handle. Just as frequently, it has meant designating a different person IC because their subject-matter expertise enables them to problem-solve more effectively from the command chair than the initial IC. The sad truth is that political pressure from willfully ignorant exec staff has often driven me to take over IC just to shut up the haters, causing a distorted version of ICS to spring up where I'm the IC but the former IC is still effectively in charge. My inner Viking is generally screaming for blood about the time this happens, but vengeance has to wait until the crisis has passed and we head into post-mortem reviews.


A couple of key points here about many senior officials, generally speaking. Most did not get there by being risk takers and decision makers. They got there by being risk avoiders. There is nothing worse in an emergency that a commander who can’t make a timely decision and who keep their subordinates from making them either.

Right up there with Commanders who can’t make decisions are senior officials who try and micro-manage from a long distance, generally to prevent someone making a decision that might embarrass them. I remember a hostage incident were I was pointedly told by a very senior fed that it would require Wash DC approval for any hostage rescue assault. That was a bit funny because the only tactical assests for 2 days were LSP. I’m not going to talk about procedures, but even an idiot should understand that an emergency response to prevent the immediate killing of hostages wouldn’t work if it takes 10 minutes to initiate. I'm not picking on the feds, there were plenty of long-distance mico-management attempts from Baton Rouge during hurricane Katrina.

Yeah, that sounds painfully familiar. No direct-action options in my world, not in the physical sense at least, but if the actuaries are to be believed regarding the dollar value of human life I've been in situations where we were losing the economic equivalent of a hostage every 8 minutes and accelerating. This tends to bring folks out of the mahogany woodwork with opinions on how you should be dealing with things.

As mentioned above, I figured out early on in adapting ICS to mission-critical IT that one of the most important roles was command liaison, who had to absorb substantial stress from both directions yet still keep things driving forward. If the IC also has to do command liaison work, then their eye is off the ball and they aren't serving their team(s) effectively.


It all falls back to putting the right people in the right places. IMO, this is harder to do with LE than the fire service due to the variety of missions and their rapidly changing nature.

Can ICS work? Yes, if done correctly and staffed accordingly it works very. However, it's not some magical cure all for poor performance.

Ken

Truth.

[LHS]

Yeah, that sounds painfully familiar. No direct-action options in my world, not in the physical sense at least, but if the actuaries are to be believed regarding the dollar value of human life I've been in situations where we were losing the economic equivalent of a hostage every 8 minutes and accelerating. This tends to bring folks out of the mahogany woodwork with opinions on how you should be dealing with things.

As mentioned above, I figured out early on in adapting ICS to mission-critical IT that one of the most important roles was command liaison, who had to absorb substantial stress from both directions yet still keep things driving forward. If the IC also has to do command liaison work, then their eye is off the ball and they aren't serving their team(s) effectively.


So true. I can't count how many emergency bridge calls/techlines I've been on where some VP or another gets on and tries to act like he/she knows what he/she is talking about, constantly wanting 'situation updates', and asking 'how long will it take to get back online?'. The answer to the latter frequently is something along the lines of 'We don't even know what's broken yet, so how can we estimate time to restoration?' I've been the lone tech working on the disaster and still had to fend off the VP's ignorant demands for answers, and it's a hell of a lot less stressful for the tech (and resultingly faster to restore service) when there's an intervening manager who has confidence in their team and can dazzle the higher-ups with bullshit long enough for us to diagnose and fix the problem. Seriously, I look at the moronic deputy chief in Die Hard and see a lot of VPs at places I've worked, they're almost like a walking caricature of that trope.

I'm all for post-mortem evaluations, as they're one of the most effective tools in preventing future incidents, but they have to be done at the right time and in the right way. During the event is not the right time. Having a 'blamestorming session' where management is looking for a whipping boy and everyone is scrambling to avoid getting thrown under the bus is not the right way. And yet... that's what I see all too often.

[Trooper224]

The ICS is a framework that works well for some things and less well for others. It originated with the fire service and has become the national standard for emergency response. I’m going to talk in generalities. Certainly there are exceptions to everything.

The key to making ICS work for law enforcement is having the right people in the right place. Like everything else, the right people in the right job leads to success or failure.

I think it’s fair to say that senior fire officials understand fires and fire fighting. That doesn’t always translate well to senior law enforcement officials understand every type of emergency they may be participating with under an ICS. LE ICS can range from protective details, major criminal actions, National Special Security Events, hurricane response, SWAT operations, and the list is almost endless.

As JLW pointed out, ICS generally works fine in a single agency, providing the appropriately trained people staff the key roles. In my old agency, major SWAT events were ICS affairs, but the SWAT LT (Me and others to follow) was the Incident Commander. Having a non-specialized IC over an incident involving specialized operations such as SWAT, Haz-Mat, etc. is, IMO, a road map for disaster. If you don’t understand the business, you can’t make appropriate business decisions, regardless of the business you are in.

The real problems tend to crop up when you have multi-agency Unified Command combined with a rapidly changing or moving situation. While a particular agency might be the lead agency, that doesn’t automatically void an assisting agency’s policies, procedures, responsibilities, etc. The supporting agencies will likely have a command level representative as part of a Unified Command structure. This command by committee can struggle to keep up with a rapidly changing need.

A couple of key points here about many senior officials, generally speaking. Most did not get there by being risk takers and decision makers. They got there by being risk avoiders. There is nothing worse in an emergency that a commander who can’t make a timely decision and who keep their subordinates from making them either.

Right up there with Commanders who can’t make decisions are senior officials who try and micro-manage from a long distance, generally to prevent someone making a decision that might embarrass them. I remember a hostage incident were I was pointedly told by a very senior fed that it would require Wash DC approval for any hostage rescue assault. That was a bit funny because the only tactical assests for 2 days were LSP. I’m not going to talk about procedures, but even an idiot should understand that an emergency response to prevent the immediate killing of hostages wouldn’t work if it takes 10 minutes to initiate. I'm not picking on the feds, there were plenty of long-distance mico-management attempts from Baton Rouge during hurricane Katrina.

It all falls back to putting the right people in the right places. IMO, this is harder to do with LE than the fire service due to the variety of missions and their rapidly changing nature.

Can ICS work? Yes, if done correctly and staffed accordingly it works very well. However, it's not some magical cure all for poor performance.

Ken

Very, very well said. These are the salient points that outline why ICS is typically doomed to failure in the LE world. At some point it requires those at the top echelon to check their egos and paranoia to risk, get out of the way and let the specialists do their jobs. In more than twenty years in the LE profession I've yet to see this happen.

[LSP972]

I remember a hostage incident were I was pointedly told by a very senior fed that it would require Wash DC approval for any hostage rescue assault. That was a bit funny because the only tactical assests for 2 days were LSP.

No doubt that was the one where, when HRT finally showed up, they locally purchased some... unorthodox... entry tools?:rolleyes:

.

[LSP972]

At some point it requires those at the top echelon to check their egos and paranoia to risk, get out of the way and let the specialists do their jobs. In more than twenty years in the LE profession I've yet to see this happen.

Ken and his successors have made it work for us. Its a bit difficult to argue with positive results... although some tried (and failed).

.

[LSP552]

No doubt that was the one where, when HRT finally showed up, they locally purchased some... unorthodox... entry tools?:rolleyes:

.

That's the one. Unfortunately, Command limitations often drive mission tools and procedures.

Ken

[LSP552]

As mentioned above, I figured out early on in adapting ICS to mission-critical IT that one of the most important roles was command liaison, who had to absorb substantial stress from both directions yet still keep things driving forward. If the IC also has to do command liaison work, then their eye is off the ball and they aren't serving their team(s) effectively.



I agree that coordination and liaison between the various organizational/response groups is critical or you end up with an uncoordinated gaggle instead of a unified response. Another critical piece in the public safety arena is the elected leadership and their expectations. With one exception (Sheriffs where they have a LE role instead of jail only), chief law enfacement executives have a boss; major, governor, city/county manager, etc. If the incident is big enough, or newsworthy enough, the elected leadership will play a role, and they should. How well that integrates into ICS depends highly on PRIOR training and participation in exercises and established policies and procedures. Everyone has a valuable role at a major incident. The time to clarify those roles and expectations is well in advance.

IMO, one of the most important things for the IC to do is command liaison if we are talking about the public safety side with elected government leadership. Its very easy for the IC to get bogged down on the operational side, been there done that. But, if the IC doesn't "feed the beast" by providing information to the elected leadership, things won't end well. Naturally, this is scalable and most LE incidents are actually pretty simple in comparison to a major disaster or terrorist event.

Ken

[Trooper224]

Ken and his successors have made it work for us. Its a bit difficult to argue with positive results... although some tried (and failed).

.

That's good to hear. Unfortunately, my agency is too driven by cronyism and ego at the upper echelon. When things go smoothly it's because we've handled them quickly, before the pencil necks in the glass palace can get involved.

[SeriousStudent]

This is a very interesting and valuable discussion. I really do appreciate all the input and ideas, it's quite useful.

In my organization, I frequently find myself in the role of "command liaison" so my minions may achieve resolution. Sometimes I do put on my cape and boots and "do the needful" in order to fix the issue. But most often, I am answering the questions "Are were there yet?" "How much further?" And "Can I go pee?"

Question for all the respondents: Do you find it helpful or even mandatory to rigorously separate the communications channels? So that the geeks or face shooters are spared the mindless prattling of higher headquarters? I have lately taken to insisting on a pair of bridge calls. One is an open communications path (usually Microsoft Lync) where the worker bees can share data, voice and video to resolve the issue. Then I have a completely different voice bridge call for the Exalted Ones to call in with assorted orders, inquiries and demands. I handle the funneling of data between the two groups, so that both may focus on their respective tasks.

Does that follow the best practices you folks use?

Again, thanks very much for the information and resources, this is a fascinating discussion. I much appreciate everyone's time and input.

[TheTrevor]

Question for all the respondents: Do you find it helpful or even mandatory to rigorously separate the communications channels? So that the geeks or face shooters are spared the mindless prattling of higher headquarters? I have lately taken to insisting on a pair of bridge calls. One is an open communications path (usually Microsoft Lync) where the worker bees can share data, voice and video to resolve the issue. Then I have a completely different voice bridge call for the Exalted Ones to call in with assorted orders, inquiries and demands. I handle the funneling of data between the two groups, so that both may focus on their respective tasks.

Does that follow the best practices you folks use?

Yes, separation is absolutely something to maintain if possible. I'm generally the exec-level command liaison (being an exec-leadership type myself, though I still push my people to bring me the really hard problems for help/coaching) as well as the person who led design of the processes in the first place. I will not infrequently have four or more group-comms channels open:

* Voice bridge for team leads
* Multiple IM/chat channels (sometimes for large & busy individual teams that would overwhelm a shared channel; more often a single shared cross-functional channel)
* Voice bridge for outside vendor(s)
* Email updates and/or voice bridge for command liaison; sometimes supplemented with SMS text blasts to small groups of key command staff, especially during sleep hours

The majority of the public-safety crisis management types I've worked with, wearing my "mobile device/service product designer" hat, utilize similar communications practices and approaches. The text-messaging channel, and in particular the ability to form ad-hoc groups for shared discussion, is getting a lot of attention these days.

I'll also re-emphasize that, if at all possible, it's best to separate command liaison (CL) role from the IC role. I joke that I speak about a dozen languages all based on English: I speak Sales, Marketing, Finance, CEO, Public Relations, Systems, Network, DBA, Engineering Manager, Engineer, etc etc. Having a talented power broker (aka social engineer/PsyOps manager) in the CL role can make or break the ability to effectively support both the operational teams and the command staff during a crisis.

[TheTrevor]

I agree that coordination and liaison between the various organizational/response groups is critical or you end up with an uncoordinated gaggle instead of a unified response. Another critical piece in the public safety arena is the elected leadership and their expectations. With one exception (Sheriffs where they have a LE role instead of jail only), chief law enfacement executives have a boss; major, governor, city/county manager, etc. If the incident is big enough, or newsworthy enough, the elected leadership will play a role, and they should. How well that integrates into ICS depends highly on PRIOR training and participation in exercises and established policies and procedures. Everyone has a valuable role at a major incident. The time to clarify those roles and expectations is well in advance.

This is an area where I've not invested as much time as I should have in the past, instead relying on my own power base and force of personality to carry the day. After some scar tissue acquired during retrofits of actual crisis-management process to existing half-kittened organizations, I've definitely learned to deliver an expectation-settings briefing AND schedule a well-run training exercise for exec leadership ASAP after getting everyone on board with the ICS approach.

I've also found this to be an excellent opportunity to identify people who are likely to be passive roadblocks or active bad actors during a crisis. At one particular company, the VP of the professional services team pretty quickly emerged as an internal enemy who, for reasons only known to him, would seize any opportunity to make the hands-on teams look bad. Much easier to deal with jackwagons like that if you have a read on them ahead of time.


IMO, one of the most important things for the IC to do is command liaison if we are talking about the public safety side with elected government leadership. Its very easy for the IC to get bogged down on the operational side, been there done that. But, if the IC doesn't "feed the beast" by providing information to the elected leadership, things won't end well. Naturally, this is scalable and most LE incidents are actually pretty simple in comparison to a major disaster or terrorist event.

Ken, I find it interesting that you collapse the IC and CL roles into one, where I prefer to separate them. In both my direct experience and from discussing crises at other organizations post-mortem, separation of those two roles has demonstrated significant benefit. The caveat, of course, is that those two staff have to work VERY well together, with a strong trust-based professional relationship. Have you found it to be more effective in your scenarios to have the IC also cover CL?

[LHS]

This is a very interesting and valuable discussion. I really do appreciate all the input and ideas, it's quite useful.

In my organization, I frequently find myself in the role of "command liaison" so my minions may achieve resolution. Sometimes I do put on my cape and boots and "do the needful" in order to fix the issue. But most often, I am answering the questions "Are were there yet?" "How much further?" And "Can I go pee?"

Question for all the respondents: Do you find it helpful or even mandatory to rigorously separate the communications channels? So that the geeks or face shooters are spared the mindless prattling of higher headquarters? I have lately taken to insisting on a pair of bridge calls. One is an open communications path (usually Microsoft Lync) where the worker bees can share data, voice and video to resolve the issue. Then I have a completely different voice bridge call for the Exalted Ones to call in with assorted orders, inquiries and demands. I handle the funneling of data between the two groups, so that both may focus on their respective tasks.

Does that follow the best practices you folks use?

Again, thanks very much for the information and resources, this is a fascinating discussion. I much appreciate everyone's time and input.

A thousand times this. I can't count how many times I've been on a bridge call with VPs freaking out, while the techs work out all the necessary issues via a private IM session, complete with screen sharing as necessary.

I'm a firm believer in letting the folks on the ground do what needs to be done to restore service, as they are the ones who likely understand the actual issues. The higher-echelon folks can give info about systemic problems outside the techs' immediate area, and run interference with the executives, but otherwise I prefer they stay out of the direct fray. As for the executives themselves, during the event itself I prefer to treat them like mushrooms. Most of them don't understand the technology anyway, and will just screw things up if they get to thinking too hard. It's bad enough when they come back from some conference all excited about an article they read (but didn't comprehend) in a tech magazine. Having them try to offer 'advice' in real-time only hinders resolution.

[TheTrevor]

Kitten it all, it's too late to edit out the references to the fact that I'm in exec leadership. At least I can console myself with the knowledge that I'm nothing like the lead-by-distraction types that LHS describes...

But yeah, what he said.

[LSP552]

This is a very interesting and valuable discussion. I really do appreciate all the input and ideas, it's quite useful.

In my organization, I frequently find myself in the role of "command liaison" so my minions may achieve resolution. Sometimes I do put on my cape and boots and "do the needful" in order to fix the issue. But most often, I am answering the questions "Are were there yet?" "How much further?" And "Can I go pee?"

Question for all the respondents: Do you find it helpful or even mandatory to rigorously separate the communications channels? So that the geeks or face shooters are spared the mindless prattling of higher headquarters? I have lately taken to insisting on a pair of bridge calls. One is an open communications path (usually Microsoft Lync) where the worker bees can share data, voice and video to resolve the issue. Then I have a completely different voice bridge call for the Exalted Ones to call in with assorted orders, inquiries and demands. I handle the funneling of data between the two groups, so that both may focus on their respective tasks.

Does that follow the best practices you folks use?

Again, thanks very much for the information and resources, this is a fascinating discussion. I much appreciate everyone's time and input.

The communications plan is a critical part of any emergency response. Like everything else, size and complexity will drive your needs. Critical Operations requiring instant communication priority, such SWAT operations, should have their own frequency. Otherwise someone will be asking where to deliver the donuts and tying up the channel at the worst possible time.

I've been out of the business too long to be current on specific technologies/programs.

Ken

[LSP552]

Ken, I find it interesting that you collapse the IC and CL roles into one, where I prefer to separate them. In both my direct experience and from discussing crises at other organizations post-mortem, separation of those two roles has demonstrated significant benefit. The caveat, of course, is that those two staff have to work VERY well together, with a strong trust-based professional relationship. Have you found it to be more effective in your scenarios to have the IC also cover CL?

TheTrevor,

I think it's all about the senior command/political leadership expectations, which will vary by location and even event. Lots of information can be disseminated via technical means if that's what the leadership will accept. It's been my experience that they usually still want to talk to the person in change, or their boss. My favorite saying is it depends on the size, nature and complexity of the event, and they are all unique in some way. If it's large enough, you will be probably be conducting regularly scheduled briefing sessions for political leaders.

Unfortunately, it's been my experience that the more complex the emergency, the greater the tendency by command to focus too heavily on the operational side. The larger the event, the greater role political liaison and logistics will play. There is a limit to the situational awareness an IC can maintain in a complex event. The key is knowing what you have to personally touch. There should be an Operations Chief/Operations Officer to focus on the details.

I personally think Army Battalion Staff model as outlined in Army FM101-5, Staff Organization and Operations is a better format for LE that the fire service based ICS. I know that's a moot point, just my opinion.

http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/FM-101-5_staff_organization_and_operations.pdf

Enjoyed the discussion, but I'm out of my element when you guys start talking IT stuff.

Ken

[SeriousStudent]

Ken, I appreciate you sharing your insight a great deal. I think there are a lot of applicable lessons, from the work you and your predecessors did.

The stakes are obviously smaller with us geeks - millions/billions of dollars, contrasted with human lives. But leading the teams to a successful conclusion may require similar methods.

Thank you for the link to the Army manual. It's interesting that a lot of the stuff I learned 30 years ago as a Misguided Child still comes in handy - commander's intent, warning orders, etc. I just use different words now. :cool:

And regarding the senior executive level, I find they often can be useful when handled appropriately. You have to give them something to do, that is meaningful, and gives them a task that makes them feel like they contributed. Often, I have them go wave their Vice-President's badge in a vendor's face, to speed something up. It makes them feel needed. Much like you LEO folks have personal relationships that pay off, it's frequently the same thing with us nerds. You gents may have been classmates at the FBI National Academy, or attended a SWAT conference together. It's much the same with us, and pays off big time when my CIO can "call sum dood's cell" at Microsoft, Dell, HP or Oracle.

"Jimmy, put that server on the first thing smoking, and get it to our data center right now. I owe you".

I hope that you folks in law enforcement have a similiar ability, with the same level of friends.

It also makes the "autopsy" a lot easier. We do a very detailed hot wash within 24 hours (people have to sleep), and I have found that fewer heads roll needlessly when His Immenseness was able to "lend a hand". The trick is the right hand at the right time, much like you discussed earlier.

Lots of "gerbil voodoo" and managing your boss going on. That likely sounds very familiar.

Thank you again, my brain is going to eventually coagulate this into a proposal, and I'll use it to make my organization better. We are already quite good, but I always wish for us to be better.

Thanks, and stay safe.

[Glenn E. Meyer]

Here's a follow-up take on the NBC/Boston analysis. Take away points concerned the massive response and perhaps violations of civil liberties with the lock down as well as the shooting procedures.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/22/the-police-response-to-the-boston-marathon-bombing/?hpid=z3

[Alpha Sierra]

"perhaps" violation of civil rights?

If someone even entertains the question of whether the constitutional rights of citizens were violated in that incident, we have a big problem.

[GardoneVT]

"perhaps" violation of civil rights?

Indeed. That looked like "Martial Law" to me.

Can we get a professional opinion on why Bostons' city government felt the need to go full- Soviet Union to hunt down two guys?

[Alpha Sierra]

Indeed. That looked like "Martial Law" to me.

Can we get a professional opinion on why Bostons' city government felt the need to go full- Soviet Union to hunt down two guys?
There is no need for professional opinion. The government of the city of Boston has had a long history of pissing over people's rights in the name of "law and order". Not unlike NYC, come to think of it.

[tanner]

I wasn't there, but I do have family in Boston. The way I understood it was that the "lockdown" wasn't enforced by law, they asked the citizenry to stay home and by and large they did.

None of the lockdown business started until after the shooting of the officer, a day or two after the bombing. None of that happened until they were in active pursuit of the terrorist suspects. Once they lost contact with the one suspect, they set up a perimeter and began searching.

If you look at the "lockdown" simply as a larger than normal perimeter set up for a fleeing suspect, it wasn't that different from perimeters that are set up every day in this country other than the scope and scrutiny of the deal.

I'm just a run of the mill suburban patrol Sergeant, but I have done everything those officers did, from when they lost sight of the bad guy right up to the point where they shot the dude in the boat.

Well, I usually don't wear full military battle rattle and point my rifle at citizens as much as they seemed to, but then again nobody has ever thrown a bomb at me either. I have had occasion to knock on doors and ask to search homes looking for various kinds of bad people. I have gone through yards and searched for hours on end.

[tanner]

On second thought, I take that back. They did ask people to stay home before the officer was shot. I remember because my bro-in-law and sis-in-law both disregarded the "lockdown". Sis-in-law was at her office which was just 2 blocks away from where the officer was shot and I remember the wife being mad at her for not heeding the advice.

Neither of them, however, were arrested for being out on the streets when they were asked to stay home.

[KevinB]

There is no need for professional opinion. The government of the city of Boston has had a long history of pissing over people's rights in the name of "law and order". Not unlike NYC, come to think of it.

Being from Ohio are you familiar with Terry stop criteria? USSC has upheld that short duration restraint of persons is constitutional.
By looking at the larger picture the "lock down" was in the interest of public peace and security.

I'd argue that the Manhunt and actions during the search for Chris Donner was much more intrusive.


I have family in Boston -- yeah they where not impressed, but more so by the State's Gun Laws effectively leaving them defenseless while stuck at home.

[Coyotesfan97]

The average K9 handler could have set a better perimeter and managed the search better then whoever was in charge in Boston. When the suspect fled from the stolen SUV they set a three block perimeter. This was the most wanted person on the planet on that day and they set a three block perimeter. I've searched for beer theft suspects in a three block perimeter. The more the suspect is wanted the bigger it should be. It expanded to twenty blocks but that was many hours into the search.

I just attended some training in apprehending fleeing suspects and this was debriefed. There was little command and control of the search. SWAT teams were showing up in buses and freelancing where they searched. The search grid wasn't managed. Areas that had been searched weren't marked down.

I'm just taking the instructor's word but he told us the difference between an east coast perimeter and a west coast perimeter is huge. The suspect wasn't locked down and was able to move almost twenty blocks. The instructor talked to the Mass. State Police air crew for the helicopter used in the search. They were divided on whether the boat where the suspect was found was inside or outside of the perimeter. It shouldn't have been a question. There should've been a clear line of high profile squad cars marking the edges of it.

It shocks me but K9 teams weren't used in the search. There were maybe 2-3 dog teams used but they jumped in. Command didn't use K9. You don't use the resource that is trained to search and find fleeing/hiding suspects? Amazing! Each SWAT element should have had a dog team with them.

Frankly from what Ive seen and heard the average K9 handler could have set up a better perimeter and search pattern then the "command" in Boston.

[KevinB]

Mismanagement on a ton of levels...

I often look at events from a more military perspective - but the cordon zone (okay we can call it a perimeter) needs to be set early and solid.
CONUS you don't really need an outer cordon - but we may find a time where there are needed.

The Incident Commander needs to be on site and controlling the scene -- a few LO's can deal with the higher brass and the political ramifications.

From what I see in LE, is the pre deployment planning is miserable or non-existent -- a quick map recce and frag O can get pertinent personnel immediately switch on to the ground needs.
Everyone on the cordon needs to know the boundaries and the responsibilities of the cordon team. In a city - the cordons are very easy to set boundaries on it due to streets -- clear them, and control entry/egress.

Air Assets need to be controlled to offer the most good.
Entry/Search Teams inside the cordon need to be systematically deployed and movements controlled to ensure that the targets do not escape.

I'm pretty sure my 4year old could have given them a run for their money.

[Coyotesfan97]

Kevin I think our terms are different but the end results would be pretty similar. .

I don't know if Boston has CAD mapping in their DXTs but I've set perimeters off my computer map driving to a search.


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